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ABSTRACTS

The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics

By G. H. SNYDER

The concept of the "security dilemma" is applied to alliance relations in multipolar and bipolar systems. The dilemma involves a choice between support or nonsupport of allies, and tension between fears of entrapment and abandonment. It interacts with the adversary security dilemma in which the choice is between firmness and conciliation toward the opponent. The multipolar interaction is illustrated by a survey of the 1904-1914 period, the bipolar by reference to the contemporary crisis in NATO. The alliance security dilemma is more severe, and places more constraints on allies' policies toward adversaries, in multipolar than in bipolar alliances. The weakness of the dilemma in the contemporary system is a major reason for the current persistence of conflict in NATO.

What Makes Deterrence Work?
cases from 1900 to 1980

By P. HUTH and B. RUSSETT

The article develops an expected-utility model of extended deterrence and tests it on 54 historical cases. Successful deterrence is associated with close economic and political ties between the defender and the state it is trying to protect, and with a local military balance in favor of the defender. Deterrence success is not systematically associated with the presence of a military alliance, with the overall strategic military balance, with possession of nuclear weapons, or with the defender's firmness or lack of it in previous crises. If deterrence fails, only alliance and the military value of the state under attack are associated with the defender's willingness to go to war.

Taking the Bishops Seriously

By S. M. OKIN

The U.S. Catholic bishops' pastoral letter on war and peace argues that nuclear deterrence is conditionally morally acceptable. Their concluding message is therefore not an exhortation to nuclear pacifism. The author argues, first, that the bishops' conditional moral acceptance of deterrence does not follow from their premises and the evidence presented to them; second, that this justification of deterrence, even if consistently arrived at, does not sanction current U.S. deterrence policy; third, that the conditions the bishops place on deterrence are incompatible with the type of deterrence they attempt to justify; and fourth, that there is no serious attempt currently being made to meet these conditions. The moral obligation that follows for those who take the bishops' principles seriously is nuclear conscientious objection.

Ethnonationalism and Political Stability:
the soviet case

By G. W. LAPIDUS

While the Soviet system has demonstrated an unusual degree of immunity to the world-wide upsurge of ethnic self-assertion, rising national consciousness among both Russian and non-Russian populations poses a growing, although not necessarily unmanageable, problem for the Soviet leadership. Several issues bearing directly on the resources, power, and status of different nationalities lie at the heart of current debates: the nature and future of the federal system; the pace and pattern of economic development; access to positions of political power; demographic policy; and cultural and linguistic status. Over the long term, the political mobilization of ethnicity is likely to be constrained by both intrinsic and systemic factors, encouraging national elites to focus on strategies and goals that will enhance their power within the system rather than challenging it directly.

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Moral Membership in a Postliberal State

By N. L. ROSENBLUM

This review article interprets Michael Walzer's *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* as a radical argument for community. It demonstrates the continuity between this volume, in which the particular community and its own moral understanding is the foundation of justice, and Walzer's study of international relations in terms of universal human rights in *Just and Unjust Wars*. It questions the appropriateness of Walzer's conception of community, of membership, and of shared moral understanding for heterogeneous and differentiated modern societies, and in particular for the United States. It defends liberalism, with its indirect market relations and legal formalism, against Walzer's communitarian challenge, with its substantive agreement among members about the meaning, value, and distribution of goods.

Why the Soviets Buy the Weapons They Do

By M. A. EVANGELISTA

The authors of three recent books attempt to account for Soviet military developments by exploring a wide range of possible explanations. In *Soviet Strategic Forces*, Berman and Baker adopt a "requirements" approach; they argue that the Soviet strategic posture has developed mainly in response to threats generated by the West. Andrew Cockburn, in *The Threat*, maintains that internal factors—in particular, bureaucratic politics and the workings of the military-industrial complex—are responsible for Soviet weapons decisions. David Holloway's more eclectic explanation, in *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race*, describes both the internal and external determinants of Soviet military policy. The evolution of Soviet regional nuclear policy, and particularly the deployment of the SS-20 missile, can be accounted for by several different explanations—indicating a problem of overdetermination of causes. One way to resolve this problem is by adopting a framework developed by James Kurth to explain U.S. weapons procurement. It suggests that the "modes of causation" for Soviet weapons decisions are generally the opposite of those for American decisions. This generalization is consistent with what an analysis based on the relative strengths of state and societal forces in the two countries would predict.

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THE SECURITY DILEMMA IN ALLIANCE POLITICS

By GLENN H. SNYDER*

The Security Dilemma

A CENTRAL concept in international relations theory, but still one of the most under-studied empirically, is that of the "security dilemma."[1] The term is generally used to denote the self-defeating aspect of the quest for security in an anarchic system. The theory says that even when no state has any desire to attack others, none can be sure that others' intentions are peaceful, or will remain so; hence each must accumulate power for defense. Since no state can know that the power accumulation of others is defensively motivated only, each must assume that it might be intended for attack. Consequently, each party's power increments are matched by the others, and all wind up with no more security than when the vicious cycle began, along with the costs incurred in having acquired and having to maintain their power.

States accumulate power in many ways; the most prominent methods are by armament, territorial aggrandizement, and alliance formation. The "supergame" of international security may thus be divided, for analytical purposes, into three subgames: the armaments game, the adversary game, and the alliance game. Typically, discussions of the security dilemma are illustrated by the armaments game: the arms race is seen as the epitome of competition for illusory security. Sometimes, at least implicitly, the security dilemma is seen operating in the adversary game (competition other than armaments), as in explanations that ascribe the cold war to the United States and the Soviet Union misperceiving each other's "defensive" actions in Europe as "aggressive." Little attention has so far been paid to the security dilemma dynamics of the alliance game. The present essay is intended to fill this gap, and to explore some

* I wish to thank Robert Art, David Goldfischer, Robert Jervis, Robert Osgood, Dean Pruitt, Jack Snyder, and Kenneth Waltz, for helpful comments; and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, for financial support and office space.

[1] The best recent treatment is Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978), 167-214. The concept of the security dilemma was originated by John Herz, in his *Political Realism and Political Idealism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951).

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interactions between the alliance game and the adversary game in multipolar and bipolar systems.

Alliance Formation in a Multipolar System: The Primary Alliance Dilemma

The security dilemma in the alliance game has two phases: primary and secondary. The primary phase occurs during the process of alliance formation, the secondary one after alliances have formed.

In a multipolar system (such as the one that existed before 1945), the primary alliance dilemma among the major states follows the logic of an N-person prisoner's dilemma. Each state has two options: seek allies or abstain from alliances. If all states are about equally strong and are interested only in security, all are fairly well off if all abstain, since each has moderate security against individual others, while alliances involve various costs, such as reduced freedom of action, commitments to defend the interests of others, and so forth. Alliances will form, however, for two reasons: (1) some states may not be satisfied with only moderate security, and they can increase it substantially by allying if others abstain; (2) some states, fearing that others will not abstain, will ally in order to avoid isolation or to preclude the partner from allying against them. Once an alliance forms, a counter-alliance necessarily follows, since there is no way of knowing that the first alliance is intended only for defensive purposes. The eventual result is the division of the system into two rival coalitions. This outcome is worse than all-around abstention because each state has incurred the risks and burdens of alliance with little improvement in its security.[2]

Figure 1 portrays the primary alliance security dilemma. Although it is cast in two-person form, it is understood that for player A, the other player, B, means "all other players," and vice versa. The numbers in the cells are ordinal, ranked from 4 (best) to 1 (worst). The first number in each cell represents A's payoff, the second B's. The logical

[2] This is, of course, an idealized model based on certain assumptions from which the empirical world will deviate more or less, from time to time. The basic assumptions are that: (1) no state is aggressive, but none can know the intentions of others; (2) the states are roughly equal in military strength; and (3) military technology is such that there is no time to form a successful defense alliance after war begins. Uncertainty about the aims of others is inherent in structural anarchy. If a state clearly reveals itself as expansionist, however, the alliance that forms against it is not "self-defeating" as in the prisoners' dilemma (security dilemma) model. Or, if some states are weaker than others, their motives to ally will be different from the incentives of the prisoner's dilemma. The third assumption has been valid since about 1870. Before then (when the pace of warfare was slower), the compulsion to ally in peacetime was much weaker than suggested by the model. Despite these qualifications and possibly others, the model does capture some essential dynamics of multipolar alliance formation between 1870 and 1939.

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FIGURE 1
THE PRIMARY ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA

A \ B	ABSTAIN	ALLY
ABSTAIN	All-around abstention 3, 3	B's coalition forms A isolated 1, 4
ALLY	A's coalition forms B isolated 4, 1	Two rival coalitions 2, 2

outcome, two rival coalitions, is the second-worst for all players. The best, forming an alliance while others do not, and the second-best, all-around abstention, cannot be obtained, primarily because of uncertainty about the intentions of others and the overwhelming need to guard against the worst outcome, that of isolation.

This model predicts only that alliances will form. It does not predict who will align with whom, or how the benefits, risks, and costs of an alliance will be divided among its members. These matters theoretically are decided by a process of bargaining in which the states compete in offering each other attractive shares of the alliance's "payoff." Each state has two principal aims in the bargaining: to be in the most powerful coalition, and to maximize its share of the alliance's net benefits.[3] These are the "interests" of the state in the alliance game. If these were the only interests at stake, the alliance bargaining process would be completely indeterminate—that is, each state would be equally eligible as the ally or the adversary of every other state.

In the real world, however, the indeterminacy is reduced, though not eliminated, by other interests, which exist apart from the alliance game and which predispose states to align with certain others and against

[3] "Being in" the most powerful coalition does not necessarily mean that states join the most powerful coalition that is already in existence. Indeed, they will more likely join the weaker one which then becomes the most powerful as a consequence of their joining, because this gives them leverage to bargain for a maximum share of the alliance's payoff. Thus the logic of N-person game theory is consistent with Waltz's argument that states "balance" rather than "bandwagon." See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1979), 125-26.

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others. Here we must distinguish between "general" and "particular" interests. General interests stem from the anarchic structure of the system and the geographic position of the state. They include, for instance, a state's interest in defending a close neighbor, or in expansion to enhance its security, or even more generally, in preserving a balance of power in the system. Typical examples of general interests would be England's traditional interest in preserving the independence of the Low Countries and in maintaining a balance of power on the Continent. Such interests are "general" because they do not involve conflicts over specific issues with specific other states, but will be defended or acted upon against all comers. Since they are valued chiefly for their power and security content, I will occasionally refer to them as "strategic" interests. Such general strategic interests introduce only a modest amount of determinacy into the basic N-person model.

The indeterminacy is further reduced by the "particular" interests of states, which bring them into conflict or affinity with specific other states. These conflicts and commonalities may have some power content or they may stem from ideological, ethnic, economic, or prestige values. The Franco-English conflicts over Egypt in the 19th century and the Austro-German ethnic affinity are examples.

Particular conflicts or affinities of interest establish a tacit pattern of alignment, prior to or apart from any overt alliance negotiations. That is, states will expect to be supported in some degree by those with whom they share interests and to be opposed by those with whom they are in conflict. To illustrate: in the decade of the 1870s, Germany had a serious conflict with France over Alsace-Lorraine, but no significant conflicts with any of the other major powers. Russia had conflicts with Austria over the Balkans, and with England over the Straits question and colonial issues from the Middle East to China. England was on good terms with Germany, Austria, and Italy, but was in conflict with Russia and France over colonial issues. Italy had territorial conflicts with Austria in Europe and with France in Africa. The autocratic governments of Germany, Russia, and Austria stood on ideological common ground, but were ideologically antagonistic toward the three Western democracies. The alignments implied by these conflicts and affinities were: (1) on grounds of territorial interest: England and Austria versus Russia; England, Germany, and Italy versus France; and France and Russia versus England; (2) on ideological grounds: Germany, Austria, and Russia versus England, France, and Italy.

Such conflicts and alignments of interest and ideology establish a

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background of relationships against which the overt alliance bargaining process takes place, and which affect that process considerably, predisposing the system toward certain alliances and against others. These relationships may foreclose some combinations if the conflict is severe enough; in other cases, the absence of conflict between some pairs may make them natural allies. More likely, however, these conflicts and affinities will narrow the range of indeterminacy rather than eliminate it. Natural partners may fail to ally because one of them overestimates the other's conflicts with third parties and tries to drive too hard a bargain, as Germany did in negotiations with England in 1899 and 1901. And natural opponents may be able to overcome their conflicts, as France and England did in 1904. Technically, conflicts and commonalities of particular interest enter into the bargaining process by reducing or increasing the total value, or "payoff," of certain alliances, thus reducing or increasing the likelihood that they will form. For example, a state with which one has a conflict will appear as a more likely opponent in war than other states; hence, an alliance *against* it will yield greater value than an alliance *with* it; the latter would require a prior settlement of the conflict, incurring costs in the form of compromised interests.

Thus, although an alliance between France and Germany was not logically out of the question between 1870 and 1914, it was extremely unlikely: it required a settlement of the Alsace-Lorraine issue, a compromise that would have cost one or both parties too much compared to the deals they could negotiate with others. France could get Russia as a partner at the minor cost of swallowing some ideological repugnance, and she could get England by giving up a position in Egypt that was valuable only for prestige reasons and could hardly be maintained for long.

The choice of allies is also influenced by the internal political configurations of states apart from the general ideological preferences just mentioned. For example, the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 probably would not have occurred, and certainly would not have developed so soon into a quasi-alliance against Germany, if the Radical rather than the Imperialist wing of the British Liberal party had been in charge of the foreign policy making posts in the Cabinet.

To summarize: in a multipolar system there is a general incentive to ally with *some* other state or states, following the logic of the N-person prisoner's dilemma, or security dilemma, that is generated by the structure of the system. Who aligns with whom results from a bargaining process that is theoretically indeterminate. The indeterminacy is reduced,

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though not eliminated, by the prior interests, conflicts, and affinities between states and their internal political make-up.[4]

After Alignments Form: the secondary alliance dilemma

Once alliances have begun to form, the alliance security dilemma takes on a different character. That is, having already "defected" in the primary dilemma by choosing to make alliances, states move into the second phase of the alliance dilemma, in which their choices are no longer whether to ally or not, but how firmly to commit themselves to the proto-partner and how much support to give that partner in specific conflict interactions with the adversary. The horns of this secondary dilemma may be described by the traditional labels "cooperate" (C) and "defect" (D), where cooperation means a strong general commitment and full support in specific adversary conflicts, and defection means a weak commitment and no support in conflicts with the adversary. The secondary alliance dilemma may or may not be a prisoner's dilemma. (Henceforth in this discussion, the terms "alliance game" and "dilemma" will refer to the secondary game rather than the primary one.)

Each horn of the dilemma has both prospective good and prospective bad consequences; and the "goods" and "bads" for each alternative tend to be the obverse of those of the other. In the alliance security dilemma, the principal "bads" are "abandonment" and "entrapment," and the principal "goods" are a reduction in the risks of being abandoned or entrapped by the ally.[5]

In a multipolar system, alliances are never absolutely firm, whatever the text of the written agreement; therefore, the fear of being abandoned by one's ally is ever-present. Abandonment, in general, is "defection," but it may take a variety of specific forms: the ally may realign with the opponent; he may merely de-align, abrogating the alliance contract; he may fail to make good on his explicit commitments; or he may fail to provide support in contingencies where support is expected. (In both of the latter two variants, the alliance remains intact, but the expectations of support which underlie it are weakened.) Suspicion that the ally is

[4] Despite the importance of internal politics, this reference will be the only one in this essay. For reasons of theoretical parsimony and space limitations, the analysis is based entirely on what in recently popular academic terminology is called the "rational actor model," the actors being states.

[5] The concepts of abandonment and entrapment were first posited, I believe, by Michael Mandelbaum, in *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), chap. 6.

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considering realignment may generate an incentive to realign preemptively.

Entrapment means being dragged into a conflict over an ally's interests that one does not share, or shares only partially. The interests of allies are generally not identical; to the extent they are shared, they may be valued in different degree. Entrapment occurs when one values the preservation of the alliance more than the cost of fighting for the ally's interests. It is more likely to occur if the ally becomes intransigent in disputes with opponents because of his confidence in one's support. Thus, the greater one's dependence on the alliance and the stronger one's commitment to the ally, the higher the risk of entrapment. The risk also varies with the ally's inherent degree of recklessness or aggressiveness.

The risks of abandonment and entrapment tend to vary inversely: reducing one tends to increase the other. Thus a "C" strategy of strong commitment to an ally reduces the risk of abandonment by reducing *his* fear of abandonment; he is discouraged from defecting by his confidence in one's support. But this very support may encourage him to excessive boldness in disputes or crises with the adversary, thus exposing one to the risk of a war that one would not wish to fight. Conversely, a "D" strategy of weak or vague commitment, or a record of failing to support the ally in specific conflicts, tends to restrain the ally and to reduce the risk of entrapment; but it also increases the risk of abandonment by casting doubt on one's loyalty, hence devaluing the alliance for the ally. Thus, the resolution of the alliance security dilemma—the choice of strategy—requires chiefly a comparison and trade-off between the costs and risks of abandonment and entrapment.

There are certain other "goods" and "bads" that enter into the alliance security dilemma. A strategy of strong commitment and support will have the undesired effect of reducing one's bargaining leverage over the ally. If he knows he can count on being supported, he is less influenceable. Conversely, bargaining power over the ally is enhanced to the extent he doubts one's commitment because one can then make credible threats of nonsupport. Alliance bargaining considerations thus tend to favor a strategy of weak or ambiguous commitment—a "D" strategy in the alliance game. (Note that the opposite is the case in the adversary game where firm commitments to defend one's interests tend to strengthen bargaining power vis-à-vis the opponent.)

Another negative effect of strong commitment is that it tends to foreclose one's own options of realignment. Despite the general com-

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pulsion to align in a multipolar system, states usually want to keep their commitments tentative or vague as long as possible—both to preserve opportunities for shifting partners in case the present one turns out to be unsatisfactory and to maximize bargaining leverage over the current partner by showing that they have alternatives. A strategy of weak commitment has the desirable effect of keeping alignment options open.

Finally, a strong commitment to the ally tends to solidify the adversary alliance by increasing the degree of threat to it. A weak or tentative commitment reduces this effect and may even weaken or divide the opposing alliance by preserving, for states in that alliance, the apparent option of realigning with oneself.

INTERACTION BETWEEN ALLIANCE AND ADVERSARY GAMES

Up to now, I have been discussing the alliance game or dilemma more or less independently of adversaries. But allies are dealing with their adversaries at the same time they are dealing with each other. The alliance and adversary games proceed simultaneously and complement each other in various ways. Strategies and tactics in the alliance game will have direct effects in that game, but also side-effects in the adversary game—and vice versa. Strategy choices in either game must therefore take account of both kinds of effects.

Table 1 presents a composite security dilemma that combines the two games. Each of the strategy pairs, I and II, shows an alliance strategy, together with its complementary strategy in the adversary game. (The cooperative "C" strategies and the defecting "D" strategies are shorthand for a wide range of empirical variations that cannot be explored here.) The two columns show the possible direct consequences of alliance and adversary strategies in their respective games.

The column labeled "alliance game" simply summarizes the previous discussion. The column labeled "adversary game" shows the possible "good" and "bad" effects of either conciliation or firmness toward an adversary when one is interested only in maintaining the general status quo. The security dilemma arises from the state's uncertainty whether its adversary has far-reaching expansionist aims or, like itself, is interested essentially in the preservation, or limited modification, of the status quo. If the opponent is expansionist, a policy of firmness promises the desirable effects of deterring him and enhancing one's own reputation for resolve. However, if he is basically oriented toward the status quo, a tough stance may provoke him, increase tension, and induce an "in-

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TABLE 1
THE COMPOSITE SECURITY DILEMMA IN A MULTIPOLAR SYSTEM

Strategies	*Possible Consequences*	
	Alliance game	*Adversary game*
I ALLIANCE C: Support, strengthen commitment ADVERSARY D: Stand firm.	"GOODS" 1. Reassure ally, reduce risk of abandonment 2. Enhance reputation for loyalty	"GOODS" 1. Deter, or prevail over, adversary 2. Enhance reputation for resolve
	"BADS" 1. Increase risk of entrapment 2. Reduce bargaining power over ally 3. Foreclose realignment option 4. Solidify adversary's alliance	"BADS" 1. Provoke adversary; increase tension; insecurity spiral
	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
II ALLIANCE D: Withhold support, weaken commitment ADVERSARY C: Conciliate	"GOODS" 1. Restrain ally, reduce risk of entrapment 2. Increase bargaining power over ally 3. Preserve realignment option 4. Divide adversary's alliance	"GOODS" 1. Resolve conflict; reduce tension
	"BADS" 1. Increase risk of abandonment 2. Reduce reputation for loyalty	"BADS" 1. Encourage adversary to stand firmer 2. Reduce reputation for resolve

security spiral"—that is, a vicious circle of "unnecessary" power competition because the adversary interprets one's own firmness as aggressiveness toward him. Conversely, a conciliatory policy may have the desirable effect of resolving conflict and reducing tension with an essentially nonaggressive adversary; on the other hand, if the opponent

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has expansionist goals, conciliation may encourage him to make further demands in the belief that one lacks resolve.[6]

Strategies in each game can have desirable or undesirable side effects in the other. In making choices, a state must therefore calculate the sum of direct effects and side effects. To save space, I will discuss here only the side effects on the alliance game of strategies in the adversary game, and omit the obverse side effects. An adversary "D" strategy of firmness, resistance, or coercion will tend to reassure an ally who doubts one's loyalty, and reduce the risk of the ally's defection or realignment. Opposed to this "good" are several "bads." Firmness toward the adversary increases the risk of entrapment by the ally, as the ally becomes intransigent through his confidence in one's support. Firmness in the adversary game reduces bargaining power over the ally in the alliance game because it reduces the credibility of a threat to withhold support. A tough stance toward the adversary also tends to close off the option of realignment with him. Toughness will also cause the adversary to move closer to his own allies, thus solidifying his alliance.

[6] The adversary dilemma presented here is a secondary security dilemma, analogous to the secondary alliance dilemma. In both cases, the primary security dilemma, which is a prisoner's dilemma, has already been resolved by mutual defection. That is, alliances have formed and adversaries have adopted a general posture of power/security rivalry in the "DD" cell of the primary game, which we might also call the international "supergame." Once adversaries are in this cell they may be able to reduce their conflict; on the other hand, they may sink deeper into conflict and competition. That is, having protected themselves against the worst, they are now able to consider whether they might not improve their situation by conciliating the opponent—although they must also guard against exploitation of such cooperation. Whether conciliation or continued (or greater) firmness is the better policy for any state will depend on its adversary's preferences—which the state does not know, although presumably it knows its own. The adversary dilemma in Table 1 simply assumes the extremes—the opponent is either status-quo-oriented or expansionist—even though he may have mixed motives or be expansionist in different degree in different situations. Formally speaking, adversaries play a series of sub-games within the general context of supergame "DD." Some of these may be prisoner's dilemmas, but some may be other games that are either more or less conflictual than the prisoner's dilemma. The dilemma for the state, then, arises from its uncertainty as to what game is being played, which in turn stems from its uncertainty about the adversary's preferences. Choosing the best strategy thus requires an estimate of the opponent's preference rankings for possible outcomes. Space forbids a discussion of the various possible sub-games: in Table 1, they are implicitly "Stag Hunt" (when the opponent prefers the status quo) and a variant of "Chicken" (when the opponent is expansionist but prefers peace over expansion by war). For a comprehensive treatment, see Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), chap. 2.

The secondary adversary dilemma is similar to the dichotomy between the axioms of deterrence theory and those of the "spiral model" as described by Robert Jervis in *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3. Jervis makes the point that the choice between deterrence and spiral-model axioms—between firmness and accommodation—depends essentially on one's estimate of the adversary's ultimate aims. Jervis does not apply the term "security dilemma" to this broad choice, but uses it in its traditional sense as an explanation of why the search for security among status-quo states may be self-defeating—i.e., as the structural basis of the spiral model.

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A "C" strategy of conciliating the adversary will have the desirable side effect of restraining the ally, thus reducing the risk of entrapment. The ally, observing one's improving relations with the opponent, will have less confidence that one will stand four-square behind him in a crisis; consequently, he will be more cautious in his own dealings with the opponent. He may even interpret the improved relations with the adversary as a sign that one is considering realignment; he may then become more amenable in order to discourage one's defection. Conciliating the opponent also keeps open one's option of realignment with him, which is desirable for its own sake as well as for the enhancement of one's bargaining leverage over the present partner. Accommodating an adversary may also weaken *his* alliance, as his partners begin to doubt his loyalty and seek alternative partners.

The most undesirable side effect of conciliating the adversary is that it entails the risk of abandonment by the ally. His fear that one is contemplating realignment may induce him, not to try to discourage this by becoming more accommodative, as suggested above, but to realign preemptively or at least move closer to the opponent. This risk is an important constraint on conciliation between adversaries, possibly offsetting the benefits from greater cooperation in the adversary game.[7]

THE DETERMINANTS OF CHOICE

What determines choices in the alliance security dilemma? Thus far, we have suggested only a superficial answer to this question: choice involves estimates of, and trade-offs among, the various benefits, costs, and risks listed in Table 1. But what determines the magnitude of these values and consequently the severity of the dilemma?

Probably the most important determinant is the relative *dependence* of the partners on the alliance—how much they need each other's aid—and their perceptions of each other's dependence. Thus, the more dependent a state is, and/or the less dependent the ally appears to be, the

[7] There are some interesting analogies between the dynamics of the two games. A strategy of conciliation in the adversary game may produce a "falling domino" effect: the opponent interprets one's overture as weakness and pushes harder on both present and future issues. The alliance analogue is the entrapment effect. As an opponent may be emboldened if he is appeased, the ally may become more intransigent and aggressive if he is supported. The alliance analogue to deterrence of the opponent is restraint of the ally. Deterrence involves a threat of force against an adversary; restraint may be accomplished by threatening *not* to use force in support of the ally. In the alliance game, strengthening one's commitment to the ally tends to foreclose one's alternative alliance options; in the adversary game, firming up one's commitment against the opponent may foreclose compromise settlement options. Bargaining power over the ally is enhanced by a weak, ambiguous commitment; leverage over the adversary is strengthened by a firm, explicit one.

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more likely it is that the costs and risks of abandonment will outweigh the costs and risks of entrapment. Dependence is compounded of (1) a state's need for assistance in war as a function of the extent to which its military capability falls short of its potential adversary's capability; (2) its partner's capacity to supply the assistance (the greater the partner's strength, the more one is dependent on him, up to the point where the combined strength provides sufficient security); (3) the state's degree of conflict and tension with the adversary (the greater the conflict and tension, the more likely one will have to call on the partner for help);[8] and (4) the state's realignment alternatives (the more numerous the alternatives, and the more satisfactory they are, the less the dependence on the present partner). These factors will of course change over time; some may change in opposite directions. For example, by 1914 the increased military strength of France and Russia (especially the latter) had reduced their dependence on England, but this was partially offset by their increased conflict with Germany and Austria. Also, the factors are not entirely independent. Thus, increased conflict with the adversary will reduce realignment alternatives by tending to close off the option of realigning with him.

Another determinant is the degree of *strategic interest* that the parties have in defending each other. Strategic interest is an interest in keeping the ally's power resources out of the opponent's hands. Analytically, this is different from dependence as just defined, since it refers not to the need for aid in case one is attacked, but to the need to block an increase in the adversary's power. In practice, the two are closely linked since the ally's independent existence is a prerequisite to receiving his aid. Strategic interest might be termed "indirect dependence," and need for the ally's assistance might be labeled "direct dependence." Most alliances in a multipolar world involve both kinds of dependence, but they should be kept separate because allies may be dependent in different degree on each dimension. The most important causes of such asymmetries are geographical factors and disparity of power between allies. The English Channel, for instance, minimized Britain's direct dependence on her continental allies, but she was indirectly dependent on them because domination of the Continent by a single power would have neutralized the protection of the Channel. In the pre-1914 decade, France was directly dependent on British aid, but had little operational strategic

[8] "Conflict" and "tension" are analytically separable. Conflict is incompatibility of interest; tension may be defined crudely as the felt likelihood that the conflict will produce war in the immediate future. A high degree of conflict may be accompanied by low tension; the opposite is also possible, though less likely. The two are linked here because of their similar effect on alliance dependence.

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interest in defending England because England could defend herself against direct attack by Germany. The effects of power disparity may be seen in the German-Austrian alliance of 1879. Because of her relative weakness, Austria was much more dependent in a direct sense on German assistance against Russia than vice versa, but Germany was indirectly dependent because of her strategic interest in preventing Austria from being absorbed by Russia.[9]

Asymmetries in indirect dependence chiefly affect the partners' relative fears of abandonment. Thus, when one state has a stronger strategic interest in its partner than vice versa, the first will worry more about abandonment than the second, although this differential may be offset if the second state is more dependent in the direct sense. Differences in strategic interest help to explain why the most powerful state in an alliance often has little leverage over its partners: when the stronger state's strategic interest is well known, it cannot credibly threaten defection or realignment.

A third determinant is the degree of *explicitness* in the alliance agreement. A vague or ambiguous agreement tends to maximize fears of abandonment; an explicit one minimizes such worries, but it does not eliminate them. Conversely, entrapment may be a less worrisome possibility with a vague agreement since the partners can assert that they are not committed. The flip side of this, however, is that while states explicitly allied may be entrapped over the partner's interests that are covered in the agreement, they may find it quite easy to dissociate themselves from the ally in contingencies not mentioned because they can be fairly confident of each other's loyalty in the ultimate contingency. But when the agreement is ambiguous, they may find it necessary to stand by the ally in all situations to prove their loyalty. Thus, France and Russia, bound by a quite specific agreement limited to the contingencies of German or Austrian military attack, were each able to withhold support in several crises in the pre-1914 decade where only the partner's interests were at stake, with little damage to the alliance. England, however, tied only loosely to France and Russia, felt compelled

[9] Austria also had a strategic interest in Germany's not being absorbed by Russia, but this interest was abstract—i.e., non-operational—since Germany was quite capable of holding her own against Russia, provided Russia had not previously conquered Austria. Thus, the situation was analogous to the Franco-British relationship. The general point is that the stronger ally will be less directly dependent than its partner but more indirectly dependent. Asymmetry of this kind is especially pronounced in a bipolar world because of the wide disparity of power between the superpowers and their allies. Thus the European members of NATO are highly dependent on the U.S. in the direct sense, but the U.S. is not similarly dependent on them; on the other hand, the U.S. is indirectly dependent on its allies because of its strategic interest in containing Soviet power.

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to support them in nearly all confrontations lest they doubt her fidelity.[10]

At bottom, however, the explicitness factor is only a modifier of the effects of the more basic dependence and interest factors. Vagueness allows these factors full play; explicitness tends to inhibit their effects. Thus, asymmetrical dependence by itself will cause the more dependent ally to fear abandonment, but this anxiety will be reduced by a formal, explicit contract. Conversely, such a contract will make it harder for the less dependent ally to escape entrapment, at least on issues specified in the agreement.

A fourth determinant, affecting both the risk of abandonment and the risk of entrapment, is the degree to which the allies' *interests* that are in conflict with the adversary are shared. If these interests are similar and valued with about equal intensity, both risks will be minimized for both parties, since presumably (*ceteris paribus*) they will be about equally ready to fight over them. On the other hand, if their interests are quite different, each partner will worry about being trapped into "pulling the other's chestnuts out of the fire," but each will also fear that the other may stand aside if his own interests are threatened. For instance, in the Franco-Russian alliance before World War I, France had little intrinsic interest in Russia's conflicts with Austria in the Balkans, while Russia had little interest in France's conflicts with Germany. When France strengthened her commitment to Russia in 1912, she encouraged Russian aggressiveness, thus increasing her own danger of being entrapped. But this was more than offset by the reduced danger of Russia's abandonment of the alliance in a Franco-German war. The French by this time were convinced that a war was virtually inevitable: it was desirable that it begin with a Russian-Austrian fracas in the Balkans, thereby ensuring Russian participation.[11]

Finally, the incentives and disincentives for current strategy options will be affected by one's own and others' *behavior* in the recent past. The determinants just described are situational rather than behavioral. Although they are fairly good indicators of some items in the calculus, such as the *costs* of abandonment or entrapment, they yield only general and uncertain judgments about their *likelihood* and about such other items as one's own or the ally's loyalty reputation. Expectations about

[10] The best treatment of this series of crises, beginning with Morocco (1905) is still that of Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), Vol. I.

[11] The term "abandonment" is used here in the sense of reneging on one's specific alliance obligation, not as realignment or de-alignment.

On Franco-Russian relations between 1912 and 1914 and the strengthening of the French commitment, see G. P. Gooch, *Before the War: Studies in Diplomacy* (London: Longmans, Green, 1938), chap. 2.

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allies' future behavior and their probable expectations of one's own behavior cannot be very precisely arrived at from guesses about the others' "dependence," "interest," and so on. Behavioral evidence supplements the situational elements to yield more specific and confident expectations. Thus, Britain and France were generally concerned about Russian defection throughout the pre-1914 decade because of their knowledge of Russia's rather low dependence on the Triple Entente—mostly because her option of realigning with Germany was open until late in the period. They became more specifically and intensely concerned when Russia negotiated a settlement of certain disputes with Germany in 1910. Of course, the ally's recent behavior may be in response to one's own prior behavior. The point is that the continuing sequence of strategic choices by all actors yields a stream of behavioral evidence which interacts with estimates of the general situational factors when the parties assess the probable consequences of current strategy options.

These factors—direct and indirect dependence, explicitness of commitment, disparity of interests in conflict with the opponent, and the behavioral record—are the principal determinants of the values and likelihoods that the parties impute to the various possible consequences of strategy options as listed in Table 1. These values and likelihoods, in turn, are the proximate determinants of strategy choice itself.

Thus, if a state feels highly dependent on its ally, directly or indirectly, if it perceives the ally as less dependent, if the alliance commitment is vague, and if the ally's recent behavior suggests doubtful loyalty, the state will fear abandonment more than entrapment. It will therefore tend to reassure the ally of its commitment, support him in specific confrontations with the opponent, and avoid conciliating the opponent. The reverse conditions will tend to induce opposite strategies.

These propositions may be illustrated, though imperfectly, by certain differences between British and French behavior toward each other and toward Germany from approximately 1905 to 1909. Britain was not dependent on French aid in case of a direct German attack—the navy could handle that. She was indirectly dependent on the Entente, however, because of her strategic interest in a continental balance of power and her derivative interest in preventing a German conquest of France or a German-French alliance, either of which would make the British Isles vulnerable. France was perceived as less dependent because she already had an alliance with Russia in addition to an apparent option of realignment or rapprochement with Germany while England had no alliance alternatives. The vague language of the Entente Cordiale of 1904 placed little constraint on French realignment. The British did

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worry somewhat about entrapment in a Franco-German war over specific French interests, but this concern was less important than their anxieties about French defection.

The result of these considerations was a policy of reassurance toward France and firmness toward Germany. This reduced the risk of abandonment at the cost of some increased risk of entrapment—in case the French became too intransigent toward Germany in their confidence of British support. However, the latter cost was small: Britain had little leverage for restraining France in any case because of French knowledge of British strategic interests. The firm stance toward Germany would deter Germany if she were aggressively inclined, but it risked provoking an insecurity spiral if she were not. Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister, entertained both possibilities, but chose firmness as a prudent worst-case strategy in the adversary game; it was also consistent with his alliance game strategy of reassuring France.

Although France valued the Entente, she was less dependent on it than England—not because she would not need help in a war against Germany, but because she did not believe England could provide much help in a land war. France correctly perceived the strong British strategic interest in defending France and in preventing a Franco-German realignment. She was also reassured by unqualified British support in the Morocco crisis of 1905. Therefore, France had little reason to doubt British loyalty and felt little need to reassure the British of her own loyalty in order to avoid abandonment. Instead, she exploited British anxieties about French loyalty in order to get a firmer British commitment—principally in the form of joint military staff talks and an implicit British pledge to send an expeditionary force to the Continent in case of war. France had some fear of entrapment in a war resulting from the Anglo-German naval race; partly for this reason, she adopted a policy of moderate conciliation of Germany. Other incentives for conciliation came from the Franco-German adversary game. Powerful groups in France wanted a rapprochement with Germany at this time, both to compensate for French and Russian military weakness and to secure commercial and colonial benefits by deals with Germany in the Near East and Africa. These incentives produced an agreement with Germany over Morocco in 1909, which, of course, further increased British concerns about a possible French realignment.[12]

[12] On Anglo-French-German relations during this period, see K. A. Hamilton, "Great Britain and France, 1905-1911," and D. W. Sweet, "Great Britain and Germany, 1905-1911," in F. H. Hinsley, ed., *British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey* (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1977), chaps. 5 and 11.

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Thus, actual and perceived asymmetries of direct and indirect dependence, differences in particular interests vis-à-vis the opponent, the vagueness and fragility of the Entente, and the behavioral record combined to produce different strategies by France and Britain in both the alliance and adversary games.

ON SPIRALS

In the adversary security dilemma, "D" strategies of firmness, played between adversaries who believe each other to be potentially aggressive but who really are not, produce an "insecurity spiral"—i.e., a spiral of power/security competition that feeds on each party's fears that the other's defensive moves are aggressively motivated.[13] An analogous spiral in the alliance security dilemma is an "integrative spiral," in which allies move progressively closer out of their mutual fear of abandonment. The integrative spiral interlocks with the insecurity spiral in the adversary game—i.e., the two spirals are mutually reinforcing. Thus, allies play reciprocal "C" strategies out of fear that the partner may defect if they do not show support; they further attempt to reduce the partner's anxieties by standing firm against the opponent; the opponent then feels threatened and encircled, and his hostile response increases the allies' incentive to close ranks; when they do, the adversary becomes more fearful and hostile, and, feeling more dependent on his own allies, moves closer to them; in reaction, the first alliance further solidifies, and so on.

The Anglo-French Entente of 1904 and the German reaction to it set in motion an alliance integrative spiral and an interlocking adversary insecurity spiral that continued until the outbreak of war in 1914. The Entente had not initially been intended as a quasi-alliance against Germany, but only as a colonial settlement and as a hedge against involvement in the impending war between the parties' respective allies—Japan and Russia. But Germany did see it as a threat and challenged it in the Morocco crisis of 1905 in an attempt to break it up by exposing British infidelity. However, Britain stood firmly behind France; the result of the Germans' coercion was a self-confirmation of their own hypothesis: the Entente was transformed into a quasi-alliance against the newly revealed German threat.

The tightening of the Entente set in motion an insecurity spiral in

[13] What I call the insecurity spiral is sometimes referred to as the security dilemma. I believe this is a mislabeling, however, since the spiral is an *outcome* of both adversaries' choosing one of the options in the security dilemma, not the *problem* of choice itself. The defining feature of any dilemma is the difficulty of choosing between two options, each of which will have more or less unsatisfactory consequences.

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the adversary game, chiefly between Germany and England. The latter, feeling more dependent on France as evidence of German hostility mounted (especially via the Anglo-German naval competition) carefully avoided, or limited, any accommodative moves toward Germany that might raise doubts in French minds about British loyalty and thus possibly trigger a French realignment with Germany.[14] She also increased her commitment to France by initiating military staff conversations. For Germany, the hypothesis of Entente hostility now seemed to be even more strongly confirmed by the British reserve and the spectacle of the partners moving closer together. Germany stepped up her ship-building and drew closer to Austria. Thus, the increased solidarity in one alliance, interacting with an insecurity spiral in the adversary game, increased the cohesion of the other alliance.

These spirals continued with the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 and the Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909. The Anglo-Russian agreement, like the earlier Anglo-French one, was on its face a settlement of various colonial conflicts, but for Britain it was also (unlike the French Entente) consciously intended to strengthen the balance of power against Germany. Germany perceived it as another step in her encirclement, and felt increasingly dependent on Austria. During the Bosnian crisis, fearing Austrian defection, she supported her ally completely and, by issuing an ultimatum, she forced Russia to back down. She also expanded the scope of her alliance commitment to Austria. Whereas the alliance formally called for mutual support against Russia only in a defensive war, Germany now assured Austria of full support even in an offensive war. Britain also supported Russia during the crisis, although not to the point of offering military assistance. The result of the crisis was thus to consolidate both alliance systems, to extend the scope of the German-Austrian one, and to increase the level of tension between the two.[15]

The integrative process continued on the Entente side with British support of France during the second Morocco crisis (1911),[16] and a firming and extension of commitments between France and England, and between France and Russia, in 1912. The French-British connection was tightened by an agreement on a naval division of labor in which the French fleet was to guard the Mediterranean and the British fleet was to guard the Atlantic coasts of both countries. In return for this

[14] George Monger, *The End of Isolation* (London: Nelson, 1963), chap. 12.
[15] Bernadotte Schmitt, *The Annexation of Bosnia* (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1937).
[16] Ima C. Barlow, *The Agadir Crisis* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940).

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arrangement, France successfully demanded an exchange of notes that strengthened the British diplomatic commitment.[17]

The bolstering of the French-Russian alliance occurred mainly because of France's increasing anxiety about possible Russian defection. Russian dependence on France was declining because of Russia's steadily increasing military strength. Moreover, she had demonstrated some independence by failing to support France during the 1911 Morocco crisis and by settling some minor conflicts with Germany in the Near East. France became worried that Russia might be induced to remain neutral in a Franco-German war. She dealt with the problem by extending the scope of her commitment to Russia, implicitly promising aid not just in case of a German (or German-Austrian) attack on Russia (as per the terms of the treaty) but also in case Russia was forced to attack Austria because of an Austrian military initiative in the Balkans. This was analogous to the extension of the German commitment to Austria after the Bosnian crisis.[18]

The integrative/insecurity spiral was partially—but only temporarily—interrupted during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), when England and Germany managed to fashion a détente based on collaborative restraint of their allies.

THE RESTRAINING ALLIES' DILEMMA: THE BALKAN WARS INTERLUDE

When members of opposite alliances become involved in a crisis confrontation, their allies may find themselves in a special form of the composite security dilemma in which the alliance and adversary components are closely linked. The dilemma is not just whether to support or restrain the ally, but whether to support the ally or to *collaborate* with the noninvolved state on the opposite side in restraining both protagonists. As in the classic prisoner's dilemma, the opposite restraining states have a good deal to gain by cooperating—in keeping the peace and avoiding entrapment—but they are also motivated *against* cooperation by the desire to avoid alienating their allies. The best outcome

[17] Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., *The Politics of Grand Strategy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), provides an excellent account of these French-British negotiations; see chaps. 11 and 12.

[18] It is interesting that France tightened her alliance with Russia by increasing her own commitment, but strengthened her British connection by extracting a firmer commitment from England. The explanation for the difference is that the "balance of dependence" between France and Russia favored Russia, whereas between France and England, it favored France. In other words, France enjoyed more bargaining power over England than over Russia.

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may be obtained by secretly supporting one's own ally while the adversary restrains his; but if both parties pursue this strategy (perhaps out of suspicion that the other is doublecrossing) the result is the typical "DD" outcome of the prisoner's dilemma—in this case, mutual entrapment.

The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 engaged Britain and Germany in this sort of dilemma. Their allies, Russia and Austria respectively, supported opposite sides among the Balkan states who first stripped Turkey of most of her European territory and then fought another war among themselves over the division of the spoils. England and Germany reached an informal agreement: England was to restrain Russia from intervening, Germany to restrain Austria. The collaboration worked initially. Acting through a conference of all the great powers, the two peacemakers did restrain their allies and enforced compromise settlements. Formally, England and Germany both played "C" in the adversary game and "D" in the alliance game, risking the loss of their allies in order to avoid entrapment in a conflict over issues in which neither had much intrinsic interest. Apparently, the integrative/insecurity spiral of the preceding years had been stopped.

This cooperative achievement, however, was due to a special combination of factors and, ironically, its success generated forces that made its repetition unlikely. For Germany, the payoff for collaboration with England was illusorily magnified by the vain hope that it would lead to an Anglo-German neutrality pact, which Germany had been seeking for years. This hope outweighed the risk of alienating Austria, a risk that was low because the government in Vienna was itself divided about risking a confrontation with Russia. As for England, she was now more willing than before to take a chance on Russian defection because her dependence on the Russian and French ententes had declined. England's dependence had always been indirect, based on her strategic interest in a continental equilibrium. In 1912-1913, such an equilibrium was at least being approached, by virtue of a substantial increase in Russian military strength and the growing solidarity of the Russian-French alliance. A British commitment was therefore less necessary to deter the central powers, and Russia and France were less likely to realign if they began to doubt British loyalty. In the adversary game, the British balance of incentives had shifted somewhat from deterrence to conciliation, and in the alliance game her balance of worries had shifted from fears of abandonment to fears of entrapment. The British payoff in collaborating with Germany was further increased by Sir Edward Grey's desire to dampen the insecurity spiral by easing German fears of encirclement,

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and by the desire to gain more leverage over Russia in the persistent squabbles with her over Persia. Finally, Britain's cost in restraining Russia was minimized by the fact that the Russian government was as divided and vacillating about risking war as the Austrian government was.[19]

THE STRADDLE STRATEGY: SIR EDWARD GREY IN JULY 1914

The Anglo-German cooperation of the Balkan Wars did not carry over into the crisis of July 1914, chiefly because Germany's balance of incentives had changed sharply by then. The growth of Russian military power, the initiation of Anglo-Russian naval conversations, and the increasing tension between the continental alliances had increased Germany's sense of dependence on Austria. This, combined with Austria's reproaches for her weak support during the Balkan Wars, increased German fears of Austrian defection: Austria must not be restrained again. Germany's feeling that war was inevitable led to the thought that it had better be now than later, when Russia would be even stronger. Her incentive to cooperate with England had declined with the evaporation of the dream of a neutrality pact, although German leaders continued to believe that England might well stand aside in a war in which Russia could be made to appear the aggressor. By July of 1914, Germany was no longer in a security "dilemma," strictly speaking, since she had resolved it on the side of definite support of her ally and firmness toward her opponents. The same was true of France and Russia: Russia, like Austria, was determined not to back down again, and France repeatedly avowed her unflinching loyalty.

In England, however, Sir Edward Grey's dilemma was as severe as ever: his incentives for either option in both the alliance and adversary games were about evenly balanced. In the alliance game, this was largely the result of the apparent equilibrium of power on the continent, which lessened Britain's need to stand by her allies. If they could hold their own against the central powers, they were less likely to defect out of fear of British defection. In the adversary game, Grey hoped to keep alive the détente with Germany that had been nourished by the amicable settlement of certain colonial disputes in the spring and summer of 1914. Thus Grey's worries about the intransigence of Britain's allies were at

[19] The classic study of the Balkan Wars is E. C. Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938). For a more recent interpretation emphasizing Anglo-German relations, see R. J. Crampton, *The Hollow Detente* (London: George Prior Publishers, 1979).

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least as strong as his fears of their desertion, and he was as eager to avoid provoking Germany as to deter her. The two horns of the dilemma appeared about equally attractive (or unattractive). Grey therefore adopted a straddle—a mixed "C-D" strategy in both the alliance and the adversary games. He gave vague reassurances to France and Russia, rejecting their pleas for an unambiguous declaration of armed support. He issued a few mild warnings to Austria and Germany, but concentrated on reviving the joint Anglo-German mediation of the Balkan Wars. The latter effort failed because Grey did not appreciate the extent to which German payoffs had changed since 1912-1913. Germany agreed to collaborate in joint restraint of Austria and Russia, but defected by goading Austria on. In the overall straddle, it was Grey's hope that Russia would be restrained without being alienated while Germany would be deterred without being provoked. This strategy failed because France-Russia and Austria-Germany, all thinking wishfully, drew opposite conclusions from it. France and Russia counted on British support while Germany and Austria expected British neutrality until the very last moment. Thus, in striving for the best of all worlds, Grey got the worst. If, early in the crisis, he had declared his firm support of Russia and France and warned Germany unequivocally, *or* if he had clearly declared to France and Russia that Britain would not fight, the war might have been averted.[20] This is not to argue that Grey's ambiguity was a central cause of the outbreak of World War I. But England was the only major power that still had both polar options available; in failing to exercise either one, she gave up a chance to prevent the war.[21]

We should not conclude from this single case, however, that a straddle strategy in the composite security dilemma cannot work, that one must firmly grasp one horn or the other. Special circumstances in 1914 made it virtually inevitable that the continental powers would interpret British intentions wishfully. These circumstances were, first, that the continental powers were firmly locked into a collision course: Austria and Russia via their deep conflict of interest in the Balkans, Germany and France because of their high dependence upon and firm commitments to their

[20] Historians are divided as to whether Grey could have averted the war by taking a clear stance one way or the other. Albertini's opinion (fn. 10, Vol. II, 514), is that he could have. For a contrary view, see A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 525. For a discussion of Grey's dilemma, see Michael J. Eckstein, "Great Britain and the Triple Entente on the Eve of the Sarajevo Crisis," in Hinsley (fn. 12), chap. 18.

[21] It is true that Grey felt constrained by domestic and constitutional considerations from issuing an unequivocal commitment. The fact that eventually he did issue a clear warning to Germany that England could not remain neutral—although it came too late to affect German decision making—indicates that these constraints were not absolute.

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allies. The integrative/insecurity spiral within and between the continental alliances had become so tightly wound by the summer of 1914 that, in order to have any chance of reversing it, Grey would have had to choose one of his extreme options. Second, British power was not considered so decisive for the outcome of a war that the other states were unwilling to gamble with the uncertainty of its being used. Third, both sides on the Continent had grounds for optimistic expectations about England, generated by recent interactions with her.

With different background conditions, a straddle might be successful. Success means instilling cautious (and, hence, opposite) expectations in the ally and the adversary, rather than wishful (and opposite) ones, and doing so without unduly antagonizing either party. One wants the ally to think one probably will not fight, and the opponent to think one probably will. The ambiguity of a straddle is most likely to be interpreted cautiously in circumstances more or less opposite to those of 1914: the conflict of interest between ally and adversary is relatively mild, they are not firmly committed against each other, and one's own military power is expected to determine the outcome of a war. Then the other parties' costs of being restrained or deterred, or of accepting a compromise settlement, would be low compared to the expected cost of a war (and defeat) resulting from a mistaken prediction of one's own intentions. A mixed past record containing instances of both non-support of the ally and strong resistance to the opponent would also be helpful. Such conditions were approximated in relations between Russia, Austria, and Germany in the 1870s and 1880s, when Bismarck played the straddle option successfully on several occasions.[22]

The Alliance Security Dilemma in a Bipolar System

The alliance security dilemma is sharply truncated in today's bipolar system because one of the central "bads"—that of abandonment—is

[22] These remarks can no more than suggest the complexity of the straddle problem. One aspect of this complexity is that one is trying to optimize among four objectives: restrain the ally, but avoid alienating him; deter the opponent but avoid provoking him. Just what mixture of communications is likely to optimize will be difficult to estimate, even if one could assume that they will be interpreted as desired by both other parties. Another aspect is the necessary ambiguity of one's messages, which makes it unlikely that they *will* be interpreted exactly as desired. The possible porosity of diplomatic communication channels limits the extent to which signals sent to the ally and adversary can be inconsistent with each other—e.g., signals to the ally that lean toward restraint and messages to the opponent that emphasize firmness. The "pure" and consistent strategies of restraining the ally while conciliating the adversary, or supporting the ally while warning the opponent, are less likely to be misread, and either one may well keep the peace, but they risk alienating the ally or increasing the opponent's hostility. By minimizing these latter risks, a mixed strategy promises a better outcome than either of the pure ones, but also risks a worse outcome, especially when the background conditions approach those in 1914.

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highly unlikely. At least that is so for the European central arena of the system, to which the following discussion will be limited.[23] The superpowers are solidly committed by their own interests to defend their allies, hence their de-alignment is irrational. Realignment with each other is logically impossible, simply because there is no other state powerful enough to provide a motive. The European allies theoretically could shift sides if left to their own devices. However, the superpowers have powerful incentives to prevent their realignment—by force if necessary—as the Soviets have demonstrated. The West European states have no motive to realign, since the Soviet Union is the principal threat to their security and the United States is their natural protector.[24] Finally, simple de-alignment by the smaller states is ultimately illusory, since their protector will defend them no matter what political posture they assume.

Entrapment is possible, however. Conceivably, both the superpowers and their allies could be pulled unwillingly into a conflict in Europe by one partner's initiative—for instance, involvement of the West German army in an East German revolution. The smaller allies must worry in addition about extraregional entrapment (the spillover into Europe of a superpower conflict originating in other areas), and about nuclear entrapment (a superpower initiating nuclear warfare in Europe in the hope that it might be confined there). In general, entrapment is a more serious concern for the lesser allies than for the superpowers because they share only a portion of the latter's global interests, because the superpowers have a much greater capacity for taking initiatives (notably nuclear initiatives), and because the allies' capacity to restrain the superpowers is much smaller than vice versa.

Since the alliance dilemma is mostly a function of *tension* between the risk of abandonment and the risk of entrapment—reducing one tends to increase the other—the dilemma is weak in a bipolar alliance, because only one of these risks is significantly present. That risk, entrapment, can be dealt with simply by dissociation from the ally's policy, or by various means of restraining the ally, without concern that the ally may defect in consequence. The superpower may exert economic pressure or simply withhold support from the ally's adventures (as the

[23] I believe the present system should still be classified as bipolar, even though there has been some movement toward multipolarity. Although some of my theoretical statements in this section apply to bipolarity in Europe in general, they are much more relevant to NATO than to the Warsaw Pact, as my examples clearly indicate. Bipolar alliances outside Europe have somewhat different dynamics, which cannot be explored here.

[24] Some might argue that the West European countries are allied with the United States out of cultural and ideological affinities (and disaffinities with the Soviet Union), not because of structural compulsion. However, even if these affinities did not exist, alignment with the U.S. would be dictated by their security interests.

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United States did during the Suez crisis of 1956). The weaker allies may also fail to support, or even hinder, the superpower's actions (as the Europeans did during the Yom Kippur War and on the recent gas pipeline issue); they may also be able to exercise some restraining leverage by appealing to consensus norms or by exploiting the superpower's need for collective legitimization. In so doing, they do not risk losing the superpower's protection. Neither the superpower nor its protégés need feel any compulsion to support each other (and thereby accept *increased* risks of entrapment) solely to insure against the alliance's collapse. When support is provided against the adversary, it is chiefly because the allies share each other's interests and perceptions in the adversary game, not because they fear the partner might otherwise leave the fold. Finally, neither the greater nor the smaller allies are inhibited from conciliating the adversary by the worry—typical of multipolar alliances—that such conciliation might precipitate the ally's realignment.

Because of the weakness of the alliance security dilemma, the adversary dilemma dominates. That dilemma can be dealt with by each partner according to its own preferences, with little concern for alliance "side effects." The superpowers and their allies may disagree about policy toward the adversary, and, as in NATO at present, they may even pursue contradictory policies. But they need have little fear that their own association is thereby endangered. Indeed, it is largely because the alliance itself is fundamentally stable that such policy divergences may develop and persist. The alliance is stable because it is essentially a product of the structure of the system and of the common security interests generated thereby. So long as that structure and those interests persist, the allies are free to disagree.

By contrast, in a multipolar system where the alliance and adversary dilemmas are roughly co-equal, allies are much more constrained in their play of the adversary game by the possible consequences to the alliance. In particular, they are inhibited from conciliating the adversary for fear the ally will take it as a prelude to realignment, and will realign preemptively. Since multipolar alignments are not determined by the structure of the system, but are formed by choice among several options, they are unstable and vulnerable to policy disagreement. Worries about alliance disintegration thus tend to induce similarity of policy toward the opponent. In a mulitpolar alliance there is a close link between the degree of policy solidarity and the stability of the alliance; in a bipolar alliance that link is tenuous at best.[25]

[25] For a similar argument, see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1979), esp. 169-70. This essay has been considerably influenced by Waltz's impressive work.

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Although the alliance security dilemma is weak in a bipolar system, it is not entirely absent. There are partial surrogates for abandonment—various degrees of movement away from the ally or toward the opponent that give rise to truncated forms of the dilemma. Different types can be discerned at the political and military levels.

At the political level, the most extreme conceivable approaches to abandonment are "condominium" for the superpowers and "finlandization" or "neutralization" for the lesser states. Condominium means a high degree of collaboration by the superpowers to maintain order in the system, and subordination of their competitive interests and the interests of their allies to this goal. Logically, condominium is more akin to multipolar "concert" than to realignment, and is not inconsistent with a continued intention to defend allies against actual attack. However, the allies might still have reason to worry about not being supported over less-than-ultimate issues, and about losing whatever political influence they currently enjoy as a consequence of superpower rivalry.

Finlandization or neutralization are also just barely conceivable. In an ultimate sense, both are illusions. Although it is possible that some European NATO members might drift in these directions out of fear of being abandoned by the United States or, conversely, of being entrapped in a conflict between the superpowers, such stances would amount only to "pseudo-abandonment" so long as the U.S. retained its intention to defend them. NATO, like any bipolar alliance, is essentially a guarantee of the lesser states by the superpower; as long as the guarantee holds, the alliance holds—whatever postures the smaller states may strike. This does not mean, however, that the degree of West European accommodation with the Soviets is unimportant. If West Germany, say, were to come under significant Soviet influence, important costs for the U.S. and the Western alliance would be entailed, even if the alliance *per se* remained intact.

Within these extremes—that is, within the realm of the possible—are various degrees of "détente" with the adversary, each involving some degree of cooperative benefits and some dependence on the adversary for continuance of the benefits, and hence, some influence by the adversary. Specific moves toward détente, by either the superpowers or their protégés, may generate fears that further moves that would weaken alliance obligations are impending. Typically, the fears exceed what is likely to happen, much as fears of realignment in the multipolar world are quite disproportionate to the real possibilities—states are notoriously paranoid—but, of course, it is the subjective fears rather than the objective possibilities that influence their behavior. Thus, in the truncated

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alliance game of bipolarity, simply the reduction of tension between adversaries, or its possibility, is functionally equivalent to potential defection or realignment as a source of abandonment anxiety.

An obvious military surrogate for abandonment would be a partial U.S. troop withdrawal from Europe. (A complete withdrawal is hardly conceivable.) Although this would not seriously impair the U.S. commitment to Europe, it would certainly stimulate ever-lurking European worries about a U.S. retreat to the American "fortress."

The alliance dilemma for the U.S. at the political level is a by-product of the adversary dilemma—of the choice between conciliating or confronting the adversary. Unlike the multipolar version, it does not involve a trade-off between risks of abandonment and risks of entrapment, but rather a balancing between two kinds of incentives for partial "abandonment" by the smaller states. As Henry Kissinger has noted, the West Europeans tend to oscillate between fears of collusion and fears of collision between the United States and the Soviet Union, and their response to *both* fears is to conciliate the Soviets.[26] Their motives for this response to superpower collusion presumably are (1) to hedge against a possible weakening of the American will to protect their interests; (2) to preserve some bargaining power vis-à-vis the United States; or (3) simply to share in the benefits of better relations with the Soviet Union. When they fear collision (entrapment), their incentives to conciliate the Soviet Union may be (1) to restrain U.S. intransigence; (2) to insulate their own good relations with the Soviets from the superpower confrontation; and perhaps (3) to offset U.S. belligerence, thus moderating the overall alliance stance and reducing the risk of provoking the Soviets.

Thus, for the United States, the alliance dilemma presents the problem of finding the optimum blend of firmness and accommodation toward the Soviets—that which generates the least incentive for the allies to "neutralize" or "finlandize." Since the U.S. will have its independent preferences in the adversary game, which might point to a different optimum stance in that game, the overall problem is one of optimizing between two optimums.

Henry Kissinger stated the problem clearly when he warned President Nixon in 1973:

> We had to remain sober in our dealings with the Soviet Union. If we became too impetuous the European nations would grow fearful of a U.S.-Soviet deal. This would cause them to multiply their own initiatives ... to protect themselves, by making their own arrangements with the U.S.S.R. But paradoxically, the same would happen if the U.S. remained in the

[26] Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 382.

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> trenches of the Cold War. In that case European leaders would be tempted to appear before their publics as "mediators" between bellicose superpowers. The U.S. had to conduct a careful policy towards the Soviet Union: sufficiently strong to maintain the interest in the common defense; sufficiently flexible to prevent our allies from racing to Moscow.[27]

This strategy is appropriate when a superpower is most concerned about the effects of its own strategy upon that of the allies. When the concern is that the ally is "defecting" on its own initiative, however, a better strategy might be to preempt. For example, Nixon and Kissinger worried in the early seventies that the West German *Ostpolitik* might go too far; this stimulated them to move ahead with their own negotiations lest Germany be left alone in the Soviet embrace. Kissinger reports that he dreaded the moment "when no German chancellor can afford the hostility of the Soviet Union . . .":

> This uneasiness about the drift of Brandt's policies was shared by his principal partners in the Western alliance. . . . To forestall [independent German maneuvering between East and West], or perhaps outflank it, each of Brandt's colleagues—including Nixon—sought to pre-empt Germany by conducting an active detente policy of its own. In this sense, Ostpolitik had effects far beyond those intended. It contributed to a race to Moscow and over time heightened mutual suspicion among the allies.[28]

When the U.S.-Soviet détente negotiations were well underway, the bogey of "condominium" was raised in Europe—notably after the agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War in 1973, which seemed to imply joint Soviet-U.S. management of crises and disputes between other states. At that point, the European states felt impelled to deepen their own détente in order to hedge against the possibility that Washington's commitment to its allies was weakening. Willy Brandt noted that one of his motives for *Ostpolitik* was his belief that only a part of U.S. forces would still be in Europe at the end of the seventies.[29]

However, the most important motives for détente on both sides of the Atlantic were autonomous ones stemming from the adversary game, and the reduced cohesion of NATO was more the result of the reduced Soviet threat than of mutual fears of defection among the allies. Nor did fears of the partners' defection seriously *inhibit* the détente policies of either the U.S. or Europe—despite Kissinger's warning.

There is no bipolar parallel to the integrative spiral that occurred in

[27] *Ibid.*, 382.

[28] Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), 145-46.

[29] Willy Brandt, *Begegnungen und Einsichten. Die Jahre 1960-1975* (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1976), 348, cited in Karl Kaiser and Hans-Peter Schwarz, *America and Western Europe: Problems and Prospects* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977), 229.

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the pre-1914 alliances. Such a spiral may occur in a multipolar system because alliance commitments are always somewhat in doubt; hence—especially during periods of rising tension—there are tendencies to strengthen and expand commitments in order to guard against abandonment, tendencies that at the same time generate and are reinforced by an insecurity spiral between adversaries. In a bipolar alliance such as NATO, the basic alliance commitment is not in doubt since it is structurally ordained; there is little scope or incentive to strengthen it by acts of policy, and there is hence no integrative spiral. An insecurity spiral may develop independently in the adversary game, and NATO's policy cohesion may increase in response to common perceptions of a rising external threat, but these processes are not additionally driven by fears of desertion by allies.[30]

The Current NATO Crisis and the Security Dilemma

The present conflict between the United States and its European allies is chiefly a disagreement about how to deal with the adversary security dilemma. Each side of the alliance prefers a different strategy toward the Soviet Union, and each either advocates or independently pursues its own preferred strategy. The United States prefers a "D" strategy of toughness and confrontation; the Europeans generally a moderate "C" strategy of conciliation. Their strategies in the alliance game are consistent with, though more or less incidental to, their favored strategies in the adversary game. The United States perceives itself as increasing its support for its allies by building up its capability for deterrence and defense, in Europe as well as in peripheral areas where it perceives European interests to be at least as great as its own. The Europeans are divided, but mostly skeptical about U.S. nuclear policies. They resist U.S. pressures to increase their own conventional forces; they also resist U.S. tendencies to make détente a hostage to Soviet behavior in the third world, and they obstruct Washington's attempts to apply economic sanctions against the Soviets.

Some of the reasons for this divergence are extraneous to the present

[30] Conversely, it ought to be easier for the bipolar superpowers than for multipolar adversaries to dampen or avoid insecurity spirals by conciliating each other, since their conciliation is so much less constrained by alliance concerns. In the pre-1914 decade, Sir Edward Grey empathized with Germany's insecurities and fears of encirclement; he realized that the steady tightening of the Entente was provoking her, but he could do little about it because he feared abandonment by Russia and France if he tried. The U.S. and the Soviet Union do not have a similar problem. This is not to say that it is easy to escape from or weaken insecurity spirals in a bipolar system—it is merely easier because the attempt involves significant risks in the adversary game only.

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theme—notably, the rise in Europe's economic strength (which has generated a new spirit of assertiveness against the U.S. in the security as well as the economic fields), and a declining faith in America's leadership capacities. A rough assessment of the weights that the parties attach to the "goods" and "bads" of the composite security dilemma and of why these weights have changed, may provide a further explanation. The reasons fall into four somewhat overlapping categories: (1) divergent images of the motives and intentions of the adversary; (2) different valuations of détente; (3) European perceptions of a declining credibility of the U.S. deterrent in light of the Soviet Union's achievement of nuclear parity; and (4) a shift of Soviet aggressive adventures to the third world, which has precipitated a conflict between the global interests of the United States and the more limited perspectives of the European allies. These changes have affected both the alliance dilemma and the adversary dilemma, but mostly the latter.

The perceptions and value loadings on the adversary dilemma have changed sharply for Europe since the early seventies.[31] Most importantly, of course, the political and economic gains from détente have substantially increased the incentive to conciliate the Soviets. The European states see no "resolve reputation" costs in conciliation because they perceive Soviet intentions as essentially defensive, possibly because the Soviets have not been aggressive in Europe for more than two decades. This image may be partly a wishful one, supported by the benefits from détente.

The "goods" and "bads" of a tough strategy toward the Soviet Union have also changed with a net increase for the "bads." For the Europeans, the deterrent value of firmness has declined because of their pacific image of the Soviets, while the danger of provoking an insecurity spiral through excessive firmness has increased. Europe is disposed to invoke the "1914 analogy": the greatest danger arises not from the powerful adversary, but from the dynamics of conflict itself, which might produce a "war that nobody wanted."[32] Finally, too tough a stance might undermine prospects for arms control, the centerpiece of détente.

American perceptions and values in the adversary dilemma have changed in the opposite direction. Viewing Soviet behavior and détente

[31] The terms "European" and "American" are intended to refer to the apparently dominant views among European and American elites. Obviously, there is a wide spectrum of opinion on both sides of the Atlantic.

[32] The 1914 analogy is poorly taken, since that spiral fed on factors peculiar to a multipolar system—notably high and equal interdependence among allies. Also, recent historiography has suggested that World War I was a war that "somebody" (Germany) did want. See, for example, Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967).

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from a global perspective, the United States began to devalue détente in the late seventies after Soviet advances in the third world, and virtually wrote it off after the invasion of Afghanistan. The Reagan Administration perceives the Soviet Union as an inherently aggressive state that will seize every opportunity to expand by force, and will interpret any conciliation as weakness. Accordingly, deterrence and firmness are valued more highly, while the risk of stimulating Soviet insecurity and a spiral of rising tension has been downgraded, if not ignored. On the economic side, a strategy of economic deprivation, designed to weaken the Soviet Union's military potential and economy, has been substituted for the former strategy of inducing Soviet accommodation by weaving the U.S.S.R. into a web of economic interdependence.

In the alliance game, the Europeans worry principally about entrapment. They fear that excessive U.S. bellicosity might set off a severe insecurity spiral with the Soviet Union, which could explode into crisis or violence. A more specific concern is that of extraregional entrapment—being caught up in a superpower conflict caused by an American over-reaction to Soviet advances in the third world. Talk by U.S. military planners of "horizontal escalation" has no doubt fueled this anxiety. However, the fear probably is not so much one of being pulled into an actual war begun in some peripheral area as it is that tensions generated in such areas might become general and destroy détente in Europe. Another cost would be a tightening of the Soviet hold on the East European countries, ending the dream of at least a partial integration of all of Europe. (European concern about "nuclear entrapment" is a special case which will be discussed below.)

The alliance dilemma for the European allies is how to escape or minimize these risks of entrapment without seriously risking some form of partial U.S. abandonment. The latter might consist of troop withdrawals, American downgrading of the priority of European defense in favor of other areas such as the Persian Gulf, or a further drift to unilateralism. Although the European alliance dilemma is somewhat sharper than the U.S. dilemma discussed earlier, it is still not severe because any such partial abandonment by the United States would fall well short of total withdrawal of the latter's commitment or its nuclear deterrent.

The Nuclear Dimension

I have chosen to treat the issue of nuclear strategy separately because it poses the risks of abandonment and entrapment (and consequently the alliance dilemma itself) in different forms. Simply put, nuclear aban-

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donment means the loss of U.S. will to use its strategic weapons in defense of Western Europe; more precisely, that the credibility of U.S. deterrence drops below the level required to deter the Soviets. Europe has had reason to worry about this since the Soviet Union achieved a second-strike capability in the late fifties or early sixties: the recent advent of full parity apparently operates as a kind of perceptual threshold that has greatly heightened European anxiety. Of course, European concerns about such "decoupling" are not so much fears of actual U.S. nuclear abandonment as they are worries that U.S. strategic nuclear forces are no longer effective in deterring the Soviets. American proposals for a policy of no first use do raise fears of deliberate nuclear abandonment.

Thus, to Europe nuclear abandonment means either a withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear deterrent or an evaporation of its credibility. Nuclear entrapment means the actual use of nuclear weapons in case deterrence fails, especially in a way that makes Europe the principal battleground. Thus, the tension between nuclear abandonment and entrapment is virtually equivalent to the familiar tension between deterrence and defense, the latter defined as war-fighting, or a capability and doctrine for fighting a nuclear war "rationally." Europeans have always favored pure deterrence over war-fighting postures. Some, if not most, probably (if secretly) would prefer a strategy of pure nuclear bluff: deterrence by a threat of massive retaliation, but no retaliation at all if the threat is ineffective. Nuclear war-fighting and limited nuclear war strategies favored by the United States are resisted for at least three reasons: (1) they imply a greater likelihood, and greater degree, of devastation in Europe than a strategy of assured destruction, which seems to hold out at least some possibility of a nuclear war being conducted intercontinentally, "over Europe's head"; (2) they might encourage the U.S. to initiate nuclear war too casually in the event of conventional attack or to take excessive risks in a crisis; and (3) they are provocative to the Soviet Union, both politically and militarily.

The nuclear issue presents the alliance dilemma to the Europeans in its severest form, and it is the issue about which Europe is most ambivalent or divided. By itself, the dilemma is whether to support American efforts to strengthen extended deterrence, including intermediate nuclear forces (INF), at the risk of greater destruction in Europe if deterrence fails, or to resist these efforts, thereby sacrificing some deterrence in the hope of limiting damage to Europe. As on the political side of the dilemma, there is a trade-off between the risks of abandonment and entrapment. The nuclear dilemma links up to the broader security dilemma through the risk of alienating the United States if its

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preferences are opposed, and of damaging the Europe-Soviet détente if they are accepted. A further link is provided by the option of conciliating the Soviets: if deterrence is weakened by parity, perhaps the U.S.S.R.'s incentives to attack can be weakened by increasing its stake in economic intercourse with Western Europe—even if this means increasing Europe's vulnerability to Soviet influence.

European governments have tentatively resolved the nuclear dilemma by a contingent acceptance of INF, intended both to recouple the U.S. strategic deterrent to Europe and to balance off the Soviet SS-20. Damage to the European détente will be minimized, they hope, with only American fingers on the triggers. They tacitly, if reluctantly, accept the U.S. war-fighting doctrine. The package is rounded out by political assurances to the Soviets—or "reinsurance," as former chancellor Schmidt called it—presumably against either lower deterrence credibility if INF is not deployed or against Soviet ire if it is. Deployment was made contingent on a prior effort at arms control; these talks, at this writing, have broken down and deployment is underway, but whether it will be completed as planned is uncertain.

This is not the place to rehearse all the arguments, paradoxes, and political currents generated by the INF issue. It is of interest for our present theme in that it presents Europe's nuclear alliance dilemma in quintessential form: it is seen simultaneously (or by different groups) as insurance against American nuclear abandonment and as a source of European nuclear entrapment.[33] Probably INF would shore up deterrence marginally. In contemplating a conventional attack, the Soviets probably would perceive a greater likelihood of U.S. retaliation against their homeland with nuclear weapons based in Europe than with intercontinental ones, since the U.S. could at least hope the Soviets would limit their counter-retaliation to Europe. (Indeed, Moscow would have a strong incentive to so limit it—to act as if the physical location of the weapons rather than the nationality of the trigger finger dictated the direction of their response—in the hope of avoiding setting off the whole U.S. strategic arsenal.) Alternatively, the Soviet Union might feel that an attack on Europe would have to start with a preemptive assault on INF, and would shrink from that for fear that so provocative an act would trigger full-scale U.S. retaliation. But both of these deterrent arguments lead straight to the point made by the European Left that INF means greater damage to Europe in case deterrence fails, and the first argument supports the view that it makes the United States more

[33] A similar point is made by Robert J. Art in "Fixing Atlantic Bridges," *Foreign Policy*, No. 46 (Spring 1982), 77.

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willing to *initiate* nuclear war. The Left in the European political spectrum tends to focus on the danger of nuclear entrapment that INF poses, whereas the Right emphasizes its reduction of the risk of nuclear abandonment. No doubt the moderates feel the dilemma most intensely.

Conclusion

The security dilemma occurs in relations between allies as well as between adversaries. In a multipolar system, the alliance and adversary dilemmas are of roughly equal importance and are closely intertwined. Choices in each dilemma are constrained not only by predicted or feared effects internal to itself, but also by side effects in the other dilemma. In particular, strategy choices in the adversary game—conciliation or firmness—are constrained by fears of abandonment or entrapment by allies.

The alliance dilemma is more severe in a multipolar than in a bipolar system because high mutual dependence coexists with plausible realignment options. An ally's defection is a calamity, yet distinctly possible. Conciliating the adversary, or weakening one's support of the ally to guard against entrapment, are both constrained by fears of abandonment. But attempts to insure against abandonment by supporting the ally and avoiding accommodation with the opponent increase the risk of entrapment; hence the dilemma. On the whole, however, abandonment worries outweigh entrapment fears. The mutual fear of abandonment tends to promote convergence of policy—typically convergence on mutual support and firmness toward the adversary.

The alliance security dilemma is less severe in a bipolar system because—although fears of entrapment exist—the risks of abandonment are low. The adversary dilemma dominates; strategy choices in that dilemma are not much constrained by side effects in the alliance game. The allies may adopt independent, indeed contradictory, policies toward the opponent with little fear that the partner will defect in consequence. Thus, the tendency is toward divergence rather than convergence of policy. Although minor policy differences may be resolved by consensus norms, major differences tend to persist because there is little structural pressure toward their resolution. And their persistence does not seriously threaten the existence of the alliance.[34]

It follows that those who see NATO's current crisis as heralding its collapse tend to confuse cause and effect. Although the disagreements

[34] These remarks are, in effect, an elaboration of Kenneth Waltz's axiom that flexibility of alignment in multipolarity produces rigidity of strategy, while rigidity of alignment in bipolarity promotes flexibility of strategy. Waltz (fn. 25).

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have arisen from a variety of proximate causes, they persist largely because the alliance *cannot* break up. Since NATO is a product of the bipolar structure of the system, it cannot collapse or change basically until that structure changes. This structural guarantee against disintegration encourages unilateralism and inhibits compromise. Policy conflicts may not be resolved because the cost of not resolving them does not include a risk to the alliance itself. In contrast, the structural instability of multipolar alliances—the fact that they *could* collapse—tended to promote conflict resolution and policy consistency among their members.

The only way in which intra-NATO conflict might conceivably bring about the alliance's demise is through a radical revision of the U.S. conception of its interests such that it is no longer subject to structural compulsion. It is conceivable that the U.S., disillusioned with European obstinacy, might relapse into hemispheric isolation. This would mean recognizing, as Robert Tucker and others have argued,[35] that America's physical security in the nuclear age is not dependent on keeping Western Europe out of Soviet hands; it would also indicate a substantial devaluation of the cultural, economic, and other nonsecurity values that have motivated the U.S. commitment. It is also conceivable that Western Europe might unite and take full responsibility for its own defense and nuclear deterrence. This would amount to a change in the structure of the international system, rendering the alliance irrelevant or unnecessary. The likelihood of either of these events in the foreseeable future is extremely low. The alliance will survive, while its internal conflicts will continue to produce much argument but little resolution until the Soviet Union once again appears threatening to Europe or nonthreatening to U.S. interests elsewhere, or until political changes in either the United States or Europe (or in both) generate more harmonious policy preferences toward the adversary.

[35] Robert W. Tucker and Linda Wrigley, eds., *The Atlantic Alliance and Its Critics* (New York: Praeger, 1983), chap. 6.

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WHAT MAKES DETERRENCE WORK?

Cases from 1900 to 1980

By PAUL HUTH and BRUCE RUSSETT*

Extended Deterrence of Overt Threats

THE use of military force to achieve foreign-policy objectives is an enduring feature of international politics. Force, or the threat of force, may be used either to change the status quo or to maintain it. Threatening the use of force to maintain the status quo often takes the form of deterrence, defined by Patrick Morgan as "the threat to use force in response as a way of preventing the first use of force by someone else."[1] Deterrence sometimes succeeds and sometimes fails. Failures are attested to by numerous international wars of history. In the nuclear age, a failure could cost us our lives. The conditions of successful deterrence thus require thorough logical and empirical analysis.

Deterrence may seek to prevent an attack on oneself, or an attack on some other party—in international politics, an ally, a client state, or a friendly neutral. Deterrence as practiced by major powers is most commonly deterrence of an attack on another party. This is known as "extended deterrence." For the United States since 1945, it has meant deterrence of attack on American allies in Western Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. It is a more precarious and demanding task than that of deterring a frontal attack on oneself. "Extended deterrence" will be the focus of this article.

Deterrence may also be classified as either general or immediate deterrence. Morgan identifies general deterrence as relating to "opponents who maintain armed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither is anywhere near mounting an attack." Immediate deterrence concerns a relationship "where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it."[2] The success or failure of general deterrence is

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[1] *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis,* 2d ed. (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983) 11.

[2] Morgan (fn. 1), 30.

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difficult to evaluate. As most observers have long recognized, the absence of an attack does not necessarily attest to the success of deterrence: perhaps the potential "attacker" never really had any intention of attacking. If so, the "attacker" was never deterred. Lacking access to the archives and minds of the Kremlin, for instance, analysts can argue indefinitely as to whether the Soviet Union in fact has, or has not, been deterred from invading Western Europe.

Situations of immediate deterrence are somewhat easier to identify and to analyze. They may also be more important. If we do not know how deterrence works when it is most needed (in a crisis when there is a relatively high probability of war), policies designed to assure general deterrence are likely to be based on incomplete or misleading notions of how deterrence works, and deterrence theory will be weak. Even with immediate deterrence, however, there remains a problem in identifying precisely why an attack does not materialize. It is always possible that the reason has little to do with the threat of retaliation, and that the failure to attack is due to a change of priorities by decision-makers, or a change of decision-makers. But it is a reasonable presumption, permitting empirical analysis, that the threat was the primary reason for success. If the deterrent threat fails, then we may ask whether the threat was not perceived, or not perceived as likely to be executed, or not perceived as, even if carried out, carrying consequences severe enough to warrant abstention from the attack. Most commonly, the perception may combine some element of low expected probability of execution with not-too-severe consequences—in other words, attack carries an acceptable "expected utility," at least as compared with the perceived alternatives available to the prospective attacker.

In this article we shall lay out an expected-utility model of deterrence and test that model on a set of cases of extended, immediate deterrence from the period 1900 to 1980. We shall conclude that successful deterrence is very much more than just a matter of having a favorable military balance, and very much a matter of the nature and extent of ties between the defender state and the state it wishes to protect.

The effort derives in part from an exercise first carried out more than two decades ago.[3] That exercise, although it reached some potentially important conclusions, needs to be refined and extended in a number of ways. First, it considered only seventeen cases of deterrence, from the

[3] Bruce Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 7 (March 1963), 97-109. The logic of this analysis was extended, and difficulties in comprehending the reasons for success and failure delineated further, in Bruce Russett, "Pearl Harbor: Deterrence Theory and Decision Theory," *Journal of Peace Research* 4 (No. 2, 1967), 89-105.

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period 1935 to 1961. The set of cases can now be extended both forward and backward in time. Second, the definition used to identify the cases needs to be made more rigorous—an explicit use of the concept of immediate deterrence, with overt threat of retaliation, will enable us to identify the universe of applicable cases and to protect against the inclusion of cases in which deterrence was not demonstrably applicable at all. Third, we can extend the theoretical model with additional variables and more rigorous empirical measures. Finally, expansion of the universe of cases will permit formal statistical analysis in a way not possible with only seventeen cases.

The problem, then, is one of immediate deterrence. We will employ Morgan's criteria[4] to identify the relevant cases:

1. The officials in a state (which we shall call the "attacker") are considering attacking a state ("protégé") that is formally allied to or deemed important by a third state ("defender").

2. Key officials in the defender state realize this.

3. Recognizing that an attack is a distinct possibility, the officials of the defender state, either explicitly or by movement of military forces, threaten the use of retaliatory force in an effort to prevent the attack.

The threats of the attacker and defender states must be overt and clearly entail the use of military force, and the target of the attack (protégé) must be clearly identifiable. We are concerned only with the period before substantial interstate violence begins. Subsequently the defender's task becomes one of compellence—stopping an action already undertaken—which is more demanding than deterrence.

The expected-utility model we shall be applying in our efforts to explain decisions to fight requires some further assumptions. An expected-utility model involves analysis of inference about the utilities decision-makers attach to outcomes, and the probabilities they attach (however crudely or vaguely) to achievement of those outcomes. It is customary to assume that the decision-making systems of attacker and defender operate essentially as unitary actors. Although there is a vast literature on bureaucratic politics that disputes the applicability of such an assumption, it remains a common one in studies of peace and war decisions. In this instance it only requires assuming that the key decision (to attack or not, to respond to the attack with force or not) are made

[4] Morgan (fn. 1), 38. Morgan also used a fourth criterion requiring that the leaders of the attacker state desist primarily because of the retaliatory threat. Such a judgment cannot be made definitively. But in all the cases that met our other criteria, we are satisfied that a failure to attack was largely because of the defender's threat.

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by single decision-makers or by small groups operating as units. For such key security decisions it remains a justifiable assumption.[5]

Similarly, we must assume that decision-makers are rational expected-utility maximizers. This too appears at first to be a strong assumption, but it is reasonable as required here. We use "rational" in the sense of being able to order one's preferences, and to choose according to that ordering and perceptions of the likelihood of various outcomes. A rational decision-maker may be risk-averse, or risk-acceptant. The assumption of rationality does not require that perceptions be accurate, or that a given decision-maker's preferences be the same as other people's.

It does require that a decision-maker choose the option with greatest expected utility at the time, but in this context it does not mean the choice has to be made from a search through a near-infinite set of possible options, as in the ideal model of rationality. It requires only a choice between two options so clear as almost surely to be among those considered. For the attacker, the options are holding back or pressing ahead with military force against the protégé. For the defender, the choices are accepting the consequences of the loss of the protégé or meeting the attack with substantial military force. Permutations within these options doubtless exist but need not be considered here. As to whether the decision-maker's search of options yields the optimal plan of action, we cannot know, but we do assume that the search is intense enough to yield a "satisficing" version for each of the two basic options, and that the satisficing version will not be so different from the optimal one as to distort our results significantly. For decisions of great import, usually taken over a period of some weeks or months, this assumption appears reasonable.[6] With these assumptions we are much closer to an image of the bounded rationality of the "sensible" decision-maker than to the unattainable ideal of full rationality.

An Expected-Utility Model

Deterrence can be viewed as a game of strategic interaction, in which a "rational" opponent assesses the potential costs and benefits of its actions based upon expectations regarding the likely behavior of its

[5] See especially the argument in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 27-29.

[6] Decisions to threaten a smaller state with attack usually are the result of substantial premeditation (resulting from previously perceived opportunities or provocations), even when they are triggered by a short-term crisis. Similarly, decisions to counter such a threat are usually (though less often) presaged by deliberation or contingency planning.

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adversary.[7] By this view, a deterrent threat is effective to the extent it can produce cost-benefit calculations on the part of the potential attacker in which the expected utility of an attack would be less than the expected utility of foregoing the attack. The expected gains from an attack must be so small, or the expected losses so substantial, that abstaining from attack will produce a more favorable outcome (greater gains or, more likely, smaller losses).

In the standard formulation, expected utility is the product of the utility of a given outcome times the decision-maker's estimated (subjective) probability of achieving the outcome. The attacker, in estimating his prospective gains from an attack, must consider the gains he can achieve from attacking (occupying, perhaps, or otherwise forcing major concessions from) the protégé if the defender does not provide active military assistance to (fight for) the protégé, and the gains (or very likely net losses) to be accrued if the defender does fight. Furthermore, he must weight each of these outcomes by the estimated likelihood that they will occur (the probability that the defender will indeed fight or not). Then he must compare the value of this term (expected utility of attack) with the utility (which may or may not be high) of not attacking. If the value of the first term is more than the second, he will attack; if less, he will be deterred. Finally, in making estimates of the probability that the defender will fight, the attacker must expect the defender to make a calculation of the utility the protégé provides to the defender, as compared with the costs the defender would incur from fighting. To the degree the attacker thinks the defender's losses would be less from fighting than from letting the protégé go without a fight, the higher should be the attacker's estimate of the probability that the defender will fight.[8]

[7] Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960), 3-20.

[8] Formally, the attacker will fight if $U_{a_1}(p) + U_{a_2}(1-p) > U_{a_3}$ where U_{a_1} is the utility of attacking if the defender resists, U_{a_2} is the utility of attacking if the defender does not resist, U_{a_3} is the utility of no attack, and p is the attacker's subjective probability that the defender will resist. If the defender had full freedom of action to decide whether to resist or not only after attacker had committed himself, the utility calculation would be simple: fight only if $U_{r_a} > U_{r_b}$, where U_{r_a} is the utility of resisting an attack and U_{r_b} the utility of not resisting. But since much of deterrence consists in committing oneself to irreversible acts (with which one might in the end wish one did not have to follow through), the defender too must calculate from the beginning the probability that the attacker will indeed attack, and the defender's own utilities from the "attacker's" nonattack (if deterrence succeeds) as well as from attack. Hence the symmetrical formula for the defender in deciding whether to commit himself to fight: $U_{r_2}(q) + U_{r_2}(1-q) > U_{r_3}$ where q is the probability that deterrence will fail. In deciding on the probability the other will fight, each must estimate the other's utilities. In doing so each must make some judgment about whether the other is risk-averse or risk-acceptant. We include a measure for that element in the analysis below. This presentation assumes cardinal calculations of utility and probability; of course few if

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Most attention in analyzing deterrent situations is usually given to the balance of military capabilities between attacker and defender. The attacker must assess whether it has sufficient military power to win a war with the defender, and at what cost. That assessment affects the attacker's calculations in two ways. First, it affects the raw utility of attacking and fighting the defender. Second, it affects the attacker's estimate of the probability that the defender will in fact fight, since the defender presumably will make a similar assessment and, other things being equal, be more likely to fight the more favorable it considers the military balance. This kind of consideration is standard in contemporary political assessments, from arguments about the need to close the "window of vulnerability" to debates about whether NATO conventional forces can be adequate to support a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. Both strategic weapons for general war and the balance of capabilities for local war in the region of the protégé are said to matter. In the nuclear era, debate is further complicated by arguments as to whether nuclear weapons are so destructive that the mere prospect that substantial numbers of them might be used is sufficient to deter the attacker, regardless of the relative balance.[9]

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any political decision-makers attach such firm calculations to decisions they make. Nevertheless a rational decision-maker has to operate in some crude approximation of this fashion, with estimates of more and less, and our ultimate conclusions do not depend on our assumption being a perfect representation of reality.

[9] The systematic evidence on this point is against attributing great importance to the military balance. Erich Weede, "Extended Deterrence by Superpower Alliance," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (June 1982), 231-54, reports evidence that *mutual* nuclear deterrence prevents war not only between the superpowers, but between their allies across the alliance divide. A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), chap. 4, find nuclear powers prevailed in only about half of the deterrence crises studied, though local conventional superiority did seem to help. Jacek Kugler, "Terror without Deterrence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (September 1984), reports similar results, and that even nuclear monopoly (much less if both powers have a nuclear option) brought a favorable outcome only half the time. Russett, "Calculus of Deterrence" (fn. 3), reports the irrelevance of both conventional and strategic superiority, and both he and Bueno de Mesquita (*The War Trap*, fn. 5, chap. 5) report the inferior predictive power of the military balance as compared with a full expected-utility model. Randolph Siverson and Michael Tennefoss, "Alliance, Power, and the Escalation of Conflicts: 1815–1965," mimeo. (Davis: University of California, 1982), find that minor powers with major-power allies are less likely to be the targets of threat than are minor powers without such allies, and that minor powers with major-power allies are less likely to have those threats escalate to war. Nevertheless, all these studies (least *The War Trap*) suffer from challengeable decisions about case selection or measurement, and the results are hardly definitive. More broadly in the literature, there is some evidence that wars are more likely between states of near-equal power than between states of very disparate power. But it is still not clear whether that statement merely says that states very different in power are unlikely to go to war (they don't "need" to, because it is clear who would win), and whether the war-among-near-equals phenomenon is really a result of changing power relationships in the region of near equality. On this see Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, *World Politics: The Menu for Choice* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1981), 119.

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Deterrence is a much more complex problem than simply weighing military balances, however. As George and Smoke point out, "the requirements for implementing deterrence are much less a matter of acquiring, proving possession of, or using raw military capabilities than a matter of demonstrating concern, motivation and commitment."[10] This is especially true in the case of deterrence of attack on a third party, since the costs of failing to meet an attack on the third party are rarely as great as the costs of failing to defend one's home territory. Bargaining power is a product of resolve as well as of capability, and resolve is in turn a function of the interests at stake and of "inherent" resolve (that is, risk-proneness). Presumably (again, other things being equal) the willingness to run risks or pay costs to defend a protégé will be greater the greater the objective or intrinsic value of the protégé, perhaps as measured by wealth, population, or strategic importance. But that value may not be very helpful in analyzing a deterrent situation, since the greater the value of the protégé, the higher the costs and the greater the risks the attacker will presumably be willing to accept in order to acquire it. The "objective" value of the protégé thus appears on both sides of the equation.[11]

Motivation, commitment, and resolve are in some part a matter of the "psychology" of the decision-maker. Some decision-makers seem to be determined, others irresolute. Or, in decision-making terms, some may be risk-acceptant (Hilter in 1938) and others risk-averse (Chamberlain). An attacker (whatever his own attitude toward risk) must try to assess the behavior of the defender in previous international crises, if any are relevant. Ideally one would look at the behavior of the particular decision-maker(s) in charge of the defender state; lacking that example one might look at the behavior of previous decision-makers in charge of the state.

What conclusions can be drawn from such considerations? The obvious one would follow from an assumption that risk-acceptance or risk-aversion are inherent to a decision-maker (or state). If he was unwilling to take the risk of fighting the last time, the odds may be that he will

[10] Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 52.

[11] This is not to imply that it will have the *same* value on both sides of the equation, only that a more valuable protégé will have greater value on both sides than would a less valuable protégé. Western Europe is a case in point. Presumably its value is much greater (prosperous, industrially intact, willingly allied) to the Western alliance than it would be (economically chaotic, devastated, sullenly occupied) to the Soviet side after a successful Soviet attack. Nevertheless, we imagine that Western Europe is of sufficient intrinsic value that the Soviet Union *might* under some circumstances pay costs to acquire it that it would never pay to acquire, say, only Finland.

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be risk-averse once again. An alternative assumption, however, would be that attitudes toward risk-taking are determined more by political context than by personality or "character." Context may be determined so randomly (for example, variations in the intrinsic importance of the protégé in each case) that past behavior will provide little or no guidance for predicting future behavior. Or it may operate perversely, leading to an opposite prediction. For example, Chamberlain's acquiescence in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia may have made him less willing to acquiesce in the case of Poland a year later. Some research suggests that the defender's previous behavior does not systematically predict either way subsequent behavior,[12] but we still must take it into account in our analysis. Certainly the "need" to demonstrate resolve (to avoid falling dominoes) was a key rationalization for America's experience in Vietnam and throughout the post-Munich era.

Motivation and resolve are also affected by aspects of the relationship between the defender and its protégé. Resolve may be communicated by establishing a formal military alliance between the two—and once established, it may serve to strengthen a defender's resolve by raising the stakes it has to lose by failing to honor its alliance commitment (weakening its credibility the next time it is challenged). Motivation may be strengthened by a variety of economic, political, and military ties between defender and protégé, such as trade, investment in the protégé's economy, economic assistance or military equipment and advisers to the protégé from the defender, and a host of less tangible forms of political or cultural affinity. Again, holding other elements of the calculation constant, the defender should be more willing to take risks in defense of a third party the more tangible and intangible interests there are at stake. The immediate role of tangible interests like trade and investment is obvious. Additionally, they, and other less tangible ties, may widen the defender's image of itself, providing an emotional stake in the well-being of politically or culturally related peoples. There also is some evidence from systematic comparative analyses to this effect.[13]

[12] See Michael Altfeld and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Choosing Sides in Wars," *International Studies Quarterly* 23 (March 1979), 87-112. For a good discussion on the matter of deriving generalizations from a deterrer's past behavior, versus the context-bound meaning of the behavior, see Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," *International Security* 7 (Winter 1982/83), 3-30, esp. 8-13.

[13] H. K. Tillema and J. R. Van Wingen, "Law and Power in Military Interventions by Major States after World War II," *International Studies Quarterly* 26 (June 1982), 220-50, report that ties of formal alliance, and defender's military bases on the territory of the protégé are associated with successful deterrence. Russett, "Calculus of Deterrence" (fn. 3), found no such association with alliance but did with various ties of economic and political interdependence and military cooperation. Bruce Russett and Miroslav Nincic, "American Opinion on the Use of Military Force Abroad," *Political Science Quarterly* 91 (Fall 1976),

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Cases and Hypotheses

We shall test hypotheses about conditions favoring deterrence on a set of historical cases of attempted deterrence of attack on third parties. The cases include all those we were able to identify in the international system in the period since 1900. We limited ourselves to that period because reliable information on earlier cases is too difficult to acquire, and because even with reliable data the utility of some of the measures (the significance, for instance, of certain military forces) shifts as one moves into earlier historical epochs. Even so, we were able to identify fifty-four relevant cases including examples from both the nuclear and prenuclear eras. Thus we can test whether nuclear weapons make a difference.

The universe of cases is delineated in terms of overt threat and counterthreat. Military or political acts that constitute such threats include threats of force (threat to use force, threat to blockade, threat to occupy territory, threat to declare war) and displays of force (alert, mobilization).[14] We studied diverse primary and secondary sources to establish that the cases chosen fit our criteria, and to obtain information on the variables.[15] Table 1 shows a list of the cases with dates, the states

411-32, report that among the general American public, willingness to aid other states militarily is stronger the greater the geographical proximity of the protégé and the level of foreign trade. Neither formal alliance nor similarity of political system (save for the protégé's not having a communist government) seemed to matter much.

[14] This classification is taken from Charles Gochman and Zeev Maoz, "Serious Interstate Disputes, 1816–1976: Empirical Patterns and Theoretical Insights," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (forthcoming, 1984).

[15] The full data set with all variables is available from the authors. The sources used to identify and select cases of attempted deterrence were Melvin Small and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982); Randolph Siverson and Michael Tennefoss, "Interstate Conflicts: 1815–1965," *International Interactions* 9 (July 1982), 147-78, particularly the appendix listing the data for the article; Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), particularly the case summaries in the appendix, 531-70; George and Smoke (fn. 10), 105-500; Robert Butterworth, *Managing Interstate Conflict 1945-1975* (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, 1976; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (London: Keesing's Ltd., 1933–1980); *Index to The New York Times* (New York: The New York Times, 1900–1980); Thomas Ehrlich, *Cyprus 1958–1967: International Crises and the Role of Law* (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1974); William B. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1967–1976* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977; H. Peter Krosby, *Finland, Germany, and the Soviet Union, 1940–1941—The Petsamo Dispute* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968); and the Correlates of the War Project data set on international disputes, 1816–1980, obtained from tapes made available through the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan. In some other candidate cases we decided either that there was no overt threat by the attacker (e.g., Soviet Union against Iran in 1979), or no previous overt deterrent threat by the deterrer (e.g., United States for South Korea before the North Korean attack, or the United Kingdom over the Falklands/Malvinas before the Argentine invasion). On this last case, see Richard Ned Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falkland War," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 6 (March 1983), 5-35. Inevitably a few cases are marginal for one reason or another. Probably the most questionable to many readers will be the characteri-

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involved, and the outcomes. Some historical events are "unpacked" into separate, sequential cases. For example, in the Agadir crisis France first must decide whether to defend its interest in Morocco, and then the United Kingdom must decide whether to defend its ally France; in August 1914 there were four separable cases.[16] We judged deterrence to be successful in thirty-one (57 per cent) of the cases.

We have attempted to identify the conditions under which deterrence will succeed or fail. Thus for explaining the attacker's decision we simply code that decision as "attack the protégé" (0) or "no attack" (1). A military attack is defined as a government-sanctioned engagement of its regular armed forces in combat with the regular armed forces of the protégé and/or its defender, resulting in more than 250 fatalities. Once this level of combat and casualty has been reached, subsequent events become a matter of "intrawar" deterrence. We also include as "attacks" (failures of deterrence) instances in which the attacker gained its principal goals even though fatalities were minimal (e.g., Czechoslovakia in 1938, case no. 25; Cyprus in 1964, no. 44; Goa, no. 39), and instances in which the attacker occupied territory of the protégé for several years.[17]

We have also analyzed the cases in which deterrence failed: can we explain the defender's decision whether or not to fight? Attackers often misjudge the defenders' resolve. As Lebow remarked, describing his results, "Perhaps our most striking finding is the extent to which crisis strategies in the cases we studied were based on unrealistic assessments of how adversaries would respond when challenged. In every instance brinkmanship was predicated upon the belief that the adversary (defender) in question would back down when challenged."[18] Therefore

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zation of Israel as the attacker to be deterred in 1967 (case no. 49). We did so because of the origins of the situation. PLO forces, with the complicity of Syria, had been attacking Israel, and Israel threatened to make a (limited) strike on Syria to put a stop to the attacks. Egypt rushed verbally to Syria's side with deterrent threats and began to take military steps that, although they may have originated partly as an effort to deter attack on Syria, escalated to the point where they put basic Israeli security at risk. The result was a failure of deterrence manifested by an Israeli strike (possibly preemptive) against Egypt. See Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), chap. 5.

[16] In an alternative analysis we aggregated both sides for most of these events to make single cases (e.g., Russia and France defending Serbia against Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1914), reducing the total number of cases to forty-seven. But save for one minor exception to be discussed below, the values that emerged in our equations were not significantly different in the two procedures. Hence we shall consider only the results of the "unpacked" cases, which we consider the more appropriate mode of analysis.

[17] In fact, all cases that were characterized by relatively low levels of fatalities (250-1,000) also qualified as deterrence failures by one of the other criteria (goal achievement or occupation).

[18] Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 270-71. Also see Snyder and Diesing (fn. 15).

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Table 1
Deterrence Cases, 1900-1980

Cases of Attempted Deterrence					
Case	*Year(s)*	*Attacker*	*Protégé*	*Defender*	*Outcome*
1	1902/3	Germany	Venezuela	United States	Success
2	1904	Russia	Korea	Japan	Failure
3	1905/6	Germany	Morocco	France	Success
4	1905/6	Germany	France	Britain	Success
5	1908	Turkey	Persia	Russia	Success
6	1908/9	Russia/Serbia	Austria-Hungary	Germany	Success
7	1908/9	Austria-Hungary/Germany	Serbia	Russia	Failure
8	1911	Italy	Tripoli	Turkey	Failure
9	1911	Germany	Morocco	France	Success
10	1911	Germany	France	Britain	Success
11	1912	Serbia	Albania	Austria-Hungary	Success
12	1912	Austria-Hungary	Serbia	Russia	Success
13	1912	Russia/Serbia	Austria-Hungary	Germany	Success
14	1913	Rumania	Bulgaria	Russia	Success
15	1913	Bulgaria	Greece	Serbia	Failure
16	1913	Serbia	Albania	Austria-Hungary	Success
17	1914	Austria-Hungary/Germany	Serbia	Russia	Failure
18	1914	Russia/Serbia	Austria-Hungary	Germany	Failure
19	1914	Germany/Austria-Hungary	Russia	France	Failure
20	1914	Germany	Belgium	Britain	Failure
21	1920	Soviet Union	Iran	Britain	Failure
22	1927	Yugoslavia	Albania	Italy	Success
23	1935	Italy	Ethiopia	Britain	Failure
24	1936	Japan	Outer Mongolia	Soviet Union	Success
25	1938	Germany	Czechoslovakia	Britain/France	Failure
26	1938/39	Italy	Tunisia	France	Success
27	1939	Japan	Outer Mongolia	Soviet Union	Failure
28	1939	Germany	Poland	Britain/France	Failure
29	1940	Soviet Union	Finland	Germany	Success

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30	1946	Soviet Union	Iran	United States	Success
31	1947	Soviet Union	Turkey	United States	Success
32	1948/49	Soviet Union	W. Berlin/W. Germany	United States	Success
33	1950	United States	North Korea	China	Failure
34	1954/55	China	Taiwan/Islands	United States	Success
35	1957	Turkey/United States	Syria	Soviet Union/Egypt	Success
36	1957	Egypt/Syria/Soviet Union	Turkey	United States	Success
37	1958	China	Taiwan/Islands	United States	Success
38	1961	Iraq	Kuwait	Britain	Success
39	1961	India	Goa	Portugal	Failure
40	1961	Soviet Union	W. Berlin/W. Germany	United States	Success
41	1962	India	Nepal	China	Success
42	1962	North Vietnam	Thailand	United States	Success
43	1963/64	Indonesia	Malaysia	Britain	Failure
44	1964	Turkey	Cyprus	Greece	Failure
45	1964/65	North Vietnam	South Vietnam	United States	Failure
46	1965	India	Pakistan	China	Failure
47	1966/67	Turkey	Cyprus	Greece	Failure
48	1967	Israel	Syria	Egypt	Failure
49	1970	Syria	Jordan	Israel	Success
50	1973	Soviet Union	Israel	United States	Success
51	1974	Turkey	Cyprus	Greece	Failure
52	1975	Morocco	Western Sahara	Spain	Success
53	1976/77	Guatemala	Belize	Britain	Success
54	1978/79	Tanzania	Uganda	Libya	Failure

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TABLE 1 (*cont.*)

CASES OF FAILED DETERRENCE

Case	*Year(s)*	*Attacker*	*Protégé*	*Defender*	*Does Defender Intervene?*
2	1904	Russia	Korea	Japan	Yes
7	1908/9	Austria-Hungary	Serbia	Russia	No
8	1911	Italy	Tripoli	Turkey	Yes
14	1913	Bulgaria	Greece	Serbia	Yes
17	1914	Austria-Hungary/Germany	Serbia	Russia/France	Yes
18	1914	Russia/Serbia	Austria-Hungary	Germany	Yes
19	1914	Germany/Austria-Hungary	Russia	France	Yes
20	1914	Germany	Belgium	Britain	Yes
21	1920	Soviet Union	Iran	Britain	Yes
23	1935	Italy	Ethiopia	Britain	No
25	1938/39	Germany	Czechoslovakia	Britain/France	No
27	1939	Japan	Outer Mongolia	Soviet Union	Yes
28	1939	Germany	Poland	Britain/France	Yes
33	1950	United States	North Korea	China	Yes
39	1961	India	Goa	Portugal	No
43	1963/64	Indonesia	Malaysia	Britain	Yes
44	1964	Turkey	Cyprus	Greece	No
45	1964/65	North Vietnam	South Vietnam	United States	Yes
46	1965	India	Pakistan	China	No
47	1966/67	Turkey	Cyprus	Greece	No
48	1967	Israel	Syria	Egypt	Yes
51	1974	Turkey	Cyprus	Greece	No
54	1978/79	Tanzania	Uganda	Libya	Yes

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we shall also try to see whether our model and analysis can successfully discriminate between cases where the defender ultimately fought (coded 1) and where it did not (0).

Our general hypothesis is that an expected-utility model will provide a better-than-chance explanation of defenders' and attackers' decisions. But much more important than that, we wish to test various hypotheses about which elements of an expected-utility analysis provide the most powerful explanations. Our hypotheses, tapping aspects of the variables in the model, come under three general categories: those emphasizing relative power, those concerning the role of past behavior in signaling current intentions, and those stressing the contextual importance of communitarian ties between states. By including variables of all three types in our equations we can test their relative explanatory power. The hypotheses and independent variables are as follows:

1. The relative balance of military capabilities will help explain the results.

1a. Attacker will be more likely to fight (deterrence to fail) to the degree that attacker's *overall* ("strategic") military and economic capabilities (a measure of military *potential*) exceed those of defender.

1b. Attacker will be more likely to fight to the degree that attacker's *overall existing* military forces exceed those of defender.

1c. Attacker will be more likely to fight to the degree that attacker's *potential local* (in the area of the protégé) military capabilities exceed those of defender.

1d. Attacker will be more likely to fight to the degree that attacker's *existing local* military capabilities exceed those of defender.

1e. Attacker will be less likely to fight if defender is known to possess nuclear weapons.

To measure overall military and economic capabilities (military potential) we used the composite national capabilities index developed by the Correlates of War Project. This index measures three theoretically distinct dimensions of national capabilities: military, industrial, and demographic.[19] The military dimension includes each state's military personnel and military expenditures (weighted equally) for each year. (This is the measure we use for existing military capabilities for hypotheses

[19] The raw data for the construction of this variable were obtained from tapes made available through the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan. For the development of the composite national capabilities index, see J. D. Singer, S. Bremer, and J. Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965," in Bruce Russett, ed., *Peace, War and Numbers* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972).

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1b and 1d.) The industrial dimension consists of each state's production of ingot steel and industrial fuel consumption and measures the potential of a state to support a military effort. The demographic dimension includes each state's population and urban population and indicates the state's potential to increase its power by drawing on its civilian population during extended war. In the index of military potential for hypotheses 1a and 1c the three dimensions are weighted equally.

For local capabilities the military dimension is adjusted to reflect the impact of distance. If both defender and attacker share a border, or share one with the protégé, then no adjustment is made. Otherwise the indices of military capabilities are adjusted for the distances between the attacker's and defender's loci of power and the protégé, and for the principal military transport capabilities of the day (expressed in travel days).[20] Ideally it might have been desirable to measure actual locally available military forces (divisions, gunboats, etc.) but that would have required a level of information not easily accessible, and in any case still would not have evaded decisions about forces that, although not immediately on the scene, could be brought in within a "reasonable" time. The procedure we did use seems less arbitrary, and adequate to the purpose. In all cases the power of the protégé is added to that of the defender. As noted earlier, military capability should affect both one's own utilities and one's subjective probability that the other will fight.

Reciprocal hypotheses apply to the behavior of the defender in those cases in which the potential attacker has actually attacked:

1f. Defender will be more likely to fight to the degree that defender's overall military potential exceeds attacker's.

1g. Defender will be more likely to fight to the degree that defender's overall existing military capabilities exceeds attacker's.

1h. Defender will be more likely to fight to the degree that defender's potential local military capabilities exceed attacker's.

1i. Defender will be more likely to fight to the degree that defender's existing local military capabilities exceed attacker's.

1j. Defender will be more likely to fight if defender possesses nuclear weapons. This hypothesis cannot really be tested because there were only three instances in which an attacker pressed an attack against a nuclear-armed defender.

2. The second set of hypotheses concerns the effect of the defender state's previous behavior in deterrent situations (if any are appli-

[20] The formula used was that developed by Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (fn. 5), 105. The function is a nonlinear one; i.e., the *rate* at which power declines is less over greater distances.

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cable). This variable measures the extent to which the defender has a record of strongly supporting a threatened protégé and suggests the likelihood that the defender will fight (its degree of risk-proneness).

2a. Attacker will be more likely to fight if defender has not fought in the past when its protégé was attacked.

2b. Attacker will be less likely to fight if defender has not fought in the past. This is the alternative hypothesis, suggesting that a defender who earlier demonstrated "weakness" will be less likely to do so again.

In the statistical analysis, we assigned a series of "dummy variables" to three different possibilities: whether the defender had fought on behalf of a protégé in the past, whether it had not fought, and whether it had a record of successful deterrence. In all of these cases a "no" could indicate either the opposite historical experience or simply no relevant experience. (For example, a success would be coded 1 for the last dummy variable and a 0 for either no past experience or a failure.) We tested the hypotheses by examining the defender's behavior in the most recent past case of attempted deterrence. Similarly, we have corresponding hypotheses to explain the behavior of the defender if attack occurred.

2c. Defender will be more likely to fight if it has fought in the past.

2d. Defender will be more likely to fight if it has not fought in the past.

3. Third, we have a set of hypotheses concerning the effect of ties between the defender and protégé, with more or stronger ties raising the value of the protégé to the defender and thus raising the probability that the defender will fight rather than allow the protégé to be overcome.

3a. Attacker will be less likely to fight if defender was linked to protégé by a formal military alliance prior to the emergence of the immediate deterrence situation.

For our purposes a military alliance was defined as a written agreement, bilateral or multilateral, between sovereign states. Both defense pacts and (rare) ententes were coded as 1, and the absence of either as 0.[21] Five cases in this study were instances in which the threatened protégé was a colony. Although a formal military alliance between sovereign states could not, by definition, exist in those cases, we assumed

[21] Data on military alliances were gathered from Bruce Russett, "An Empirical Typology of International Military Alliances," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 15 (May 1971), 262-80; J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "Formal Alliances, 1815–1939," *Journal of Peace Research* 3 (No. 1, 1966), 1-32; and International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1961–1976).

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that there exists an unwritten but internationally recognized alliance between a colony and its metropole. Thus we treated a colonial relationship as one of formal military commitment.

The corresponding hypothesis for the defender is:

3b. Defender will be more likely to fight if it was linked to the protégé by a formal military alliance prior to the emergence of the immediate deterrence situation.

Two similar hypotheses apply to the role of economic linkages:

3c. Attacker will be less likely to fight the stronger the economic linkages between defender and protégé.

3d. Defender will be more likely to fight the stronger the economic linkages between defender and protégé.

We measured economic linkage as the protégé's share of defender's total merchandise exports and imports. These figures were calculated as the average level over a two- to three-year period, depending on the availability of data prior to the outbreak of the dispute.[22] This variable attempts to estimate the extent to which the defender has developed an important and direct material interest in its relationship with the protégé. Exports to the protégé represent the interest of those firms and industries selling abroad; imports suggest commodities for which the defender's economy may be "dependent" on reliable supplies of goods of a known quality or at favorable prices. Norming the volume of trade by the size of the defender's economy is thus appropriate. Although the decision-makers of the attacker are unlikely to calculate the exact amount of the defender's trade accounted for by the protégé, they are likely to be aware of the general level of commercial activity between the two states. Greater refinement for measuring this variable might result from analyzing exports and imports separately, but the high correlation between the two prevents their separation in statistical analysis. Data on the defender's private foreign investment in the protégé would be desirable but are not available for enough of the cases.

Two further parallel hypotheses apply to political-military linkages:

3e. Attacker will be less likely to fight the stronger the political-military linkages between defender and protégé.

[22] Sources used to calculate trade shares were: Sir John Scott-Keltie, ed. *The Statesman's Yearbook* (London: Macmillan, 1905–1910); *Memorandum on International Trade and Balance of Payments* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1910–1939); H. R. Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics 1750–1970* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975); *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946–1950); *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics* (New York: United Nations, 1950–1980); *World Tables 1976* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); Alexander Eckstein, Walter Galenson, and Ta-Chung Liu, eds., *Economic Trends in Communist China* (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), 671-738; and *Communist China's Balance of Payments* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1966).

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3f. Defender will be more likely to fight the stronger the political-military linkages between defender and protégé.

We measured political-military linkages by the amount of military assistance provided by the defender to the protégé—specifically the percentage share of major weapons systems (aircraft, ships, missiles, armored equipment) imported by the protégé from the defender. Because available data were incomplete and imprecise we coded this variable on a four-point scale rather than on strict percentages: 0-25 per cent = 1, 26-50 per cent = 2, 51-75 per cent = 3, 76-100 per cent = 4.[23]

Finally, we have two further hypotheses about power that apply only to the defender's decision whether or not to fight if an attack does materialize. The defender must decide on the basis of the protégé's value; this includes both values as reflected in linkages and "intrinsic" value as represented by the protégé's strategic, military, or industrial potential. The utility of "peace" under circumstances in which the protégé is lost will depend in some degree on that intrinsic value. We tapped this in two ways. One was to use the measures earlier employed for potential military capability (the composite national capabilities index) and existing military capability, and to calculate the ratio of the protégé's capability on each to that of the defender. As a partial measure of the protégé's strategic importance to the defender we also included a dummy variable for whether they shared a common border. Both defender and attacker will have to take these considerations into account in estimating the defender's utility for not fighting, and thus into account in deriving subjective probabilities for each other's actions. The relevant hypotheses therefore are:

1k. Defender will be more likely to fight the greater the ratio of protégé's existing or potential military capability to its own.

[23] Sources included Robert E. Harkavy, *The Arms Trade and International Systems* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1975); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook* (New York: Humanities Press, 1969–1980), U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965–1980); U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1954–1979* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980); League of Nations, *Statistical Yearbook of the Trade in Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1924–1939); League of Nations, *Armaments Yearbook* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1923–1939); Ushisaburo Kobayashi, *War and Armament Loans of Japan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1922); Eugene Anderson, *The First Moroccan Crisis: 1904–1906* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1966); Jean-Claude Allain, *Agadir: 1911* (Paris: Sorbonne, 1976); Firuz Kazemzadeh, *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Edward Thaden, *Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965); Peter S. M. Tang, *Russia and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1959). If there was more than one defender all defenders' military capabilities were included, but linkages were measured from the protégé to the defender that took the diplomatic lead in trying to deter.

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11. Defender will be more likely to fight if its territory borders directly on that of protégé.

This reminds us that one element of a full expected-utility model is necessarily missing from the analysis that follows. We should also have a term for the expected utility of peace to the attacker; that is, the attacker's utility for not actually pressing ahead with attack on the protégé. Peace of course includes the utility of possible prosperity and the avoidance of the costs and casualties of war. The utility of peace may be lower if a state must otherwise deal with severe domestic political discontent. Peace also includes the benefits of normal commercial exchange among nations. Most of us assume, most of the time, that the expected utility of peace is high enough to discourage military attacks. We assume, for example, that the Soviet Union probably would not, in "normal" times, have sufficient incentive to make it worthwhile to incur the costs of attacking Western Europe. But this condition might change drastically under circumstances of high-level political and military crisis. Should the Soviet Union suddenly be faced with widespread open revolt in Eastern Europe, the benefits of peace suddenly might look much less attractive. Under those circumstances, its calculation of expected utilities might change entirely and, under the further danger of actual military upheaval in Europe, it might well decide to attack. A previously unattractive balance of military capabilities suddenly might not look so bad.

Because these considerations are much more subjective than most of the others we have discussed, and especially because they can change so drastically in a short period of time, we are not able to incorporate them. To the degree that they are important, they will reduce the explanatory power of our empirical investigation. But partly because they can change rapidly, we do not expect that they will be correlated with the more stable variables in the model. In particular, we do not expect them to be related to the military balance.

Conditions Affecting Deterrence: some empirical results

We analyzed the data through probit analysis, which is analagous to multiple regression analysis for situations in which the dependent variable is dichotomous (yes-no, 1-0). Table 2 gives the results of the best (most powerful explanatory) equation. It employs the best (most powerful) indicator for each of the theoretical concepts specified earlier. (See the Appendix for the general model and the procedures used in estimating the final equation in Table 2.) The equations have been simplified

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to eliminate variables that did not reach the .9 level of statistical significance—a useful cutoff criterion even though we are dealing with the universe of cases over the relevant time period, not a sample.[24] The coefficient's statistic, in parentheses, indicates the significance level, and the relative explanatory power, of each independent variable. The coefficients (b) indicate the amount of difference in the dependent variable for which each independent variable accounts. These coefficients are not readily interpretable, but we present below a further display that will give this information in understandable form. In probit analysis the best measure for the power of the whole equation is the "percentage of

TABLE 2
CONDITIONS PROMOTING EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE

Success = -1.57 + $.18$ *Trade* + $.60$ *Arms* + $.16$ *Local Military Balance* -1.02 *Alliance*
(-2.93) (1.94) (2.84) (2.35) (-1.93)

	Predicted: Failure	Predicted: Success
Actual Failure	18	5
Actual Success	7	24

CONTRIBUTIONS TO PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS

	Value	*Probability of Success*
Trade	0%	.49
	1%	.56
	2%	.63
	4%	.76
	6%	.86
Arms	0-25%	.28
	26-50%	.35
	51-75%	.58
	76-100%	.79
Local Military Balance	0.1	.26
	0.5	.28
	1.0	.32
	2	.37
	3	.43
	5	.56
	10	.83
Alliance	Yes	.39
	No	.77

Note: Percentage of predictions correct = 78; R^2 = .31; N = 54.

[24] In fact, all but one of the results we used are at the .95 level or above. A level of .9 is lower than would be appropriate if we had the luxury of a larger number of cases. But here use of a high level would risk too great a chance of rejecting hypotheses that are basically supported (type II error). Significance levels are given for a one-tailed test where the hypothesis indicates the sign of the expected relationship.

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predictions correct," which we provide, but for those interested in the r-squared we provide that too. The cross-tabulations show the proportion of deterrence failures, and successes, that are correctly explained by each equation.

The first point to be made about these results is the fact that a majority (78 per cent) of the outcomes are correctly predicted by the model. No social science model can explain every case, and this rate compares very well with chance, or with the simple prediction that deterrence will always work. (It did in 57 per cent of the cases.) It also is a very robust result in terms of consistency when various cases are added to or deleted from our set, as, for example, in earlier analyses before events such as August 1914 were "unpacked" into discrete cases or before our list of cases had been thoroughly checked for appropriate inclusion by historians and other authorities. The results from all these analyses are very robust in that the proportion of correct predictions remains very stable; the same three variables (trade, military assistance, and local military balance) consistently make significant contributions to the equations, and only these variables consistently do so. Finally, our findings here compare well with the results derived from a set of expected utilities computed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita for *The War Trap* and kindly provided to us by that author. Of the forty-nine cases for which Bueno de Mesquita has data, his model correctly predicts 71 per cent and ours, 76 per cent. Bueno de Mesquita has since revised his method of computing expected utilities.[25] By that new method, his results would give correct predictions for 72 per cent of the eighteen cases to which those data apply, and we correctly predict 83 per cent of those cases.

But our model here, in addition to showing substantial credibility for our expected-utility model in the aggregate, provides a means of disaggregating components of the model to show which variables are the most effective predictors to deterrence success. Turning to look at the individual variables, the equation shows strong effects for economic linkage (the share of defender's trade with the protégé, hypothesis 3c), arms transfers from defender to protégé (hypothesis 3c), and the military balance, in the variant of existing local capabilities (hypothesis 1d), and a negative effect for military alliance (hypothesis 3a). Military assistance and the local military balance are of about equal importance and are significant at the level of .98 or above, and trade is at the .95 level. Trade and military assistance testify to the importance of economic and political linkages: deterrence is more likely to be effective the greater the defender's visible and symbolic stake in the protégé.

[25] "*The War Trap* Revisited," *American Political Science Review* 79 (forthcoming, 1985).

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The presence of a negative relation between alliance and successful deterrence is a surprise, just the opposite of the standard hypothesis (hypothesis 3a). The relationship is not very strong,[26] but nevertheless is strong enough to require explanation. An attacker may threaten a protégé that is formally allied to the defender, fully realizing that the risks are very high precisely because of the formal alliance relationship. In such a situation, the potential attacker has made a firm decision to force the opponent to back down or to go to war. Successful deterrence is therefore much more difficult to achieve. Russia in July of 1914 (case no. 18) was determined to protect Serbia against Austria-Hungary in order to avoid the humiliation of Bosnia in 1908-1909 and realized the risks of a confrontation with Germany in doing so. Similarly, Hitler in September of 1939 (case no. 28) pressed ahead with the attack against Poland, accepting the possibility that Britain and France would declare war.

It is also important to note the variables that do not enter into the equation. For example, the defender's past behavior in crises seems to make no systematic difference. Neither do the other kinds of military power indicators, such as power potential or overall ("strategic") military superiority by the defender (hypotheses 1a-1c), make a significant contribution.[27] We also tried a dummy variable for either local or overall military superiority on the basis that *either* might suffice to deter an attack, but found that effort made no greater contribution to our results.

One other power variable—defender's possession of nuclear weapons—also is absent, perhaps surprisingly, from these results. We cannot entirely dismiss a possible effect for nuclear weapons, because that dummy variable did approach (at .88) our cutoff level for statistical significance, and it does appear at an acceptable significance level if the case of Vietnam (no. 45) is deleted from the analysis. Although the Vietnam case does not fit our analysis very well (and will be discussed below) it is not so deviant that it should be dropped as an "outlier" from the statistical examination. We do not delete this case but merely point out here that this result at least is sensitive to the treatment of Vietnam. The effect of nuclear weapons is nonetheless marginal, not one on which to put much weight. Moreover, the possession of nuclear weapons is

[26] With a t-test of 1.93 it would be significant at the .95 level with a one-tailed test, but, since its sign is the opposite of that which we hypothesized, the level (.9) appropriate to a two-tailed test is applicable.

[27] Alone among our variables, there is some problem of collinearity among the various measures of capability. The indicator for local existing military capability nevertheless remains significant even when other power measures are added to the equation, and it is by far the strongest when each of the four capability measures is used alone.

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sometimes irrelevant (spurious), as in the British successful effort to deter Guatemalan seizure of Belize (case no. 53).

With probit analysis it is possible to compute the change in probability that the "1" value of the dependent variable will be achieved for a given change in any one of the independent variables while holding the other independent variables constant. This is the more readily interpretable measure of the impact of each independent variable, better than the probit coefficients at the top of Table 2. The lower half of Table 2 shows those impacts. We see that if the protégé takes 25 per cent or less of its arms imports from the defender the probability of successful deterrence is just .28, but if the proportion of military imports from the defender exceeds 75 per cent, the probability of successful deterrence rises to .79. Similarly, with no trade between defender and protégé the chances of successful deterrence are just about even, but if as much as 6 per cent of the defender's trade is with its protégé, the chances of effective deterrence rise to about seven out of eight. Trade and arms sales can be considered relatively susceptible to policy manipulation by the defender, perhaps more so than are relative power bases. Local military superiority likewise shows a wide range of effect, from a 26 per cent chance of successful deterrence even if defender and pawn have only a tenth of the attacker's power, to a very high probability if together they have a ten-to-one advantage.[28]

The importance of local but not overall capabilities, coupled with the absence of much explanatory power for nuclear weapons, has profound import for contemporary superpower deterrence. It suggests that rhetoric about "windows of vulnerability" is off the mark. Local military capabilities (of the defender and protégé combined) seem to have more to do with successful deterrence than do strategic ones, and both may be less important than having a dense network of political and economic bonds between defender and protégé.[29] Israel, for instance, arguably is better protected by its own local, conventional military strength (possibly augmented by that of the United States) than it would be by American strategic superiority (now declined) or by its own overt possession of nuclear weapons. It also, in terms of our results, is better protected by

[28] This result also is a bit sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of the case of Vietnam. If Vietnam were to be dropped, the probabilities, especially toward the upper range of defender's superiority, would be markedly higher.

[29] It is worth noting that economic and military-political ties are probably among the variables for which we have the least satisfactory fit between theoretical concept and empirical indicator. If so, and the biasing effect is essentially random, then we may be *understating* their true predictive power. One instance (no. 49) in which our model erroneously predicted deterrence would fail almost surely results from a weakness in our measure of military strength. In common with most other such efforts (see Organski and Kugler, chap. 2 [fn. 9], our indicator underestimates Israel's capability.

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its dense network of political and economic linkages with the United States than it would be by a formal military pact (e.g., in the Yom Kippur war of 1973, case no. 50).

Certainly the mere fact of a military alliance between defender and protégé makes no positive contribution by itself, as the existence of more tangible interests does. Just as the formal alliances provided little deterrence for Czechoslovakia and Poland, they did not suffice either for various "protégés" who had them in 1914 (although the alliance system did insure that war, once begun, would cascade to include most of the great powers). Insofar as United States foreign policy decision-makers continued to fight the Vietnam War for almost a decade in order to preserve the credibility of America's "pledged word," they may have missed the real point. The operative ties that drew the United States in were not those of the formal commitment represented by the SEATO pact, but rather the close links of economic and military assistance, and political commitment, to the South Vietnamese government. Moreover, our results indicate that the effect of honoring that commitment was not central to the credibility of American deterrent threats in the face of subsequent challenges: the defender's past behavior against a threat does not predict whether the defender will be able to succeed in deterring a later attack.

Mention of the Vietnam War is important because it does not fit standard theories of deterrence. The United States had nuclear weapons, overwhelming total superiority over Vietnam, and clear local military superiority if its forces were fully engaged, and it provided virtually all of South Vietnam's military capabilities. Up to that point the United States had no record of having failed to come to an attacked protégé's defense, and, indeed, it had come to South Korea's defense in 1950 even without having first made any prior deterrent threat.

Substantively and theoretically, the Vietnam case shows the limitations of many extant theories of deterrence. Those we have tapped here would not have predicted the true outcome. The reason lies in the element of a full expected-utility model of deterrence that we have not been able to incorporate in this empirical test—the value of "peace" to the would-be deterree was not sufficiently high. That is, the government of North Vietnam valued very highly its campaign to eliminate the vestiges of colonial rule in all of Vietnam and to reunify the nation. To that end it was prepared to suffer great costs rather than be deterred. Its goals in the war far exceeded those of the Americans and sustained them despite the latters' apparent advantages.[30] If American deterrence of

[30] Several articles make this point well. See Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small

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North Vietnamese intervention in South Vietnam epitomizes the limitations of our empirical test, the successful earlier American deterrence of North Vietnamese intervention into Thailand (case no. 42) exemplifies the strength of our model. All the conditions that applied there applied in the subsequent case—except for much more important goals held by the North Vietnamese.

Two other cases where our model erroneously predicted successful deterrence are those of Austria-Hungary against Serbia, and Germany against Belgium. (cases nos. 17 and 20. We correctly predicted the other two 1914 results.) The events of "the guns of August" illustrate what can go wrong in a deterrence crisis—the limits of any "rational" model. The complex array of alliance commitments and quasicommitments of the many powers made it unusually difficult to predict behavior. Mobilization plans made it virtually impossible to make a military threat, or even to take defensive measures, without provoking the other side. Shifting power relationships made the value of continued peace uncertain, and few expected the costs of war to be as catastrophic as they proved to be.

What Happens after Deterrence Fails?

Empirical results

Predicting the attacker's decision whether to press ahead or to be deterred is important, but so too is the matter of what happens after deterrence fails. The attacker's move is known, and the defender has to make a choice: whether to allow its bluff to be called or to resist the attacker's move against the protégé. The defender must decide whether it will lose more by going to war or by not resisting. Table 3 shows the results of our analysis of the cases in which a defender faced this choice.

Our equation correctly predicted eighteen of the twenty-three decisions (78 per cent). This record is the same as that obtained when predicting whether deterrence would or would not succeed, and it compares favorably with the success rate using data from Bueno de Mesquita's *War Trap* (80 per cent success for us in the twenty cases for which his data are available, and 50 per cent success using his method).

In fifteen out of the twenty-three cases the defender chose to fight. A decision to fight is more likely where the protégé's military capability is fairly substantial compared with the defender's own capability (hy-

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Wars," *World Politics* 27 (January 1975), 175-200; John Mueller, "The Search for a 'Breaking Point' in Vietnam," *International Studies Quarterly* 24 (December 1980), 497-519; and Robert Jervis, "Bargaining and Bargaining Tactics," in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., *Coercion: NOMOS XIV* (Chicago: Aldine, 1972).

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TABLE 3
CONDITIONS PROMOTING DEFENDER RESISTANCE

$$Fight = \underset{(-1.11)}{-.50} + \underset{(1.36)}{3.91}\ Protégé\ Power + \underset{(1.87)}{1.37}\ Alliance$$

		Predicted: Not Fight	Predicted: Fight
Actual	Not Fight	6	2
	Fight	3	12

CONTRIBUTIONS TO PROBABILITY OF RESISTANCE

	Value	*Probability of Resistance*
Protégé Power	5%	.61
	10%	.69
	20%	.81
	30%	.89
	40%	.95
Alliance	No	.69
	Yes	.97

Note: Percentage of predictions correct = 78; R^2 = .29; N = 23.

pothesis 1k). That is, the defender will fight to retain a "big" protégé. To fail to do so would be too costly, materially as well as perhaps to its reputation. The value of "peace" without trying to defend the protégé would be too low, even as compared with the costs of war. The cutoff point comes fairly quickly with increments to power. By the time the protégé's existing military power (protégé power) reaches even 10 per cent of its defender's the probability the defender will fight becomes better than two to one, and by 40 percent the probability virtually reaches unity. Sharing a common border with the protégé did not, however, significantly increase the probability that the defender would fight (hypothesis 1l).

In this exercise too, the defender's past behavior proved to have no power in predicting whether it would fight on the subsequent occasion. However, the existence of a formal military alliance does contribute substantially to a defender's decision to fight (hypothesis 3b). Without an alliance the chances the defender would fight were only about two in three; with an alliance, virtually unity. We predicted all but two of the eight instances in which a defender was not willing to use military force on behalf of a protégé. One of those cases dealt with the Indian

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seizure of Goa (no. 39). Despite the fact that Goa was juridically part of Portugal, and thus protected by a formal bond even stronger than a mere alliance, the Indians took Goa without resistance. Doubtless they were emboldened by their own overwhelming local military superiority, and by their knowledge that the Portuguese empire was moribund and unable to offer effective resistance. The other such case is Czechoslovakia in 1938, when Hitler correctly assessed the relatively greater importance of his own local military capabilities as compared with the substantial overall capabilities of his opponent and—more crucially—the absence of his opponents' political will to honor the alliance between France and Czechoslovakia.

Perhaps more important, we correctly identified twelve of the fifteen cases in which the defender *did* fight. Very often these cases, in which large-scale violence did transpire, had very costly consequences that all parties would have done better to avoid. The most notable of those for which our model did not predict resistance by the defender were Russia over Serbia and Britain over Belgium in 1914. Our earlier comments about decision-making in 1914 are apropos. Also, in both the Russian and British decisions the absence of a formal military alliance is deceptive. Russia was deeply committed to maintaining Serbia's independence, and Britain was drawn into World War I as much to prevent Germany from defeating France and dominating the continent as it was by the catalyst of the invasion of Belgium.[31]

Note that the influences associated with a defender's decision to fight once deterrence has failed are not the same as those associated with successful deterrence. Only formal alliance plays a role in both—and in opposite directions. An alliance made it more likely that the defender would fight if deterrence failed but was negatively associated with the success of deterrence. A military alliance not backed up by more tangible linkages—linkages that perhaps give the defender some control to prevent adventurism by a protégé—thus may *increase* the danger that a defender will be drawn into war. Local military superiority clearly made a contribution to effective deterrence, but, in the defender's decision to fight, military power was relevant only in the sense that the defender was more likely to fight on behalf of a protégé with substantial existing military strength. Trade ties and arms transfers, which were important for deterrence, did not appear in the second analysis.

Perhaps there is a serious and potentially dangerous mismatch between attacker's and defender's calculations. But that is not a necessary con-

[31] Paul Kennedy, *The Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences in British External Policy, 1865–1980* (London: Allen Unwin, 1981).

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clusion from our results. Since deterrence usually succeeds where the defender and protégé have close economic and political ties, it may well be that the attacker is correct in assuming that the defender will fight on behalf of such a protégé, and thus it rarely presses its challenge to a full military attack. (For example, where the protégé accounts for 6 per cent or more of the defender's trade, deterrence almost always is successful.) In cases where those ties are weaker the attacker is more likely to press forward, and other influences predominate. Another consideration, contained in our analysis of the defender's calculation, is missed entirely in the one for the attacker. Sometimes a war, even with the high probability of intervention by the defender, may look like a reasonable option to a rationally calculating attacker. The attacker may expect to win the war at a tolerable cost. Such a reasonable calculation could even apply if the attacker believed it might very well lose, if the other options looked worse. North Vietnam's decision to push ahead with its attempt to unify the Vietnamese nation may be a case in point.

Conclusion

We have developed and tested an expected-utility model of deterrence and its immediate consequences. Writing about the deterrence literature, Lawrence Freedman has judged that "much of what is offered today as a profound and new insight was said yesterday."[32] We may not have offered striking new insights, but we have uncovered some notable empirical findings that help discriminate among alleged insights. We have produced these results without analyzing the process of bargaining and threat that goes on during a deterrence crisis. Very likely, additional explanatory power could be found by such analysis, perhaps especially by looking at the ways bargaining may serve to call attention to the very elements of capability and interest we have identified in this macro-level analysis.

For deterrence attempts, we found that in our sample success was most often associated with close economic and political-military ties between the defender and its protégé. Local military superiority for the defender and its protégé helped bolster deterrence, but a military alliance was associated with deterrence failure.[33] Only a marginal contribution was made by the possession of nuclear weapons. Other elements of

[32] *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin's, 1981), xv.

[33] In broad outline these results confirm the earlier conclusions of Russett, "Calculus of Deterrence" (fn. 3). They also support George and Smoke's finding (fn. 10) that the attacker's perception of the adequacy and appropriateness of the defender's military capability is neither a sufficient nor an adequate condition for successful deterrence.

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national power and the history of the defender's earlier deterrence behavior played no significant role. Existence of a formal military alliance played no positive role, and, if not backed up by more tangible ties, actually worked against the success of deterrence. We want to caution the reader that these findings apply only to cases of immediate deterrence; that is, to instances in which an overt military threat from a potential attacker has already become manifest. Perhaps this kind of case understates the value of military strength in general deterrence. If military power were overwhelming, possibly no aggressor would ever rise to the level of making the overt challenge that characterizes these cases. But in the world of the Cold War, for example, United States military power has never been so dominant as to prevent the ten challenges we have listed here.

The problem of immediate deterrence touches on many of the most dangerous opportunities for the outbreak of war. These are portentous occasions, and our conclusions have important implications for policy, especially in an era when overwhelming military superiority is not available to either superpower. Our conclusions suggest that a definition of deterrence as primarily sensitive to strict calculation of military capability is both mistaken and profoundly dangerous. A quest for strategic nuclear superiority is unlikely to be the most effective means for providing security to America's friends and allies in a crisis, or to America itself. Nor does success in deterrence follow merely from establishing a record of "standing firm" in the past. Insofar as military strength is critical, local military forces—in some combination of forces of defender and local protégé—are likely to prove more effective than overall or "strategic" forces. Finally, an important contribution to effective deterrence may emerge from achievement of a goal that is usually sought for other purposes—maintaining and strengthening the ties of mutual interest among nation-states in an open global economic system.

Appendix

The general probit model with which we began our analysis was:

$$y = c + b_1 x_1 + b_2 x_2 + b_3 x_3 + b_4 x_4 + b_5 x_5 + b_6 x_6 + b_7 x_7 + b_8 x_8 + u_t$$

Where x_1 = trade between defender and protégé
x_2 = military arms transfers from defender to protégé
x_3 = is there an alliance between the defender and protégé?
x_4 = does the defender possess nuclear weapons?
x_5 = past deterrence success for defender

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x_6 = defender did not fight when a protégé was attacked in the past
x_7 = defender did fight when a protégé was attacked in the past
x_8 = measure of relative military balance between defender and attackers

We then deleted from this general model one by one all the variables the t statistics of which did not reach the 90 per cent level of significance. Then, in order to recheck ourselves, we took our final equation and reentered individually each of the deleted variables in separate runs to make sure that the t statistics for the deleted variables were still below the 90 per cent level.

This procedure was used to estimate the coefficients for all of the variables in the model except for the military balance variables. Because there was some problem of collinearity among the four measures of the military balance, all four could not be included in the same equation. Instead, we ran separate equations for each measure of the military balance to determine which one had the largest coefficient and t statistic. This turned out to be the measure of the existing local military balance. We then ran three additional equations, each of which included the existing local military balance and one of the three other measures of the military balance. This was done in order to see if the existing local military balance remained the best estimate in the presence of competing measures of the military balance. In all three equations the existing local military balance measure produced better estimates than the alternative measures. In fact, in all these equations only the coefficient for the existing local balance remained positive and significant at the .9 level, whereas the coefficients for the remaining measures of the military balance flip-flopped to a negative sign with t-scores well below .9.

The best measure of the degree of collinearity among the independent variables in a regression equation is the auxiliary r^2 values. In the equation reported in Table 2 the auxiliary r^2 values for each of the variables is as follows:

Variables	*Auxiliary r^2*
trade	.16
arms	.21
alliance	.29
existing local military balance	.05

As noted above there was collinearity among the four measures of the military balance. Below we report the auxiliary r^2 values of three separate equations, each of which includes our best measure of the

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military balance (existing local capabilities) and one of the remaining three measures of the military balance:

EQUATION 1

Variables	*Auxiliary* r^2
trade	.16
arms	.27
alliance	.29
existing local military balance	.85
potential local military balance	.84

EQUATION 2

Variables	*Auxiliary* r^2
trade	.20
arms	.28
alliance	.32
existing local military balance	.89
existing strategic military balance	.89

EQUATION 3

Variables	*Auxiliary* r^2
trade	.18
arms	.21
alliance	.33
existing local military balance	.83
potential strategic military balance	.84

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TAKING THE BISHOPS SERIOUSLY

By SUSAN MOLLER OKIN*

I. Introduction

THE pastoral letter on war and peace that was overwhelmingly approved by the National Council of Catholic Bishops in May 1983 is being quoted and misquoted by influential people.[1] Neither its impact nor the misunderstandings about it are surprising. The letter, which is a complex consideration of scriptural, ethical, political, and strategic issues, is a major contribution to the recently reactivated debate about nuclear weapons and the escalating arms race. A message sent to fifty million American Catholics by their spiritual leaders is not to be taken lightly by those in or aspiring to positions of power and influence, and it is only to be expected that some of those who look to the bishops' letter will take from it what they want it to say rather than what it actually does say. Because of the letter's complexity, significance, and vast potential for influence, it is important both to understand what it does in fact say and to determine whether its conclusions and guidance are consistent with its premises, its evidence, and its arguments.

In this paper, I shall address four important questions: Does the bishops' conditional moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence follow from their premises and arguments? Do the bishops' arguments justify, even

* I would like to acknowledge gratefully comments on this paper from Robert J. Art, Seyom Brown, Gregory Kavka, Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Rosow, George Sher, William Vogele, and Michael L. Walzer. Many thanks also to Lisa Carisella for her patience and skill in typing it.

[1] The pastoral letter, entitled "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response," has been reprinted as the appendix to Jim Castelli, *The Bishops and the Bomb: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Age* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1983). As this is probably its most accessible form, it will be cited throughout this paper. Permission to reprint excerpts from the letter has graciously been given by the United States Catholic Conference, which has requested the inclusion of the following acknowledgment: "Excerpts from 'The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response,' copyright © 1983 by the United States Catholic Conference. All rights reserved. A copy of the complete pastoral letter may be ordered from the Office of Publishing Services, U.S.C.C., 1312 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C., 20005."

Charles T. Manatt, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, is quoted in *The New York Times*, September 21, 1983, A15, as saying that the bishops called the principle of deterrence "the most dangerous dimension of the nuclear arms race." In fact what they say is quite different: "Deterrence is at the heart of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, currently the most dangerous dimension of the nuclear arms race" (712). McGeorge Bundy (*The New York Times Book Review*, October 9, 1983, 28) says of the bishops that they "accept deterrence and reject nuclear war," a "position which requires approval of the very threat whose execution would be an appalling confession of failure." I discuss this somewhat inaccurate representation of the bishops' position below.

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conditionally, the specific deterrence policies currently practiced by the United States? Can the conditions they place on an acceptable deterrence policy be met in the real world? And are serious efforts being made to meet these conditions? I shall argue that the answer to each of these questions is no, and that therefore the real message of the bishops' letter—the message inherent in its arguments—is considerably more pacifist than the bishops' rather cautious conclusionary guidance to Catholics would seem to suggest. Not only are the conditions placed on deterrence by the bishops not being fulfilled; it seems that they cannot be fulfilled. The moral imperative of the pursuit of disarmament is, therefore, urgent for those who take the bishops seriously.

One can have little doubt, on reading the pastoral letter—and especially on following it from the second to the third and final versions—that its authors struggled to find an acceptable moral justification for nuclear deterrence. There seem to have been several important political reasons for their determination to find deterrence at least conditionally morally acceptable. First, Pope John Paul II, in spite of his strong opposition to the nuclear arms race, has concluded that "in current conditions 'deterrence' based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable."[2] He and other recent popes are cited at numerous points in the text on this issue. Second, although there is a significant and well-established tradition of complete nuclear pacifism (i.e., the rejection of nuclear deterrence as well as use) within the Catholic church, and, although this view is shared by a number of American bishops, they are but the left flank of a wide spectrum that ranges to positions far more hawkish.[3] The bishops' committee itself ranged in viewpoint from the nuclear pacifist Bishop Gumbleton to the militarily conservative Bishop O'Connor. The Catholic church has traditionally been a strong defender of U.S. military policy and, even though there has been a definite recent shift from this position, the drafters of the letter must have perceived that, if their statement were to be heavily supported by the bishops' conference (as indeed it was, being approved by a vote of 238 to 9), it would have to avoid positions unlikely to be favored by a large majority of its members. Finally, it seems likely that the most pacifist of the American bishops feared that a more pacifist position than that finally endorsed in the letter would put them out of

[2] "The Challenge of Peace," 190 and 238.

[3] Castelli (fn. 1); Walter Stein et al., *Nuclear Weapons and Christian Conscience* (London: Merlin Press, 1961); L. Bruce van Voorst, "The Churches and Nuclear Deterrence," *Foreign Affairs* 61 (No. 3, 1983), 827-52.

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reach of influencing the mainstream of lay opinion. While it was being drafted, the bishops were the target of a considerable torrent of criticism from defenders of the Reagan administration's arms build-up.[4]

It may be asked, at this point, why one should seek *political* explanations for the bishops' conditional acceptance of deterrence. The answer is that their just-war premises, their evidence, and their logic, taken together, drive so strongly toward absolute nuclear-pacifist conclusions that the reasons for their moral acceptance of deterrence must lie elsewhere than in the thrust of their arguments. Before I proceed to substantiate this belief with reference to the final version of the pastoral letter, however, I shall summarize the principles of the just-war tradition and then examine briefly the differences between the position of the second draft and that of the final letter on the subjects of use and deterrence.

Within just-war theory, the principle of discrimination (sometimes called "noncombatant immunity") means that one is justified in attacking only those individuals who are engaged in or are directly contributing to the fighting. That is to say, one must wage war only to protect the innocent from attack and must distinguish, within the enemy's population, between combatants and noncombatants, preserving noncombatants from direct or intentional attack. Proportionality is a second-order principle that comes into play only when the principle of discrimination has been satisfied. It assesses the extent of the evil caused by an act of war compared with the good that can be expected to be gained by it. An act of war fails to satisfy the principle if it is adjudged that engaging in it will result in more harm than refraining from it.

In the letter's second draft, its authors do not deny that nuclear deterrence involves the intention to commit acts that violate the principles of discrimination and/or proportionality. Thus "not only the *use* of strategic nuclear weapons, but also the *declared intent* to use them involved in our deterrence policy, are both wrong." However, the bishops conclude that, "as the lesser of two evils," given the current world situation, deterrence is to be "tolerated" by Catholic moral teaching, on condition that negotiations proceed toward the reduction and eventual phasing-out of nuclear arms.[5] It seems, however, that this toleration of

[4] Castelli, 105-9, 118-19, 127-30.

[5] National Conference of Catholic Bishops, *War and Peace*, second draft of a proposed pastoral letter on war, armaments, and peace, special supplement to *The Chicago Catholic*, 1982, 9A. See George Sher, "The U.S. Bishops' Position on Nuclear Deterrence: A Moral Assessment," Douglas Maclean, ed., *The Security Gamble; Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allenheld, 1984), for an interesting discussion of the problems inherent in this argument.

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evil, albeit necessary evil, did not sit comfortably with the standard-bearers of an ethic that is disinclined to rely on consequentialism in its arguments or to acknowledge that the intent to act may be adjudged less harshly than the commission of the act intended.[6]

In the third draft and in the final version of the letter, therefore, nuclear deterrence is justified as conditionally morally acceptable, and not as "the lesser of two evils." This position is reached, however, only at the expense of clarity and consistency of argument. Indeed the ambiguity of the bishops' final position on the issues of nuclear use and nuclear deterrence is such that they have sometimes been misunderstood. McGeorge Bundy wrote recently with approval that the bishops "accept deterrence and reject nuclear war," pointing out that this position "requires approval of the very threat whose execution would be an appalling confession of failure."[7] But both the fundamentals of Catholic ethics and a careful reading of the introductory summary of the pastoral letter indicate that the bishops could not simultaneously arrive at this pair of conclusions. Deterrence involves the conditional intent to use nuclear weapons, and, because of a long tradition in Catholic ethics, the bishops had no choice but to adopt the position that, if it is wrong to do something, it is wrong to intend to do it under any circumstances. This is stated most clearly and fully in the summary:

> No *use* of nuclear weapons which would violate the principles of discrimination or proportionality may be *intended* in a strategy of deterrence. The moral demands of Catholic teaching require resolute willingness not to intend or to do moral evil even to save our own lives or the lives of those we love.[8]

Strict adherence to this moral equivalence of intention and action has three significant implications. First, once one has determined (in this case by the just-war criteria of discrimination and proportionality) that an act is immoral, no further argumentation about consequences is pertinent to the issue of whether the threat or intent to commit that act is immoral. Thus, in particular, the consequences of the *threat*, as distinct from the consequences of the threatened *act*, are irrelevant to the question. This is significant in the context of deterrence because of an in-

[6] Jim Castelli gives a good, brief account of the theological furore that was provoked by the first and second drafts of the pastoral letter because of their implicit distinction between action and intention and their uses of consequentialism in justifying nuclear deterrence as an evil means to be tolerated for the accomplishment of a good end. As some of the critics pointed out, enormous difficulties could be caused for Catholic ethical doctrine by the setting of such a precedent (Castelli, [fn. 1], 102-4).

[7] Bundy (fn. 1).

[8] "The Challenge of Peace" (fn. 1), 190.

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triguing claim that has been made that "deterrent intentions" are exempt from our usual insistence that intentions are the moral equivalent of actions, because of the peculiarly positive consequences of the intentions per se.[9] But the bishops' position on intention and action precludes their use of this argument.

Second, the bishops' acceptance of the moral equivalence of intention and action means that their only way of arriving at the conclusion that nuclear deterrence is not evil is to argue that, in certain circumstances, certain *uses* of nuclear weapons are morally acceptable. And, indeed, the final letter differs significantly from the second draft on the question of nuclear use. Finally, the moral equivalence of intention and action means that the *only* deterrent threats that are morally acceptable to the bishops are threats to use nuclear weapons in circumstances and in ways that would be morally acceptable.

Each of these last two points lies at the center of a major problem inherent in the solution adopted by the bishops. First, their position that certain uses of nuclear weapons might be morally acceptable—which is stated only in a very back-handed way—is unconvincing, given the evidence they cite, and causes inconsistency within their argument. I shall discuss this in Part II below. Second, the requirement that deterrence must involve only intentions to commit acts permissible by the standards of discrimination and proportionality means that, although the bishops never state the discrepancy outright, present American deterrence policy clearly violates the bishops' standards. Moreover, the just-war criteria and the other requirements that the bishops place on any deterrence policy that is to be even temporarily morally acceptable to them make it extremely doubtful that *any* effective policy of nuclear deterrence could meet their standards. These two points are argued in Parts III and IV below.

II. A Solution That Doesn't Work

It is not surprising that Bundy is confused by the bishops' position on the use of nuclear weapons, for there are many passages in the letter in which they seem to rule out any possibility of their legitimate use. "As a people," they say, "we must refuse to legitimate the idea of nuclear war.... To say 'no' to nuclear war is both a necessary and a complex task.... In light of the evidence which witnesses presented and in light of our study, reflection, and consultation, we must reject nuclear war."

[9] Gregory Kavka, "Some Paradoxes of Deterrence," *The Journal of Philosophy* 75 (June 1978), 285-302. See fn. 54 below.

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And again, "our arguments in this pastoral must be detailed and nuanced; but our 'no' to nuclear war must, in the end, be definitive and decisive."[10] When these statements are read in the context of the premise that states the unacceptability of intending any act that would be wrong to commit, it seems the bishops must arrive at the conclusion that nuclear deterrence, too, is morally intolerable.

However, within a few paragraphs of these seemingly unequivocal rejections of any justified use of nuclear weapons, the question is reopened. Turning to the criteria of discrimination and proportionality, the bishops find that "*some* important elements of contemporary nuclear strategies move beyond the limits of moral justification. . . . *Certain aspects* of both U.S. and Soviet strategies fail both tests. . . ."[11] Then, having opened up what the committee's chief staff member has called a "centimeter of ambiguity"[12] on the subject of use, the bishops proceed to consider three specific examples of the use of nuclear weapons—counterpopulation nuclear warfare, the initiation of nuclear warfare, and limited nuclear warfare.

The bishops' condemnation of counterpopulation nuclear warfare is unequivocal. Noncombatant immunity from intentional attack is an absolute principle of just-war theory. Thus, "under no circumstances may nuclear weapons or other instruments of mass slaughter be used for the purpose of destroying population centers or other predominantly civilian targets." And the bishops' extension of this prohibition to counterpopulation *deterrence* is clear: "Specifically, it is not morally acceptable to intend to kill the innocent as part of a strategy of deterring nuclear war."[13] Since the counterpopulation strategy known as mutually assured destruction (MAD) was, for almost two decades, the official deterrence policy of the United States, it must be asked why the bishops did not proclaim their clear and absolute prohibition during those years, rather than waiting until now, when it is no longer official policy. During those years, many thousands of Catholics in the armed forces must have been direct participants in a policy that, by the bishops' reasoning, violated a "universally binding moral principle." Again, by the bishops' reasoning that "in a democracy, the responsibility of the nation and that of its citizens coincide,"[14] every citizen of the United States, including fifty million Catholics, was implicated in a clear moral wrong. The

[10] "The Challenge of Peace" (fn. 1), 228-29.
[11] *Ibid.*, 231 (emphasis added).
[12] J. Bryan Hehir, "Moral Issues in Deterrence Policy," lecture delivered April 9, 1983, at the University of Maryland.
[13] "The Challenge of Peace" (fn. 1) 231 and 239.
[14] *Ibid.*, 198 and 272.

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bishops do not explicitly address this issue, but that it is a serious problem is clearly entailed by what they say.

The second instance of the use of nuclear weapons—the initiation of nuclear warfare in defense against conventional attack—is also firmly rejected by the bishops. In the context of NATO policy, they discuss the limited first use of nuclear weapons, especially tactical ones against military targets. They cite the testimony of former public officials about the extreme unlikelihood of limiting nuclear warfare once the nuclear fire-break has been violated. "The chances of keeping use limited seem remote," they say, "and the consequences of escalation to mass destruction would be appalling." The bishops conclude that "the danger of escalation is so great that it would be morally unjustifiable to initiate nuclear war in any form. . . . We find the moral responsibility of beginning nuclear war not justified by rational political objectives."[15] Thus the bishops' conclusion is that first use, under any circumstances—even as a defense against overwhelming conventional aggression—violates the principle of proportionality and is therefore morally unacceptable.

The real ambiguity of the bishops' position resurfaces at the beginning of the remaining section on the use question. Here they ask whether the limited use of nuclear weapons is justified under *any* circumstances—specifically, in response to nuclear attack. Despite the evidence they have presented up to this point about the extreme unlikelihood of being able to limit such use, they now say:

> It would be possible to agree with our first two conclusions and still not be sure about retaliatory use of nuclear weapons in what is called a "limited exchange." The issue at stake is the *real* as opposed to the *theoretical* possibility of a "limited nuclear exchange."[16]

Having reopened the issue seemingly settled firmly in the negative in the previous section, they proceed to ask a series of questions challenging the meaning of the concept "limited" in the nuclear context, and they conclude that "the burden of proof remains on those who assert that meaningful limitation is possible." However, they refuse to give a clear, resounding "no" to the question of whether the use of nuclear weapons is justified in any circumstances. Instead, they assert:

> A nuclear response to either conventional or nuclear attack *can* cause destruction which goes far beyond "legitimate defense." *Such* use of nuclear weapons would not be justified.[17]

[15] *Ibid.*, 233.
[16] *Ibid.*, 234.
[17] *Ibid.* (emphases added).

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Although they do not spell out the permissive aspect of this statement, it clearly implies that, in some circumstances, a nuclear response may *not* cause disproportionate destruction, and that it *may*, therefore, be justified. It is this possibility of the morally acceptable use of nuclear weapons that enables the bishops both to adhere to their strict linkage of intention and action and to find nuclear deterrence conditionally morally acceptable.

There is clear evidence from statements made outside the document itself that the bishops, under Cardinal Bernadin's forceful guidance, explicitly intended to leave open the possibility of morally acceptable use of nuclear weapons. Bernadin said of the third draft, "we never say that any contemplated use of any nuclear weapon would ipso facto be immoral. But we are close to that position because of the severe risk factor involved."[18] During the consideration of many amendments to the third draft, Archbishop Quinn of San Francisco, a leading nuclear pacifist, proposed the inclusion of the assertion that "there must be no misunderstanding of our opposition on moral grounds to any use of nuclear weapons." The amendment—which unequivocally made the bishops' position that of nuclear pacifism—passed. But the issue was subsequently reopened, and the amendment rescinded, largely because of Bernadin's strong opposition to it.[19] His reasons for opposition were twofold: first, the delicately balanced argument supporting deterrence as conditionally morally acceptable depended on it, given the decision to adhere to the moral equivalence of intention and action and to reject consequentialism; second, since neither Pope nor Vatican Council had condemned all possible uses of nuclear weapons, it was not, given the hierarchical nature of the church, open to the American bishops to do so.[20] The ambiguity that characterizes the position expressed in the final letter (embodied in the asking of questions rather than the giving of answers about the possibility of limiting nuclear war, and in the statement quoted in the above paragraph) was presumably designed, in part at least, to include the views of the more nuclear-pacifist bishops, who could not have tolerated any positive statement about the legitimacy of nuclear use.[21]

There are, however, two significant problems with this ambiguous position. The first is that it involves internal inconsistency. In the section on first use, the bishops conclude that the probable effect of initiating

[18] Castelli (fn. 1), 148.
[19] *Ibid.*, 169-70.
[20] *Ibid.*, 21, 101 and 136-37.
[21] On Bishop Gumbleton's position, for example, see *Ibid.*, 112-13.

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nuclear warfare—the extreme danger of escalation—is such that first use is never justifiable. They are clearly assuming, there, that not only the immediate damage caused by a limited nuclear attack, but also the risk of escalation, are both crucial parts of the calculation that must be made in order to assess whether the principle of proportionality has been violated. And they accept the judgments of former public officials about the unlikelihood of being able to limit nuclear war. If they had adhered to the same standards of logic and evidence in the subsequent section, on limited use against nuclear attack, they would surely have come to the same decisive negative conclusion. For, after all, the escalation of nuclear war to a world-devastating point is presumably unlikely to occur unless at least two powers use nuclear weapons against each other. Although, in the absence of clear answers about the justice of the war itself, we might be inclined to condemn more heavily the power that first violated the fire-break between conventional and nuclear warfare, the responsibility for full-scale escalation must rest with both sides. Indeed, in a case in which the violator of the fire-break had been clearly the victim of aggression and had found itself in danger of total defeat by conventional weaponry, we might be even less inclined to find the first user of nuclear force any more blameworthy than the retaliator. In short, if the danger of escalation renders the initiation of nuclear warfare morally unacceptable even as last-resort defense against an aggressor, then why should it *ever* be justifiable to use nuclear force, even against nuclear attack?

The second problem with the bishops' argument is that they do not seem to take seriously enough the evidence they cite about the uncontrollability of nuclear war. The former high public officials whom they quote in the earlier sections of the argument about nuclear use do not only argue, as the bishops' version of their position asserts, "the overwhelming probability that *major* nuclear exchange would have no limits."[22] Rather, they all state clearly that there is no reason to expect that *any* use of nuclear weapons, strategic or tactical, could be prevented from escalating into full-scale nuclear war. Bundy et al., for example, say that "no one has ever succeeded in advancing any persuasive reason to believe that *any* use of nuclear weapons, *even on the smallest scale*, could reliably be expected to remain limited."[23] For the bishops to cite such views in order to reject first use, and then go on to speak of "the more complicated issue of 'limited' nuclear war,"[24] as if this were not the very question

[22] "The Challenge of Peace" (fn. 1), 231 (emphasis added).
[23] *Ibid.*, n. 61 (emphases added).
[24] *Ibid.*, 231.

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they have been addressing, is highly puzzling. Again, the Desmond Ball paper that they cite later is an extremely persuasive argument against the probability that any use of nuclear weapons could be kept from escalating to the proportions of a holocaust.[25] All in all, if we take seriously the evidence they cite, the questions the bishops raise about the real possibility of limiting a nuclear exchange all require clear negative answers. These answers should convert their "high skepticism" on the subject into total rejection of any notion of a limited nuclear war. We must conclude that the "centimeter of ambiguity" regarding the use of nuclear weapons that the bishops sought to leave open in order that they might adjudge nuclear deterrence to be conditionally morally acceptable is unwarranted. In fact, the bishops present a far better case against the moral acceptability of deterrence than they present for it. Despite their rejection of the complete nuclear-pacifist position, the weight of their evidence and the logic of their argument lead one to it.

III. The Moral Status of Current United States Deterrence Policy

Even if there were no problems of logic or use of evidence inherent in the bishops' argument for the conditional justification of nuclear deterrence, the moral dilemma presented by their pastoral letter would by no means be over. Whether member of the military, defense industry worker, or ordinary citizen, whoever takes the bishops seriously must still face three major challenges. First, does the deterrent threat in which one currently participates fall within the bounds of deterrence justified by the bishops? Second, can the conditions required of an acceptable deterrence policy by the bishops in fact be met? Third, are serious attempts currently being made to meet these conditions? In Parts III, IV, and V of this paper, I shall address these questions.

I shall first argue that current U.S. deterrence policy far exceeds the limits of what is conditionally morally acceptable to the bishops. Their statements about their position on this matter are neither clear nor positive. In the beginning of the letter, the bishops state that noncombatant immunity and proportionality are "universally binding moral principles"[26] as contrasted with other moral issues treated in the letter, which are more open to the judgments of individual conscience. As

[25] *Ibid.*, 236 and n. 73; Desmond Ball, "U.S. Strategic Forces: How Would They be Used?" *International Security* 7 (Spring 1983), 31-60; Susan Moller Okin, "The Moral Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence: A Critique," *Politics* (Journal of the Australasian Political Studies Association) 18 (November 1983), 16-26.

[26] "The Challenge of Peace" (fn. 1), 198.

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noted above, this moral prohibition extends to deterrent threats made against noncombatants and to threats that, if executed, would violate the principle of proportionality, as well as to actual strikes. The bishops turned to high government officials for information about current targeting doctrine in order to assess whether the threats that constitute our nuclear deterrence policy are morally justifiable. Citing Weinberger, for example, as saying in his 1983 Annual Report to Congress that "the Reagan Administration's policy is that under no circumstances may such weapons be used deliberately for the purpose of destroying populations," the bishops were satisfied that "in principle at least" U.S. deterrence policy meets the moral criterion of discrimination.[27]

Whether current policy meets the criterion of proportionality presents a far more difficult problem. From their questioning of government witnesses and their investigation of official sources, including the Single Integrated Operational (targeting) Plan (SIOP), the bishops learned that, although administration officials "hoped any nuclear exchange could be kept limited, they were prepared to retaliate in a massive way if necessary."[28] They learned also that, because of the number and location of the military and militarily significant industrial targets identified by the SIOP (for example, 40,000 "military" targets for nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union, including 60 within the city of Moscow), the unintended or "indirect" civilian damage caused by such strikes would necessarily be massive. Indeed, the officials questioned agreed that "even with attacks limited to 'military' targets, the number of deaths in a substantial exchange would be *almost indistinguishable* from what might occur if civilian centers had been deliberately and directly struck."[29] What the bishops were presented with, then, was a policy of counterforce targeting, but with massive foreseeable civilian damage.

The bishops turned to the second universally binding principle, that of proportionality, in order to assess the moral status of this policy. After a tortured discussion of the dilemma forced on them by current counterforce strategy, they conclude:

> It would be a perverted political policy or moral casuistry which tried to justify using a weapon which "indirectly" or "unintentionally" killed a million innocent people because they happened to live near a "militarily significant target."[30]

This statement is of vast significance. Ironically, it was taken from the draft proposed by O'Connor, the most conservative member of the

[27] *Ibid.*, 239 and n. 81.
[28] *Ibid.*, 240.
[29] *Ibid.*, emphasis added.
[30] *Ibid.*, 243.

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committee.[31] But the adoption of it, taken in conjunction with the evidence cited earlier, makes it clear that, because of the foreseeable civilian damage resulting from the type of counterforce strikes constituting current U.S. strategic doctrine, such strikes cannot pass the test of proportionality. Because they cannot pass this test, it is perverted reasoning to focus on the issue of the intentionality or unintentionality of the damage to noncombatants. And because the strike would fail the test of moral acceptability, so does the threat.

In the theological context, this conclusion might seem to be directed at Paul Ramsey, whose moral defense of counterforce deterrence relies heavily on the distinction between intentional and unintentional harm that the bishops term "perverted . . . moral casuistry" in the context of nuclear weaponry.[32] But in the immediate political context, the bishops' conclusion must be read as an unequivocal rejection of the targeting plans presented to the bishops as current U.S. military policy. Having made this statement, the bishops go on to assert that any government's claim that its deterrence policy is morally acceptable "must be scrutinized with the greatest care" and that there is a "need to rethink the deterrence policy of our nation."[33] The radical implications of their argument should be clear to those who read it carefully. By saying that only "perverted . . . moral casuistry" would allow the justification of "unintended" though completely foreseeable noncombatant deaths on the scale that administration officials agreed would result from putting into effect our current targeting plans, the bishops are clearly condemning these plans as morally unacceptable. Even if they do not violate the principle of discrimination, they clearly fail the proportionality test. They thus fall within the category of actions prohibited by a "universally binding moral principle" and therefore not open to the decisions of the individual conscience. If it is wrong to threaten to do what it is wrong to do, then the implication of the bishops' argument is clear: current U.S. deterrence policy is "a perverted political policy," unjustifiable within the Catholic just-war framework.

Yet, although the bishops urge their readers to question and scrutinize their country's deterrence policy, they do not state frankly the conclusion toward which their arguments impel them. Instead, they have made, both collectively in the letter's text, and individually, statements that significantly blunt the thrust of this important part of their conclusions.

[31] Castelli (fn. 1), 145.
[32] Paul Ramsey, *The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility* (New York: Scribner's, 1968), esp. 302-5.
[33] "The Challenge of Peace" (fn. 1), 244.

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They assert, for example, that "it is surely not our intention in writing this letter to create problems for Catholics in the armed forces,"[34] and their advice to Catholics in the armed forces, in defense industries, and as citizens seems to be completely abstracted from their moral condemnation of the deterrence policy in which all of them are clearly implicated. They discuss the prohibition of "those actions which inflict harm on innocent civilians,"[35] yet bless and express support for Catholics in the armed forces, with apparent disregard for the fact that many thousands of them are direct participants in the day-to-day targeting that, if put into effect, would kill millions of innocent civilians. And, although some of the bishops have expressed their view that the letter is a long overdue move in the direction of nuclear pacifism that should stir up controversy in the church, others have expressed *relief* when it seems acceptable to members of the military. "I sent the second draft of the letter to our local Army general," said Bishop Lessard. "He had no trouble with it. So I'm not as worried as I was before that there might be difficulties."[36]

But, as I have shown above, if the letter does not cause difficulties for Catholics and others in or out of the armed forces who take the bishops seriously, it ought to. Given their moral assessment of the actual current military policy of this country, to claim that they do not seek to create problems for Catholics in the armed forces is analogous to their writing a pastoral letter condemning abortion as a moral evil and asserting that it is not their intention to cause problems for Catholics who work in abortion clinics. If the bishops' object is to influence the formation of a military policy that *is* morally acceptable, or to advise their flocks in ways that help them to avoid moral wrong-doing (and one would hope it would be both), then to cause problems for Catholic members of the military, workers in nuclear-arms production, and even ordinary citizens, is exactly the effect that their pastoral letter *should* have. Although the bishops are careful to distinguish between moral judgments that must be left up to the individual conscience and those that they are prepared to present as universally binding, their evaluation of current U.S. military policy is clearly such that it does not fall within the realm of issues that the individual may decide. Quite apart from the issue of whether arms control is being pursued, then, those who take the bishops seriously must conscientiously object to their country's nuclear policies, by refusing to participate in or to support them in any way and by making determined efforts to change them.

[34] *Ibid.*, 269.
[35] *Ibid.*
[36] *The New York Times*, "The Week in Review," May 8, 1983, E5.

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IV. The Counterforce Paradox

There is no doubt that current U.S. military policy does not meet the bishops' standards of moral acceptability. The next question that must be asked is whether *any* policy of nuclear deterrence can meet these standards. I argued in Part II that the "centimeter of ambiguity" on which the bishops base their conditional acceptance of deterrence is not warranted, given the premises and evidence from which they proceed. I maintain as well that their argument for nuclear deterrence, even if workable in theory, would not be workable in practice. The conditions they place upon deterrence policy are not consistent with the only type of deterrence policy that could possibly meet their standards of moral acceptability.

In addition to the principles of discrimination and proportionality, the bishops establish a number of other requirements that must be met by any deterrence policy that is to be sanctioned by them. First, deterrence policy must not encourage the notion that nuclear wars can be fought or won:

> If nuclear deterrence exists only to prevent the *use* of nuclear weapons by others, then proposals to go beyond this to planning for prolonged periods of repeated nuclear strikes and counterstrikes, or "prevailing" in nuclear war, are not acceptable. They encourage notions that nuclear war can be engaged in with tolerable human and moral consequences.[37]

Second, an acceptable deterrence policy must not involve the quest for superiority; " 'sufficiency' to deter is an adequate strategy."[38] Third, it must be conducive to stability, because

> a situation of stable deterrence depends on the ability of each side to deploy its retaliatory forces in ways that are not vulnerable to an attack . . . preserving stability requires a willingness by both sides to refrain from deploying weapons which appear to have a first-strike capability.[39]

Finally, an acceptable form of deterrence must be conducive to or at least consistent with the achievement of arms control and reduction. Thus, "each proposed addition to our strategic system or change in strategic doctrine must be assessed precisely in light of whether it will render steps toward 'progressive disarmament' more or less likely."[40] Since the first and second requirements as well as the third have to do with stability, or the minimizing of the danger of the *use* of nuclear

[37] "The Challenge of Peace" (fn. 1), 241.
[38] *Ibid.*
[39] *Ibid.*, 235.
[40] *Ibid.*, 241-42.

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weapons, we can reduce the bishops' criteria to two: an acceptable deterrence policy must maximize stability, and it must be compatible with meaningful arms control.

The central paradox of the bishops' letter stems from the fact that, because of the principle of discrimination and the moral equivalence of intention and action, they are forced to reject the only type of nuclear deterrence—the threat of retaliatory assured destruction—that can satisfy the two criteria set out above. Their conditioned acceptance of counterforce deterrence, instead, places them in an impossible situation, since counterforce deterrence is by its very nature far more likely than assured-destruction deterrence to cause the states of affairs (instability and arms-race escalation) that are so clearly unacceptable to them. The bishops do not ignore this problem. They acknowledge briefly the connection between a purely counterforce strategy and the instability that makes war more likely, since such a strategy "may seem to threaten the viability of other nations' retaliatory forces." They also acknowledge that some people consider the policy of deterrence to be "the driving force in the superpower arms race,"[41] though they do not attempt to compare mutually assured destruction with counterforce deterrence in this context. In spite of these isolated instances of recognition, however, the bishops do not fully confront the paradox with which they are faced—that the only kind of deterrence they find even conditionally morally acceptable cannot meet the conditions they place upon it.

The bishops do not themselves attempt to state in any positive or specific way what kind of counterforce deterrence *would* be acceptable to them. They seem, rather, to have sensed clearly the danger of engaging in such specificity.[42] It is necessary, therefore, to examine some different versions of counterforce deterrence policy and to measure them against the bishops' standards of stability and compatibility with arms control. Deterrence, in the context of nuclear weaponry, is generally understood to require the threat of "unacceptable" damage. If it does not do this, it cannot be relied upon to deter, and deterrence that does not deter could have no possible moral justification. In the case of counter-city or assured-destruction deterrence, it is easy to understand why the damage would be unacceptable, for the threat is that of a retaliatory second strike aimed directly at a population and industrial base. But what, then, does *counterforce* deterrence mean, and how and why is what it threatens unacceptable? The first thing it can mean is a policy aimed directly at military and militarily related targets, but known by both sides to be

[41] *Ibid.*, 237 and 241; see also 244.
[42] Castelli (fn. 1), 181-82.

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certain to cause, indirectly, an unacceptable level of collateral civilian damage. Such a deterrence policy has been defended within the context of just-war theory, notably, as mentioned above, by Paul Ramsey. But his arguments have been criticized harshly by other just-war theorists as "double-think about double effect," and the bishops, too, as we have seen, reject such arguments as "moral casuistry."[43]

More commonly, counterforce nuclear strategy is understood to threaten unacceptable damage by aiming specifically at destroying the second-strike retaliatory nuclear forces of the other side. In this way, the enemy would be rendered unable to deter further attack or conquest. Within this notion of counterforce deterrence, there is a conceptual distinction drawn between first-strike counterforce capability, which means the initial capacity to render the enemy's forces incapable of inflicting unacceptable damage on one's population and industry, and second-strike counterforce capability, which means the capacity to absorb a counterforce attack and then to render the enemy incapable of inflicting further damage on one's remaining population and industry. These two strategies, which are more distinct conceptually than in most of their military requirements and plans, constitute what is generally understood by "counterforce deterrence" today.

Why does counterforce deterrence, thus conceived, undermine both arms control and stability? It is, after all, possible to envisage a counterforce strategy, in the abstract, that simply entails revised targeting doctrine (away from cities and toward military targets) and improved command and communications procedures. Such a counterforce strategy would not necessitate weapons systems different from those deployed for assured-destruction deterrence. But the object of counterforce as defined above and as generally understood is to render the other side's retaliatory forces impotent, while preventing the other side from doing similar damage to one's own. It is, in this sense, *essentially* aimed at superiority. This is why the conditions the bishops seek to place upon it are unfulfillable. Rather than simply involving the retargeting of existing weaponry, counterforce deterrence has led to the deployment of highly accurate and powerful weaponry especially designed to destroy the other side's nuclear forces.

The inevitable result of the deployment of counterforce weaponry and strategy by one great power is that the power at which it is aimed has the highest incentive to do everything within its capacity to develop

[43] G.E.M. Anscombe, "War and Murder," in Walter Stein et al., *Nuclear Weapons and Christian Conscience* (London: Merlin Press, 1961), 43-62, at 57. See also Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 278-83.

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its own counterforce capabilities in order to neutralize the threat to its retaliatory, and therefore to its deterrent, capacity. Once this cycle of escalation is begun, both history and logic show us that it tends to be subject only to technological limitations. Both sides engage in the endless search for new ways to protect and multiply their own forces and to destroy the other's. As Richard Barnet puts it:

> Once the nuclear force is regarded as a "flexible" instrument for achieving purposes beyond the crude one of deterring a nuclear attack with the threat of an all-out counterattack on Soviet society, the arms race becomes a never-ending, infinitely escalating contest.[44]

Counterforce strategy, then, has "required" in turn high accuracy, hardened silos, mobility and/or concealment (under sea or land) of missiles, antiballistic missile systems (ABMs), antisubmarine submarines, air defense systems, civil defense, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and, most lately, space weaponry. The only significant limitations that have been achieved have been those severely restricting ABMs (1972). Counterforce deterrence, aided by continual technological advances, has escalated the arms race to the point where there are no foreseeable limits to it. By contrast, whatever else can be said against it, MAD deterrence does not fuel the arms race in this way. If both superpowers were to renounce counterforce and instead were to be satisfied with having second-strike assured-destruction retaliatory capacity, they would each require a far smaller number and megatonnage of nuclear weapons than they have today. They would not require hardened silos, or hard-target silo-busting capacity from their warheads, and they would have no incentive to MIRV. Without these developments, in turn, neither side would have the incentive to mobilize or to conceal its warheads, to endlessly multiply their numbers, or to rely heavily on submarine warfare. In sum, without counterforce deterrence, most aspects of the arms race of the last twenty-five, and especially the last ten, years would not have happened. Thus, as two defense analysts have recently concluded:

> The nuclear arms race would be best controlled by first controlling counterforce. If the superpowers forswore counterforce, the rationale for nuclear arms-racing would largely disappear, since programs on both sides would no longer create new requirements for the other. Conversely, meaningful arms control is very difficult if the superpowers pursue counterforce

[44] Richard Barnet, "A Reporter at Large: The Search for National Security," *The New Yorker*, April 27, 1981, at 62; see also Barry R. Posen and Stephen Van Evera, "Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration: Departure from Containment," *International Security* 8 (Summer 1983), 3-45, at 12-14.

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seriously, because counterforce programs on both sides force both sides to keep building up. Under these circumstances, arms control agreements merely ratify decisions to build ever-larger arsenals.[45]

These conclusions highlight the paradox of the bishops' adoption of the Pope's dictum that deterrence is acceptable only "as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament."[46] Because counterforce deterrence has been the driving force behind the arms race, and because its requirements continually work *against* meaningful arms control, the bishops' well-meaning interim solution is a contradiction in terms.

As for stability, counterforce deterrence is equally dysfunctional. Counterforce weaponry and strategy undermine all three categories of stability—strategic, crisis, and arms-race stability. Strategic stability, meaning the assurance that both sides have a secure second-strike capacity, is continually undermined by counterforce weaponry, for it is designed to threaten just this capacity. Crisis stability, which exists when neither side has reason to fear a disabling first strike and thus has the incentive to preempt such a strike, is likewise threatened by counterforce strategy. *Both* sides are rendered less secure in a crisis when either side fears that a high proportion of its nuclear forces has become vulnerable to attack, but this is exactly what counterforce strategy sets out to effect.[47] MIRVing has been particularly destabilizing; a MIRVed missile invites a preemptive strike against it because it affords the opportunity for one or two warheads to destroy many more. Since arms-race stability exists only when neither side is concerned that its opponent is trying to endanger either strategic or crisis stability, it follows from the above points that it too is sacrificed to the pursuit of counterforce options. Because nuclear deterrence can be justified—if it can be justified at all—*only* insofar as it prevents the outbreak of nuclear war, the instability caused by counterforce deterrence strategy cannot be overemphasized.

A major factor in the destabilizing effects of counterforce deterrence is that, between enemies, intentions and appearances are often very dissimilar. When the United States deploys hard-target MIRVed missiles, for example, it claims, not to be aiming at war-winning superiority,

[45] Posen and Van Evera (fn. 44), 28.

[46] "The Challenge of Peace" (fn. 1), 190 and 238.

[47] Leon V. Sigal, "Warming to the Freeze," *Foreign Policy* 48 (Fall 1982), 54-65; at 56-57; Joseph S. Nye, "Restarting Arms Control" *Foreign Policy* 47 (Summer 1982), 98-113, at 106-7. Mention should also be made at this point of deterrent threats to "decapitate" the enemy by destroying its top political and military leadership, in the hope of paralyzing its retaliatory capacity. This strategy, which is currently part of U.S. targeting plans, is at least as destabilizing as traditional counterforce deterrent strategy and renders war termination virtually impossible. See Ball (fn. 25), 56; Posen and Van Evera (fn. 44), 27; cf. John D. Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation," *Foreign Policy* (No. 45, 1981/82), 16-28.

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but rather to be attempting to convince the Soviets that neither side can win a nuclear war and that there could therefore be no possible advantage to them in starting one. But when the Soviets deploy similar weaponry, the United States perceives them as seeking first-strike capacity against our retaliatory forces. Thus, "even if, as is probably the case, neither side has the intention of striking first, both *look* as if they do."[48] It is this type of reciprocal misperception that is most destabilizing in a crisis.

Other things being equal, vulnerable weapons are more destabilizing than less vulnerable ones, because of the temptation to use them preemptively or to adopt launch-on-warning procedures. It might be argued, then, that one can achieve a stable counterforce deterrent posture by placing first priority on making one's weaponry invulnerable. There are, however, two problems with this solution. One is that, just as invulnerable basing modes (for example, submarine-launched missiles, hardened silos) are made possible by technological advances, so too, eventually at least, does technology provide modes of rendering this invulnerability vulnerable after all (by means, say, of antisubmarine warfare and hard-target kill capacity). Invulnerability is at best an elusive solution, and its worst effect is that it encourages a deluded sense of temporary security even as it fuels the arms race. The second problem with the solution results from a paradox that has been inherent in most counterforce weaponry, namely, that the requirement that a missile have "time-urgent hard-target kill" capacity tends to work against its deployment in a less vulnerable basing mode. For example, it makes it less possible for a missile to be either deeply buried (since this makes it less immediately fireable) or mobile (since it has to be smaller). This problem is illustrated by some of the current debates about the MX missile and its basing mode. Thus, as Posen and Van Evera have recently concluded, "the vulnerability of American forces might be cured more easily if planners put less emphasis on making Soviet forces vulnerable."[49]

The case that counterforce deterrent strategy is necessarily both destabilizing and erosive of attempts to control the arms race is reinforced by a brief glance at the history of the counterforce/assured-destruction debate. Even in the late 1950s, when Eisenhower was faced with the choice between what was then called "finite" (i.e., MAD) deterrence and

[48] Barnet (fn. 44), 64; Nye, 103-4; Herbert Scoville, "Flexible Madness"? *Foreign Policy* (No. 14, 1974), 164-77, at 170; Stanley R. Sloan and Robert C. Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and Arms Control* (New York: Foreign Policy Association Headline Series No. 261, November 1982), at 41-42.

[49] Posen and Van Evera (fn. 44), 28. The Trident II, however, is a counterforce weapon that does not involve this problem, though it is still highly destabilizing, because it will put at risk so much of the Soviets' retaliatory capacity.

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the pursuit of an increasingly elusive first-strike capability, he foresaw what were to continue to be the serious implications of the counterforce option. He recognized that it would affect significantly the Soviets' perception of American intentions, make them feel threatened by the possibility of a first strike against them, and cause them to plan and arm themselves accordingly. He also saw that, as compared with the more controllable "finite" option, it would have significant and lasting effects on the demands for weaponry that would be considered necessary by the U.S. military, and thus on the controllability of military spending. With both these factors in mind, Eisenhower turned reluctantly toward the finite-deterrence option, though he by no means entirely forswore counterforce capability.[50]

McNamara, too, in the early sixties, turned away from his initial decision in favor of the counterforce option largely because he recognized the limitlessness of the demands for armaments in which it would result. From 1963 until 1980, MAD remained the official deterrent posture of the United States, and in 1972 SALT I—in particular, the ABM treaty—formally established it as the basis of deterrence between the two superpowers.[51] The assumptions underlying the treaty were that weapons designed to attack the enemy's strategic deterrent forces must be banned, as dangerously provocative, and that other strategic warfighting capabilities were not necessary for deterrence and could be negotiated away. Beneath a declaratory posture that was consistent with these ground rules, however, the U.S. had in fact throughout the sixties and seventies a strategic plan, the Single Integrated Operational (targeting) Plan (SIOP), that provided for numerous counterforce targeting alternatives in the event of a nuclear war. Moreover, almost as soon as MAD was "sanctified" by SALT I, the U.S. proceeded to deploy accurate hard-target MIRVed missiles, designed for flexible response, despite the fact that this was bound to appear to the Soviets as an attempt to develop a first-strike capacity. As soon as they were able, of course, the Soviets followed suit with their own MIRVing, and a major counterforce escalation of the arms race was under way.

By the middle seventies, under the Ford and Carter administrations, counterforce came strongly back into fashion, to be embraced again in Presidential Directive 59 (1980) as the United States' official deterrence policy. Partly a response to the vast Soviet counterforce build-up of the 1970s, this return to formal reliance on counterforce was also encouraged

[50] David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," *International Security* 7 (Spring 1983), 3-71, esp. 54-63.

[51] Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 550; Scoville (fn. 48), 164-66.

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by the increased accuracy of U.S. ICBMs. Contrary to the assumptions of SALT I, it openly assumed the legitimacy of each side's maintaining the capability to attack the other's central strategic forces.[52] In this latest round of the MAD versus counterforce debate, in which the counterforce advocates are clearly in power—more than ever in the Reagan administration—the connections between counterforce and the escalation of the arms race and between counterforce and instability are more obvious than ever. The U.S. government, undertaking the largest peacetime military build-up in history, has become preoccupied with an alleged "window of vulnerability" that, if it has any strategic solution, seems only to have one that will lead to further escalations and to further "windows of vulnerability" perceived by one side or the other.[53] Although both sides have secure second-strike retaliatory capacity, and although full first-strike capacity for either is impossible with any known technology, both the United States and the Soviet Union continue to develop an endless succession of counterforce weapons in a futile search for security. The Reagan administration's willingness to carry the arms race into space is the latest example of such quests for "peace through strength," and continuing threats to stability have been recently highlighted by revelations that the Pentagon is considering adopting launch-on-warning procedures, which would greatly increase the risk of accidental nuclear war. If the absurdities of counterforce deterrence were not apparent earlier, they should be now.

Before we leave this subject, an objection to the argument I have made should be anticipated and answered. It might be claimed that there is a counterforce deterrence posture, not considered above, that is not essentially linked with instability and arms escalation. This posture would involve the conditional intention to strike with nuclear weapons at military targets *exclusive* of the Soviet second-strike retaliatory forces.

[52] Brown, 550.

[53] The basis of the Reagan administration's claim that the Soviet Union now possesses strategic superiority is the argument that, faced by a limited counterforce attack by the Soviets, the United States would be able only to retaliate with a counterpopulation strike, thus inviting counterpopulation retaliation and devastation. But quite apart from the question of the absurdity of any such Soviet risk-taking, it seems that any proposed "cure" to the problem would only set off inevitable further escalation. As Jeremy Stone of the Federation of American Scientists has recently summarized the problem:

> If the U.S. does go ahead with Trident II [i.e., to give us invulnerable counterforce retaliatory capacity], it will present a threat to Soviet ICBMs and bombers simultaneously; when Soviet sea-based counterforce takes place, the same thing will happen to the U.S. in reverse. The window of vulnerability argument will be heard again in the land and with a vengeance (*F.A.S. Public Interest Report* 36 [May 1983], 1; see also 3-4).

See also Posen and Van Evera (fn. 44), 12-14.

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But how would such an intention deter? What "unacceptable" damage does it threaten? If the *collateral* damage caused indirectly by such an attack were great enough to be "unacceptable," the bishops would reject such an intention, as violating the principle of proportionality. Yet, if the threatened strike were to be sufficiently surgical as to avoid such collateral damage, it is difficult to see how the threat would constitute an effective deterrent. How credible is a threat to strike with nuclear weapons only to destroy the other side's nonnuclear or minor nuclear forces? Why would one invite nuclear retaliation without damaging the enemy's principal capacity to retaliate? Would such a demonstration of one side's willingness to actually use its nuclear arsenal have the effect of deterring the other, or would it, rather, frighten the other into attempting a preemptive strategic nuclear strike? The response of even a rational enemy, much less an irrational one, to such a bizarre type of attack is impossible to predict. It would seem to be a form of deterrence more dangerous to the power that invokes it than to the enemy. It is difficult to believe that this is the type of nuclear deterrence the bishops intend to justify.

The bishops' conditional acceptance of nuclear deterrence leaves them in a seriously paradoxical situation. They cannot condone assured-destruction deterrence because it clearly violates the principle of discrimination. They cannot condone the type of counterforce deterrence the deterrent effect of which depends upon the fact that it would, if executed, involve massive civilian damage, because that violates the principle of proportionality. Thus, they are left with the type of counterforce deterrence that is based on the threat to disable the adversary's strategic nuclear capability. But, as I have argued, even if it could satisfy the demands of proportionality, this type of deterrence is the most dangerous of all, both in its destabilizing effects and in its continuing tendency to escalate the arms race.

V. The Moral Urgency of Arms Control

Although the bishops do not answer the dilemma posed by the paradox outlined above, they are unequivocal in making their moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence "strictly conditioned" upon the serious pursuit of arms reductions. Not only is an acceptable deterrence policy required to be conducive to stability and *compatible* with meaningful arms control; deterrence is "a transitional strategy *justifiable only in conjunction with resolute determination to pursue arms control and disarmament*." The significance of this condition is increased by the fact that *any* justification

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of nuclear deterrence within the just-war framework (even one that denies the moral equivalence of intention and action) seems to require it.[54]

As some of the nuclear pacifist bishops, led by Archbishop Quinn, argued during the deliberations, the conditional moral acceptance of deterrence is intolerably imprecise unless two things are specified, namely, what is to be regarded as evidence of "resolute determination" on the part of those in power, and how long one should be expected to wait for such determination to result in actual progress toward disarmament. In a criticism of the first draft's "toleration" (which subsequently became "acceptance") of deterrence, as conditioned upon sincere and substantial efforts toward disarmament, Quinn wrote:

> But the Vatican Council already stated that fifteen or more years ago. Cardinal Krol repeated it powerfully in his testimony [in favor of the SALT II Treaty] three years ago. How long do we have to wait to make a judgment that the efforts are not substantial and that toleration cannot be given any longer?
>
> What guidance do we give our people on this question, of when, how to judge whether the efforts are sincere and substantial and thus merit some toleration? I believe we have to tackle this question in the document. Have we reached the point where toleration is no longer possible?[55]

Quinn and others continued to press such points, claiming that one cannot go on indefinitely accepting nuclear deterrence because of the

[54] "The Challenge of Peace," 190 and 241 (emphasis added). Michael Walzer comes to a conclusion about deterrence that is very similar to that espoused by the bishops in the second draft of the pastoral letter, though abandoned in the final version (Walzer [fn. 43], 269-83). He argues that although deterrence cannot be adjudged morally acceptable in the context of just-war theory, it is the least evil of the alternative evil courses of action currently available to us. But his justification of deterrence is just as conditional as the bishops'; because it is an evil, we must seek to avoid it. Since it has been our failure to control the inception, growth, and spread of nuclear weapons that has rendered deterrence necessary, we are under a serious moral obligation to halt and reverse these failures.

Similarly, Gregory Kavka's defense of nuclear deterrence is conditional, though less explicitly, on the pursuit of arms control (Kavka, fn. 9). He argues that, in spite of our normal adherence to the moral premise that to intend even conditionally to do what one knows to be wrong is itself wrong, there exists, in certain conditions, a subset of intentions—"deterrent intentions"—that it is right to form, even though the action intended is inherently evil. I cannot enter into the details of Kavka's argument here. What is significant in this context is the fact that his justification of deterrence, no less than the bishops' and Walzer's, depends upon the serious pursuit of arms control. For the "certain conditions" under which Kavka claims that deterrent intentions are justified must be such that "the defender's forming this intention is likely necessary, and very likely sufficient, to prevent a seriously harmful and unjust offense" (290). Now, we have no good way of telling whether or for how long nuclear deterrence will be *sufficient* to prevent nuclear war. But we cannot even claim that it is *necessary* unless we have tried and continue to try all other alternatives. The foremost of these, it seems, is a serious and sustained effort to achieve bilateral disarmament.

[55] Quoted in Castelli (fn. 1), 99.

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supposed fulfillment of some condition that is not clearly defined.[56] As Bishop Dingman said after the letter was approved, the bishops will have to keep reviewing their position: "We said this country can keep deterrence only if it works vigorously for arms control. If that isn't achieved, I believe we'll take a far stronger stand."[57]

Even now, however, it is possible to evaluate the relevant government policies and to find them seriously deficient. If one were to rely solely upon the current public declarations of those in power, of course, one would have no trouble concluding that the Reagan administration is serious in its pursuit of arms control. As Weinberger said recently at Harvard,

> A genuine, verifiable and sharp arms reduction is the cornerstone of our whole Administration policy. At the same time we must retain sufficient strength to encourage the other side to the same position.[58]

For those who have followed the administration's policies, however, the second sentence is far more indicative of its position than the first. Indeed, the distance between the administration's public face on arms control and its actual arms policies can be illustrated sharply by contrasting the statement quoted above with Weinberger's testimony to the bishops' committee in May 1982, in which he said that there could be no substantial negotiations until we reached parity with the Russians, which would take about eight years![59]

This is not the place to enter into a detailed attempt to gauge the seriousness of the Reagan administration's arms-control efforts; fortunately others have recently undertaken such analysis. In particular, Robert Johansen has argued persuasively that Reagan's total lack of interest in arms control during his first year in office, his unprecedented nuclear arms build-up, his appointments to top arms-control positions of persons with well-known histories (like his own) of opposition to and skepticism about arms control, his unrealistic and/or destabilizing arms-control proposals, his verbal abuse of the Soviet Union and its leaders, and his failure to attempt to limit antisatellite weaponry or to agree to a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty are the outward manifestations of a conception of national security that is fundamentally opposed to arms control and reduction.[60] The Reagan administration's notion of an ac-

[56] *Ibid.* 116 and 123.
[57] *The New York Times*, "The Week in Review" (fn. 36), E5.
[58] *The Boston Globe*, November 18, 1983, 1.
[59] Quoted from an account by Bishop Reilly of the meeting between the bishops' committee and Weinberger, in Castelli (fn. 1), 83.
[60] Robert C. Johansen, "How to Start Ending the Arms Race," *World Policy Journal* 1 (Fall 1983), 71-100. See also Ronald Brownstein and Nina Easton, *Reagan's Ruling Class*

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ceptable arms-control treaty is clearly limited to one that significantly increases the military advantage of the United States and that is, therefore, hardly likely to be acceptable to the Soviets.

Although the bishops refrain from addressing the thorny question of what constitutes a serious effort at arms reduction, they do specify a number of policies that they regard as necessary for the satisfaction of the conditions they place on their continued acceptance of deterrence: our government must (1) refrain from deploying first-strike weapons and from planning for nuclear war-fighting, (2) support an immediate bilateral freeze on new nuclear weapons systems, (3) support deep cuts directed particularly at destabilizing weapons systems (and take independent initiatives in this direction), (4) support a comprehensive test ban treaty, (5) prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the international system, (6) remove dangerous short-range and first-line nuclear weapons, and (7) strengthen command and control systems so as to reduce the chance of accidental war.[61] With the partial exception of the last two items on this list, the Reagan administration has in fact worked on every count in the opposite direction from that considered by the bishops to be necessary for the continued justification of deterrence. It supports the most destabilizing of first-strike weapons systems (the MX and Pershing II missiles in particular); it has refused to renounce a launch-on-warning strategy; and its plans clearly include a war-fighting capability that goes far beyond the function of deterrence as accepted by the bishops.[62] As for arms control, it has strongly opposed a bilateral freeze; it has proposed deep cuts that were not only clearly unacceptable to the Soviets but that would, if accepted, actually exacerbate rather than ameliorate the strategic instability of the present situation;[63] it has refused to agree to a comprehensive test ban treaty; and it has a bad record on horizontal proliferation. In fact the only actions the current administration can be said to have taken that are in line with the bishops' recommendations are to remove some obsolete front-line weapons from Europe and to attempt to improve command and control systems.[64]

On balance, then, the administration could hardly be said to have passed the bishops' test. There is clearly a vast gulf between actual

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(New York: Pantheon, 1983), chap. 6; Lawrence T. Caldwell and Robert Legvold, "Reagan through Soviet Eyes," *Foreign Policy* 52 (Fall 1983), 3-21; and Posen and Van Evera (fn. 44).

[61] "The Challenge of Peace" (fn. 1), 241-43.

[62] Posen and Van Evera (fn. 44), esp. 23-29.

[63] Jan M. Lodal, "Finishing Start," *Foreign Policy* 48 (Fall 1982), 66-81, at 66-70; Nye (fn. 47), 104-5; Posen and Van Evera, 44; Sigal (fn. 47), 63-64.

[64] Posen and Van Evera (fn. 44), 42.

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government policies and attitudes and those the bishops regard as prerequisite for their strictly conditioned moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence.

VI. Conclusion: The Moral Imperatives Implicit in the Bishops' Letter

I have argued, first, that the bishops cannot logically reach the conclusion that any form of nuclear deterrence is even conditionally morally acceptable, given the principles from which they proceed and the evidence they consider. I have shown that, even if their conditional moral acceptance of deterrence were logically and consistently arrived at, it could not be interpreted as encompassing current U.S. deterrence policies. And I have argued that, quite apart from the logical and evidentiary problems of the argument for the conditional acceptability of counterforce deterrence, this type of deterrence is radically inconsistent with the conditions that the bishops place upon it. Their rejection of MAD deterrence because of its violation of the principle of discrimination leaves the bishops with a form of deterrence that—even if it could satisfy the principle of proportionality—is far more likely to lead to instability and the escalation of the arms race. Finally, I have argued that, although the bishops are not as specific as they might be about how we should assess a government's resolute determination to pursue arms reductions or about how long we should be expected to wait for results, there is very little evidence that the Reagan administration is working in the directions that the bishops do specify as necessary for the continued moral acceptability of deterrence, and much evidence that it is working against them.

Anyone who listened closely to two positions taken by Cardinal (then Archbishop) Bernadin before the committee began its deliberations might have foreseen that the bishops' letter might contain such problems and paradoxes. On the one hand, he said to the November 1981 meeting of the conference of bishops:

> We need to be convinced that some actions can never be taken, even for survival; that there are limits to the argument that, because our adversaries are considering something, we must be prepared to do it also. We need to recall that as Americans and as people of faith we are expected to have our own principles, to be prepared to live by them and, in faith, to accept the consequences of doing so.

On the other hand, Bernadin established as a firm ground rule for the committee that "it would not, under any circumstances, support uni-

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lateral nuclear disarmament."[65] As I argued in Part II above, and as the nuclear pacifist bishops clearly acknowledge, the principles of Catholic ethics and the evidence of the experts consulted by the bishops lead one straight to the conclusion that both the use of nuclear weapons and the intent to use them under any circumstances are wrong. Nuclear disarmament is the only logical conclusion of the bishops' arguments, and it is avoided by them only by means of ambiguity and inconsistency. If people are to live by their principles, wherever they lead, then those who accept the bishops' principles, and who weigh their arguments more seriously than their stated conclusions, are obliged also to take seriously the moral imperative of unilateral nuclear disarmament and all its implications. But rather than help people confront the difficult moral challenge of unilateral nuclear disarmament, the bishops rejected it—apparently from the start.

Even those who come to the conclusion or start with the assumption that unilateral nuclear disarmament is politically impossible must still recognize that the principles of just-war theory require more radical steps toward bilateral nuclear disarmament than have ever yet been tried. Those who hope to avoid the problems of the bishops' argument by rejecting the linkage between action and intention must recognize that *their* justification of deterrence, too, is conditional upon serious and determined efforts to achieve disarmament.[66] The bishops themselves advocate the taking of significant unilateral steps toward arms reduction, in the hope of eliciting comparable moves from the Soviet Union,[67] but they misleadingly imply that this is merely an extension of policies that have already been tried. Moreover, they do not confront the problem discussed in Part IV of this paper—that the counterforce deterrence they conditionally justify is radically inconsistent with such a policy. Those who reject immediate unilateral disarmament, but who recognize the moral imperative of disarmament, might consider whether it would be preferable overall to return, on a purely temporary basis, to reliance on MAD deterrence—morally abhorrent though it is—as the only way to gain control of and reverse the arms race. The bishops, of course, would say "no" to this, adhering firmly to their principle that no end (even disarmament) justifies evil means. But, although the counterforce deterrence that they conditionally justify does not violate discrimination, it both violates proportionality and fails to fulfill the conditions that deterrence be conducive to stability and disarmament. When this is fully

[65] Castelli (fn. 1), 43 and 79.
[66] See fn. 54 above on Kavka's position.
[67] "The Challenge of Peace," (fn. 1), 246.

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acknowledged, we can see that the bishops' incomplete application of just-war principles, taken together with their a priori rejection of unilateral disarmament, have led them into a practical as well as moral dead end.

Implicit in the bishops' letter, however, is radical advice for those disposed to hear it. The four arguments recapitulated at the beginning of this conclusion constitute four strong reasons for the existence of a moral obligation to refuse to participate in or support current U.S. nuclear-deterrence policy, and four strong reasons to influence the government to change this policy and make serious efforts to achieve disarmament. Those who take the bishops' principles and arguments more seriously than their flawed conclusions must acknowledge not only that they are participants in a policy of nuclear deterrence that violates universally binding moral principles, but that no policy of nuclear deterrence is consistent with these principles. Moreover, they must recognize that counterforce deterrence, far from being immune to the moral difficulties of MAD deterrence, not only violates the principles of just-war theory but also constitutes a major obstacle to progress toward nuclear disarmament, as is amply demonstrated by the current policies and attitudes of the government. Thus the only conditions under which the bishops themselves conclude that nuclear deterrence is morally acceptable are clearly not being met.

Given these conclusions, the bishops' own directives at the end of their letter to Catholic citizens in various walks of life are weak and evasive. The real message implicit in the letter's arguments is a call to members of the military, defense-production workers, and other citizens to object to our national-deterrence policy by nuclear conscientious objection. Despite the effects of the needs of political expediency on its most overt conclusions, the assumptions and arguments of the bishops' letter clearly confirm the nuclear-pacifist position that must be adopted by anyone who takes the just-war principles of Catholic ethics to their logical conclusions.

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ETHNONATIONALISM AND POLITICAL STABILITY: The Soviet Case

By GAIL WARSHOFSKY LAPIDUS*

Ethnonationalism and Political Stability: changing soviet perspectives

THE long-term stability of the Soviet system is critically dependent on how successfully the Soviet leadership deals with its "nationality problem." The U.S.S.R. is not only the largest multinational state in the world today, but also one of the most complex—comprising over 100 distinct nationalities, 22 of which consist of over one million people each. It is thus exceedingly vulnerable to the possible effects of rising ethnonationalism, one of the most potent forces of political instability in developing and industrial societies alike.

Until quite recently, the Soviet system appeared comparatively immune to the impact of ethnic self-assertion. Soviet writings continued to maintain that the Soviet system had finally solved one of the most difficult of all political problems and that, in contrast to its tsarist predecessor, the imperial Russian "prison of nations," Soviet socialism had brought equality, prosperity, and harmony to the ethnically diverse population of the U.S.S.R.[1] This optimistic assessment is no longer tenable. It has been replaced, in recent years, by the more somber recognition that, from the Baltic to Central Asia, rising ethnic self-assertion constitutes a growing political challenge. The sociocultural transformation and rapprochement of Soviet nationalities is increasingly recognized to be a

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[1] Typical of a voluminous body of such writings is the assertion that the U.S.S.R. has created a "fundamentally new social and international community . . . a single and friendly family of over 100 nationalities jointly building communism," based on "friendship, equality, multi-faceted fraternal cooperation and mutual assistance." P. N. Fedoseev, *Leninizm i natsional'nyi vopros v sovremennykh usloviiakh* [Leninism and the National Question in Contemporary Conditions] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974), 357-58. All translations are by the author unless otherwise noted.

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far more problematic and lengthy process than was earlier anticipated, and national identity a more enduring and less malleable social phenomenon than was initially assumed. The optimism of Khrushchev's assertion, at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, that "the Party has solved one of the most complex of problems, which has plagued mankind for ages and remains acute in the world of capitalism to this day—the problem of relations between nations,"[2] has been superseded by Brezhnev's more somber recognition at the 26th Congress in 1981 that, although

> the Soviet nations are now united more than ever . . . this does not imply that all the problems of the relations between nationalities have been resolved. The dynamics of the development of a large multinational state like ours gives rise to many problems requiring the Party's tactful attention.[3]

This sober reassessment was reaffirmed in even stronger terms by Yuri Andropov in December 1982, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the creation of the U.S.S.R. In a major address on national relations Andropov reminded his audience:

> [Soviet] successes in solving the nationalities question certainly do not mean that all the problems engendered by the very fact of the life and work of numerous nations and nationalities in the framework of a single state have disappeared. This is hardly possible as long as nations exist, as long as there are national distinctions. And they will exist for a long time, much longer than class distinctions.[4]

Growing recognition by the Soviet leadership that sociocultural change and long-term rapprochement among Soviet nationalities demands patient and delicate social engineering, and that "the successful construction of communism will depend to a significant degree on a correct policy in the realm of national relations,"[5] has been responsible for greater encouragement and support of empirical social research on ethnic processes. This concern was already evident during the Brezhnev years, which saw a marked expansion of the range of activities of the Institute of Ethnography in Moscow and its republic-level counterparts. The establishment, in 1969, of an All-Union Council for the Study of Nationality Problems (headed by the Institute's distinguished director, Yulian Bromlei) not only gave high-level visibility to these efforts, but

[2] *Pravda*, October 18, 1961, p. 1.
[3] *Pravda*, February 24, 1981, p. 3.
[4] *Pravda*, December 22, 1982, pp. 1-2.
[5] P. Paskar', "Sovetskii narod—novaia sotsial'naia i internatsional'naia obshchnost' liudei" [The Soviet people—a new social and international community of people], *Kommunist Moldavii*, No. 12 (December 1982), 82.

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provided an institutional framework for joining scholarship to policy formation.[6] Andropov took the final step in explicitly linking social research to current political concerns in his December 1982 speech when he called, for the first time, for the formulation of a "well-thought-out, scientifically substantiated nationalities policy."[7] Up to then, Soviet "nationality policy" had been the by-product of other functional concerns—one dimension of policies primarily focused on education, or resource allocation, or political recruitment, or demographic behavior. Now, Andropov appeared to be calling for the formulation of an explicit, coherent, and comprehensive strategy in which the "nationality question" stood at the very center.

Ethnonationalism and Political Stability: Changing Western Views

While the nationality problem has come to occupy an increasingly important place on the Soviet policy agenda of the 1980s, it has become a central preoccupation, if not a virtual obsession, in Western analyses of the Soviet system. The potential impact of politicized ethnicity went largely unrecognized in the scholarship of the 1950s and 1960s, partly for reasons common to the broader social science literature on nation building, and partly resulting from specific features of the development of Soviet studies. The totalitarian model, with its focus on the capacity of a monolithic state to bring about a well-nigh total atomization of society, left little room for explorations of the potential bases of social solidarity, including ethnicity. To be sure, the nationality problem was not completely neglected, but its absence from the classic textbooks of the period is striking.[8] Even in specialized studies, the predominant emphasis on Soviet domination and exploitation tended to reinforce rather than challenge the reigning paradigm.

The shift in Western approaches to the Soviet nationality problem was the result partly of internal changes in the Soviet system precipitated

[6] For a useful discussion of the creation and activities of the Council, see Paul Goble, "Ideology, Methodology and Nationality: The USSR Academy of Sciences Council on Nationality Problems," paper delivered at National Convention of the APSA, Washington, D.C., August 1980. In recent years, Party organizations in a number of republics have created additional bodies to coordinate research and policy on nationality problems.

[7] *Pravda*, December 22, 1982, p. 2.

[8] See, for instance, the work of Merle Fainsod, Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, John N. Hazard, Leonard Schapiro and Adam Ulam, and, among recent writings, Jerry F. Hough. Inkeles and Bauer's *The Soviet Citizen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961) is particularly instructive as a case in point. Although their study demonstrated extraordinary prescience in anticipating many of the key developments of the Khrushchev period on the basis of refugee interviews, it failed to anticipate the emergence of a significant dissident movement in general and of national protest in particular.

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by de-Stalinization, and partly of shifts in the focus of Soviet studies that these changes invited. As the emphasis on "revolution from above" was modified by the rediscovery of society, and as the image of a monolithic regime gave way to a concern with interest groups and the policy process, the attention of specialists was directed to the potential bases of solidarity and cleavage and their implications for Soviet politics.[9] Investigation of the extent to which ethnic affiliation might itself constitute an independent basis—however limited—of collective action thus represented a logical evolution of new lines of inquiry.

At the same time, internal developments within the U.S.S.R.—beginning with the ethnic self-assertion facilitated by Khrushchev's "thaw"—offered ample evidence that the quest for collective identity had been temporarily silenced, but hardly obliterated, by the repressive policies of the Stalin era. The development of the dissident movement, which included an important national component, focused new attention on the sources of alienation in the Soviet system; at the same time, the rising tide of protests in the Baltic republics, the Ukraine, among the Crimean Tatars, and in Georgia, in addition to the emigration of some 400,000 Soviet citizens (mainly Germans, Armenians, and Jews) gave further impetus to a reassessment of the position of minorities in the Soviet multinational system. Most recently, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East, with its heightened salience for Soviet domestic and foreign policy in the wake of events in Iran and Afghanistan, together with the astonishing demographic vitality of Soviet Central Asia revealed in the 1959 and 1970 censuses, has brought these regions to the forefront of scholarly as well as policy concern.

As a consequence of these developments, Western scholarship on the U.S.S.R. has taken on two new features in recent years. The first is a preoccupation with the destabilizing potential of politicized ethnicity, epitomized in the titles of two recent best-selling books: *L'Empire Eclaté* by Hélène Carrère d'Encausse and *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, by Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup.[10] The second feature is a

[9] Cleavages based on functional specialization, for example, are explored by Milton Lodge, *Soviet Elite Attitudes Since Stalin* (Columbus, Ohio: C. E. Merrill, 1969) and in H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); on task differentiation, by Jerry Hough's contribution to Skilling and Griffiths, *ibid.*; on policy orientation, by Franklyn Griffiths, *ibid.*, and by Donald Kelley, "Environmental Policy-Making in the USSR: The Role of Industrial and Environmental Interest Groups," *Soviet Studies* 28 (October 1976). For a review of these approaches, see Gail W. Lapidus, "The Study of Contemporary Soviet Policy-Making: A Review and Research Agenda" (Workshop on Contemporary Soviet Policy-Making, Berkeley, Calif., 1980).

[10] Carrère d'Encausse, *L'Empire Eclaté* (Paris: Flammarion & Cie., 1978), trans. by Martin Sokolinsky and Henry LaFarge as *Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in*

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shift in the focus of interest, and the perception of Soviet vulnerability, from the more developed and Westernized regions of the U.S.S.R.—the Baltic and the Ukraine—to Soviet Central Asia.

In the view of these and other observers of the Soviet scene, a resurgence of nationalism among both the non-Russian and Russian nationalities of the U.S.S.R. poses a growing threat to the long-term stability of the Soviet system. These scholars argue that a convergence of exogenous and internal developments, though differing in their configuration from one republic to another, is contributing to the growing confidence and self-assertion on the part of local elites in the non-Russian republics, particularly those of Central Asia, and to a growing resentment over the lack of political autonomy and other attributes of nationhood. Pressures for Russification also generate increased resentment and in some cases, anxiety, about its threat to national identities. The growth of centrifugal tendencies, whether or not they are likely to culminate over the long run in ethnonational movements or demands for secession, poses increasingly serious problems of management for the Soviet state.

The increasing self-assertion of the non-Russian nationalities has, in turn, contributed to the growth of a Russian nationalism that views the Russian people as the victims rather than the beneficiaries of the Soviet multinational empire. The rise of Russian nationalism poses a strategic problem rather than one of management: its impact could be decisive for the system as a whole. Ethnic Russians possess a strong and cohesive sense of nationhood, and combine domination of the central organs of power with the dispersion of settler communities throughout the entire territory of the U.S.S.R. (concentrating in the major cities of the non-Russian republics). Their growing impatience and resentment, therefore, if successfully translated into pressures on the Soviet leadership to promote integrationist policies and to resist further concessions to the non-Russian nationalities, could galvanize still-dormant forces and upset the precarious balance that has characterized Soviet nationality policy in recent years.

The dangers that a rise in ethnonationalism would pose for the Soviet system are substantial. Such a rise would threaten the unifying force of Soviet patriotism, provide a social base for the organization of activities directed against official values and policies, rule out reforms that entail a significant degree of decentralization, challenge the unitary structure of the Party and military, and strengthen ties of affinity and loyalty with

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Revolt (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979); Bennigsen and Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State* (London: Croom Helm, 1983).

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regions and peoples outside Soviet borders, from Poland to the Muslim East. The ultimate danger, of course, is that of political fragmentation; it is to this prospect that much of the recent Western discussion has been devoted. Indeed, in the view of a considerable number of Western scholars and policy makers, the scope and intensity of rising ethnonationalism is likely to become unmanageable: Richard Pipes, among others, has explicitly predicted that "sooner or later the Soviet empire, the last multinational empire, will fall apart roughly along the lines of today's republics," and Alexandre Bennigsen has given it only 10 to 20 more years.[11]

This burgeoning Western literature on the implications of politicized ethnicity for the future stability of the Soviet system, however, contains a number of implicit and unexamined assumptions about national consciousness and about the character of Soviet nationality policy that deserve to be held up to critical scrutiny. The first is the tendency to treat national identity as a primordial, objective fact rather than as a subjective condition. Although many features of Soviet policy—such as the passport system—treat nationality as if it were a rigid ascriptive category, Soviet reality is far more complex. In many instances, particularly although not exclusively involving the smaller nationalities, national identity has a more dynamic and fluid quality.[12] Migration, intermarriage, and changes in group boundaries alter older definitions of identity. For a growing number of Soviet citizens, the question of which of several possible identities, or levels of identity, is perceived as a core identity, and in what contexts, is a problematic issue. Moreover, to assume that national affiliation is the single most salient identity of the Soviet citizen is to ignore the degree to which national identities overlap with other social identities and the degree to which their salience varies not only among individuals but with specific situations. One of the major tasks of further research is to identify the conditions under which national identity assumes high salience, and to assess the features of Soviet policy that either contribute to or minimize such developments.

A second shortcoming of much of the current literature is the tendency to treat the preservation of distinct national identities as fundamentally incompatible with Soviet goals. As John Dunlop has expressed it: "From the very beginning, the Soviet state has been viewed by its leaders as a

[11] Pipes, in Carl A. Linden and Dimitri K. Simes, eds., *Nationalities and Nationalism in the USSR: A Soviet Dilemma* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1977), 10; interview with Bennigsen in *Russkaia mysl'*, June 23, 1983, p. 5.

[12] See, in particular, Frederik Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969).

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unitary body whose underlying principle, proletarian internationalism, allowed *no room for national differences and aspirations*."[13] In a similar vein, Alexandre Bennigsen asks whether, by the year 2000, "the children of today's Muslims will still belong to the world of Islam or will have been transformed into Soviets—*totally liberated from the perezhitki [vestiges] of the past and indistinguishable from their Russian comrades*."[14] Such formulations posit simplistic and exaggerated dichotomies that are totally at variance with historical experience as well as with Soviet reality—both of which demonstrate the resilience of traditional cultures and values and illustrate the importance of distinguishing acculturation from assimilation. Moreover, those who assume ethnic homogeneity to be the operative objective of a monolithic Soviet approach, and the preservation of any elements of national distinctiveness to be a defeat for the Kremlin's goals, ignore shifts in Soviet policy over time, internal differences over policy within the Soviet elite, and even the gap between aspirations and real possibilities. They also ignore the way in which the Soviet regime exploits ethnic cleavages to reinforce central power and does not merely deplore them.[15]

Because the perpetuation of national consciousness is viewed as incompatible with the effort to forge a new Soviet identity, a number of observers have concluded, as Seweryn Bialer puts it, that "the polarization of the Soviet peoples along ethnic lines is increasing faster than their identification with, and consciousness of, a new Soviet nationhood."[16] This assertion, quite apart from the question of whether there is an empirical basis for either supporting or challenging it, assumes an inherent conflict between ethnic consciousness and Soviet citizenship, and treats the relationship between them as a zero-sum game.

Finally, a number of observers fail to distinguish between national sentiment, a strong attachment to or exaltation of a national group, and nationalism, a political doctrine or movement—a distinction that sophisticated Soviet analysts seek to maintain.[17] Assuming the political salience of ethnicity to be self-evident rather than problematic, and

[13] Dunlop, "Language, Culture, Religion, and National Awareness," paper delivered at Hoover Institution Conference on Soviet Nationality Problems, Stanford, Calif., April 1983 (emphasis added).

[14] Bennigsen and Broxup (fn. 10), 140 (emphasis added).

[15] For a perceptive treatment of this theme, see Cynthia Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980).

[16] Bialer, *Stalin's Successors* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 208.

[17] Anthony Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 168. A similar Soviet view is found in E. A. Bagramov, *Natsional'nyi vopros v bor'be idei* [The National Question in the Struggle of Ideas] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1982), 6-7: "Socialism draws a solid line between the concepts of 'national' and 'nationalistic.' The former is preserved and developed under socialism."

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treating politics as a dependent variable, such writers anticipate a virtually automatic unfolding of ethnic self-assertion and project it forward to political destabilization. They fail to explain variations in the apparent intensity of national feelings among different groups and over time, and from one situation to another. They ignore or minimize the social and political forces—repression excepted—that may either propel or limit the politicization of ethnicity, or may indeed result in demobilization. They fail to consider the entire range of possible outcomes short of the disintegration of the Soviet empire along the lines of its constituent national republics. And they neglect the capacity of the Soviet system to satisfy, channel, or manage ethnonationalism in ways that reduce its potential for instability.

In this paper, I will propose a somewhat different framework for assessing the implications that rising ethnonationalism has for Soviet political stability. I will argue that the preservation of important features of national identity is not of itself imcompatible with Soviet goals; that the political salience of ethnicity in the U.S.S.R. is not self-evident and automatic, but varies over time and among contexts, and is constrained and shaped by complex factors; that the goals and strategies of ethnonational elites are similarly diverse; and that the capacity of the Soviet system to manage ethnonational assertion in ways that reduce or eliminate its potential for instability is a critical variable in any assessment of Soviet prospects in the years ahead.

National Identity and Soviet Patriotism

The widespread tendency to assume that Soviet policy is devoted to the total eradication of national distinctiveness ignores what is perhaps the most striking development in the evolution of Soviet views about the relationship of nationalism and socialism: the growing recognition of the ubiquitousness and durability of national identity. From the initial opposition of socialism to nationalism in the 19th-century writings of Marx and Engels, to the "Austro-Marxism" of Renner and Bauer, to the Leninist "federal compromise" which granted political-administrative recognition and limited cultural autonomy to a variety of national groups, to the ambiguous Stalinist formulation of the dialectical relationship of the "flowering" (*raztsvet*) and "rapprochement" (*sblizhenie*) of nations, to current reformulations of the very definition of a "nation," the fundamental trend of Soviet theory and practice has been its accommodation to the reality of national attachments. National identity is increasingly recognized to be a far more stable and less malleable social

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phenomenon than was initially assumed in socialist theory, and national differences are treated in recent Soviet writings as enduring, if not actually indestructible characteristics.[18]

The precise balance to be struck between integrationist and pluralist approaches in Soviet nationality policy remains the subject of continuing ideological and political controversy. Two opposing "tendencies," with conflicting diagnoses, goals, and policy recommendations echoing the early debates between Rosa Luxemburg and the Austro-Marxists, still contend for influence over doctrine and policy; the first advocates more rapid integration and assimilation of the non-Russian nationalities, and the second the more flexible adaptation of the Soviet system to the social and cultural characteristics and needs of its varied groups. But the expectation of complete merging (*sliianie*) of national groups into a single Soviet entity—as distinct from the increasing economic, political, and ideological integration of separate national entities—has been postponed to a very distant future, and in some cases explicitly repudiated, in authoritative Soviet pronouncements. A leading Soviet specialist on national relations recently commented:

> It is no secret that in the early 1960s there was exaggeration in the literature about the results achieved in the rapprochement of nations; certain scholars manifested nihilism in interpreting the national factor in the life of peoples and even began to search for the road to merger in the "visible" future.[19]

An 1969 editorial in the Party's theoretical journal, *Kommunist*, clearly distinguished between the concepts of rapprochement (*sblizhenie*) and merger (*sliianie*):

> Each Soviet nation and nationality brings its own weighty contribution to the successful construction of the new community. In the process of creating communism they attain an all-round flourishing and ever closer rapprochement with one another. For all nations the common characteristics increase in all spheres of the material and spiritual life of the Soviet people. *However, the rapprochement of nations and their international unity should not be viewed as merger. The elimination of all national differences is*

[18] For a more comprehensive treatment of this thesis, see Gail W. Lapidus, "The 'National Question' in Soviet Doctrine: From Lenin to Andropov," paper presented at the Lehrman Institute, New York, March 16, 1983. See also Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[19] M. I. Kulichenko, *Raztsvet i sblizhenie natsii v SSSR* [The Flowering and Rapprochement of Nations in the U.S.S.R.] (Moscow: Mysl', 1981). Similar critiques of authors who oversimplify the process of *sliianie* are found in I. P. Tsamerian, *Natsii i natsional'nye otnosheniia v razvitom sotsialisticheskom obshchestve* [Nations and National Relations in Developed Socialist Society] (Moscow: Nauka, 1979), 178-82, and K. K. Karakeev, I. Ia. Kopylov, and R. A. Salikov, *Problemy upravleniia stroitel'stvom sovetskogo mnogonatsional'nogo gosudarstva* [Problems of Administration in the Construction of the Soviet Multinational State] (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), 250.

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a long process, and it is possible only after the complete victory and consolidation of communism in the entire world.[20]

The renewed and explicit use of the term *sliianie* in December 1982 by Andropov, in a passage quoting directly from Lenin, was linked to the assertion that these changes will occur only in the very distant future, if at all. In a series of writings on national relations which preceded Andropov's speech, R. I. Kosolapov, a leading Party theoretician and editor-in-chief of *Kommunist*, noted pointedly:

> It seems to me that the idea of the merger of nations has suffered in large part from a vulgar-utopian interpretation which assumed that merger meant the total eradication of all linguistic and ethnic differences among national groups. . . . *But why impute a meaning to Lenin's concept that it doesn't have?*[21]

In a striking passage, Kosolapov argued:

> As the 26th CPSU Congress pointed out, social classes will largely disappear while we are still in the historical period of developed socialism. The same cannot be said of socialist nations, which are more stable social and ethnic entities. As for the racial, national, and ethnic differences among major population groups and individuals, these will undergo substantial changes, of course, as a result of migration and the constant intermixing of the population, but *in principle they are indestructible. Only given this condition can we realistically conceive of the future merger of nations.*[22]

As a corollary of this view, and in contrast to the oft-repeated assertion that Soviet policy seeks to make "state" and "nation" coterminous, Soviet writings insist on the *distinction* between existing nations and the supranational Soviet community. The term *sovetskii narod*, widely used in official writings in recent years to describe a new form of community, is properly translated as "the Soviet people" rather than "the Soviet nation"; in the Soviet conception, it "does not abolish or supplant socialist nations and national distinctions."[23] The Soviet multinational system

[20] "Torzhestvo leninskoi natsional'noi politiki," [The triumph of Leninist nationality policy], *Kommunist* (No. 13, 1969), 10 (emphasis added).

[21] Kosolapov, "Klassovye i natsional'nye otnosheniia na etape razvitogo sotsializma" [Class and national relations in the stage of developed socialism], *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia* (No. 4, 1982), 10 (emphasis added). These views were also presented at a major conference in Riga on "The Development of National Relations in the Conditions of Developed Socialism" in June 1982.

[22] *Ibid.*, 15 (emphasis added).

[23] M. A. Morozov, *Natsiia v sotsialisticheskom obshchestve* [The Nation in Socialist Society] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1979), 41. In a similar vein, a recent article in *Kommunist Moldavii* argues that,

> contrary to the false claims of bourgeois ideologists, the Soviet people do not consider themselves as some sort of "Russian-Soviet nation" in which the ethnic features of the non-Russian peoples are said to have dissolved and disappeared. In reality the inter-

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thus might more properly be viewed as one which recognizes the simultaneous existence of two cultures, corresponding to two different levels of identification: an inclusive "civic culture" based on universal membership in the Soviet political community and emphasizing a unified economic system, political integration, and a shared ideological orientation, and a variety of "group cultures" based on distinct national identities and drawing sustenance from the political recognition and limited cultural autonomy granted to them. National sentiment, or loyalty to an ethnonational group, is clearly distinguished from patriotism, or loyalty to the Soviet state. Although there may well be particular circumstances in which the two come into conflict, there is no reason why they should be incompatible in principle.

Indeed, far from being treated as a necessarily threatening or destabilizing trend, the growth of national consciouness in the Soviet Union in recent years has been endowed with historical legitimacy in authoritative Soviet writings. An article in a recent issue of *Istoriia SSSR* insisted, "the growth of national self-consciousness and national feelings is a lawful regularity [*zakonomeren*] under socialism and cannot be considered as a form of nationalism."[24] This position was reaffirmed by Andropov when he stated, in his December 1982 speech, "Life shows that the economic and cultural progress of all nations and nationalities is accompanied by an inevitable growth in their national self-awareness.[25]

The Political Salience of National Identity

The historical experience of a wide range of multinational societies suggests that the politicization of ethnicity is not a unilinear and automatically unfolding process, but the function of specific catalysts in the sociopolitical environment without which ethnonationalism would remain a latent or relatively marginal force. Moreover, the politicization of ethnicity is a two-way process: the relevant actors include not only ethnic groups or elites but also central political elites, and the forms, scope, and intensity of ethnonationalism vary with specific institutions,

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national community does not replace the national one, but encompasses it. . . . The development of the U.S.S.R. proves that the nation is now the definitive form of social development. Even under socialism, it is within the framework of the nation that production and all other social relations . . . exist.

D. Ursul, "Raztsvet i sblizhenie sovetskikh natsii—torzhestvo leninskoi natsional'noi politiki" [The flowering and rapprochement of Soviet nations—the triumph of Leninist nationality policy], *Kommunist Moldavii* 11 (November 1982), 88.

[24] Z. S. Chertina, "Burzhuaznye istoriki o novoi istoricheskoi obshchnosti—sovetskii narod" [Bourgeois historians on the new historic community—the Soviet people] *Istoriia SSSR* 6 (November-December 1982), 195.

[25] *Pravda*, December 22, 1982, p. 2.

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policies, and socioeconomic conditions. An assessment of the potential scope and limits of ethnonationalism in the U.S.S.R. therefore requires a close examination of the issues that have served as catalysts of national tensions in the Soviet context and the nature of the cleavages they have crystallized. To the extent that those cleavages are cumulative and mutually reinforcing, their potential for political instability is commensurately enhanced.

A series of issues bearing directly on the resources, power, and status of different nationalities lies at the heart of current tensions and debates; we can touch on each only briefly here. The first is the nature and future of the federal system itself, and the balance to be struck between a unitary and centralized as opposed to a federal or pluralist conception of the Union. This classic center-periphery conflict, which pits the interests of republic elites against those of the center, has its origins in the fundamental tension built into Soviet nationality policy from the earliest days of the Soviet state. Forced to grapple with the tsarist legacy and to combine political centralization with some form of administrative and cultural autonomy, Lenin opted for a federal system that granted limited political-administrative recognition to major existing national groups, fostered the creation of new nationalities, and committed the Soviet leadership to their economic and cultural development. This arrangement provided an organizational context, a political legitimacy, and a cultural impetus for the assertion of group interests, values, and demands and even served to shape group identities. At the same time, the centralization of economic power and political control in a unitary Party organization dominated by a largely Slavic elite, and pursuing a cultural policy that contained a strong component of Russification, undercut the commitment to diversity and provoked intensified national consciousness and self-assertion on the part of the non-Russian nationalities.

Despite the fact that the republics are formally endowed with many attributes of sovereignty, it is ultimately the center that defines the scope and limits of their jurisdiction; large areas of economic life are excluded from their direct control. Nonetheless, both the nature of the functions performed by the republics and, indeed, the very sanctity of the original federal arrangement have been the subject of continuing controversy. Under Stalin, several republics and autonomous areas were arbitrarily abolished; in some cases—as in the Crimean Tatar, Kalmyk, and Chechen-Ingush republics—their populations were forcibly removed.[26] Although

[26] See, e.g., Alexander Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples* (New York: Norton, 1977).

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these abuses were exposed and denounced by Khrushchev, they were not fully rectified; and it was during Khrushchev's rule that the Karelo-Finnish Republic lost its status as a union republic. During the Brezhnev era, a prolonged controversy over the status and powers of the union republics again erupted; it delayed the adoption of the 1977 Constitution. Although the debate appeared to revolve around the question whether Lenin viewed the creation of the federal structure as a temporary and tactical expedient or an expression of a durable political principle, more sensitive policy problems lurked beneath the surface.

Advocates of reducing the role of the republics further, or of eliminating the federal principle altogether, urged their case on grounds of economic rationality (holding that existing boundaries were an obstacle to optimal economic planning); as a matter of political control (arguing that retention of the federal structure impeded political integration); and as a response to demographic trends (which had reduced the titular nationality to a minority in several union and autonomous republics). Defenders of existing federal arrangements cited Lenin on their behalf and asserted that the federal system had by no means exhausted its utility and that its retention was a precondition for further rapprochement among nationalities. Their insistence on the need for an exceptionally careful and sensitive approach was coupled with the scarcely veiled warning that ill-considered measures would inflame national prejudices. While the new Constitution preserved the existing structure—although with some diminution of the republics' autonomy—Brezhnev's report about the discussions did not challenge the principle of a unitary system but indicated only that major changes were inexpedient at the time.[27] Behind the scenes the debate continues, however, with discussions of the durability of the republics and the conditions under which they

[27] For a discussion of the earlier controversies, see Grey Hodnett, "The Debate Over Soviet Federalism," *Soviet Studies* 18 (April 1967), 458-81. Brezhnev's report of October 4, 1977, to the Supreme Soviet on the discussions of the draft constitution states that a number of proposals were advanced to introduce a reference to the existence of a single Soviet nation, to liquidate or sharply curtail the sovereignty of union and autonomous republics, and to establish a unicameral Supreme Soviet by abolishing the Soviet of Nationalities, but that such proposals were resisted as premature (*Izvestiia*, October 5, 1977). See also A. Shtromas, "The Legal Position of Soviet Nationalities and Their Territorial Units According to the 1977 Constitution of the USSR," *Russian Review*, No. 3 (July 1980), 265-72. For an informative Soviet treatment of current debates over the nature and future of the federal arrangement, see Karakeev and others (fn. 19), 260-98. For an example of advocacy of expanding the powers of republics, see A. Agzamkhodzhaev, "Demokraticheskii tsentralizm i sovetskaia federatsiia," [Democratic centralism and the Soviet federation], *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 7 (July 1983), 24-31. Agzamkhodzhaev is Dean of the Law Faculty of Tashkent State University and a corresponding member of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences. Virtually no published advocacy of altering the federal system has appeared since the late 1960s either in official or *samizdat* writers.

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might become superfluous in the future forming a crypto-dialogue with considerable economic and political stakes.

The pace and pattern of economic development have constituted a second subject of real controversy, pitting the interests of different regions of the U.S.S.R. against each other. Within the framework of a unified national economy based on regional specialization and a "fraternal division of labor," local elites have called for a more diversified and balanced pattern of economic growth within their republics, greater authority over economic and social development within their boundaries, and greater reliance on indigenous labor rather than on Slavic immigrants. Moreover, declining rates of economic growth are exacerbating competition for investment among different regions. The emphasis on Siberian development is challenged by the advocates of a "European strategy" who call for increased investments in the Western regions of the country because their skilled labor forces, excellent transportation networks, and nearby markets generate higher productivity. Siberian development is also challenged by those who seek increased investment in Central Asia, both to utilize a growing labor surplus and to promote greater equalization of the level of development among republics. But even this competition over resource allocation does not directly threaten the cohesion and stability of the system; it may indeed enhance it by setting the interests of republics and regions against each other in ways that prevent unified resistance to the center.[28]

Cadres policy is a third subject of controversy, involving the sensitive issue of access to positions of political power. The *nomenklatura* has preserved the dominance of Slavic elites in the key positions of the political, military, and security apparatus not only in the central organs, but in the non-Russian republics as well. For example, while the first secretary of a republic's Communist Party is now customarily a member of the titular nationality, the second secretary, who controls cadre assignments, is usually a Russian or other Slav. Although the resentment generated by this situation seldom reaches public expression, there is abundant evidence that local elites are quietly promoting increased representation of local cadres in the political apparatus—and are reaping frequent criticism for substituting "local origins" for merit in appointments and promotions. As Politburo Candidate Boris Ponomarev pointedly remarked at the Riga Conference in June 1982, the authorities in

[28] Local elites are not themselves united on these issues, and policy differences cut across both indigenous and Russian elites. See, for example, the study by Teresa Zimmer, "Ethnic Identity and Policy-Making in Soviet Uzbekistan," paper presented at AAASS meeting, September 1981, Asilomar, Calif.

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every republic "serve the interests of all its laboring peoples regardless of whether they belong to the titular nationality."[29]

This issue is all the more delicate because of earlier Soviet encouragement of "affirmative action" in access to higher education and desirable jobs outside the political apparatus. Throughout the history of Soviet rule, considerable efforts have been made to foster the emergence of indigenous elites in the non-Russian republics whose loyalty and cooperation would add legitimacy to Soviet rule. Preferential access to higher education and professional positions, particularly in the cultural arena, have helped to create a new native intelligentsia that has a stake in the achievements of Soviet power. At the same time, the process of modernization brought with it a major influx of Russian and other Slavic settlers into urban centers in the non-Russian republics. They provided needed technical and administrative skills and, in return, enjoyed career opportunities and living conditions far above those they might have attained in the provincial capitals of the Russian republic.

During the long period of economic and educational expansion, when opportunities for rapid upward mobility were widespread, these trends generated little friction between the local populations and the Slavic settler communities which led relatively separate lives. In recent years, however, shrinking opportunities have intensified the competition for scarce positions and have provoked controversy over whether the preferential treatment of local nationalities is justifiable under present conditions. In a veiled protest against the squeezing out of Russians from republic-level organs, one of several recent articles in *Nauchnyi kommunizm* (in good Leninist form, using members of national minorities to attack local chauvinism) declared:

> Under conditions of mature socialism, when actual equality of nations and nationalities has been achieved in all spheres of life, when the population of the republics has become multinational, and the Russian language as a medium of international intercourse has become widespread, there is no longer any need in the selection of cadres to give preference to representatives of the indigenous nation to the detriment of other nationalities living in a given republic. Today an unconditional carrying out of the policy of "indigenization" of the party and state apparatus would mean a limitation of the interests of the non-indigenous nation-

[29] B. N. Ponomarev, "Leninskaia natsional'naia politika KPSS na etape razvitogo sotsializma i ee mezhdunarodnoe znachenie" [The Leninist nationality policy of the CPSU at the stage of developed socialism and its international significance], in *Vospityvat' ubezhdennykh patriotov-internatsionalistov: Po materialam Vsesoiuznoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii "Razvitie natsional'nykh otnoshenii v usloviiakh zrelogo sotsializma." Opyt i problemy patrioticheskogo i internatsional'nogo vospitaniia* [Rearing Convinced Patriot-Internationalists] (Moscow: Politicheskaia literatura, 1982), 20.

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> alities, the forgetting of the fact that all inhabitants of this or that republic, regardless of nationality, are the bearers of the statehood of a given national republic and make a contribution to the development of its economy, science, and culture. . . . Consequently neither absolutization or exaggeration of national identification, nor ignoring it or national nihilism is permissible in cadre policy.[30]

The central leadership has sought to steer a delicate balance between these two positions. Brezhnev was clearly alluding to the problem in his speech to the 26th Party Congress when he tactfully stated, "The population of the Soviet republics is multinational. All nations, of course, have the right to be adequately represented in their Party and state organs. Needless to say, the competence and moral and ideological makeup of every candidate must be carefully scrutinized."[31] Andropov expressed a similar concern in his 60th anniversary speech:

> We are not talking about any formal norms of representation, of course. An arithmetic approach to the solution of such problems is inappropriate. But we must consistently seek to ensure that all nationalities present in a given republic be properly represented at various levels of Party and soviet agencies. Consideration of business, moral and political qualities, courtesy, thoughtfulness, and great tact in selecting and placing cadres are especially necessary in conditions of the multinational composition of the union and autonomous republics.[32]

This set of issues creates a complex mosaic from republic to republic, pitting the demands of the titular nationality of a given republic against the interests not only of the Russian settler communities but often of other minority nationalities as well. It is therefore no accident that criticisms of the preferential treatment of local elites link the interests of local Russians and non-Russian minorities together as victims of these exclusionary practices.

If excessive "nativization" is a source of concern in the political apparatus, the opposite problem prevails within the Soviet military, where the need to recruit more non-Russian (and especially Central Asian)

[30] G. T. Tavadov, "O razvitii natsional'nykh otnoshenii v SSSR" [On the development of national relations in the USSR], *Nauchnyi kommunizm* 5 (September-October 1981), 11-21. Another article declared:

> In the past, when actual equality among peoples had not yet been established, when there still existed significant survivals of the former backwardness of the indigenous nationalities in this or that republic, it was necessary to conduct a policy of indigenization of the apparatus. . . . But under present conditions, . . . when there are no longer any backward national districts, the need for such advantages no longer exists.

I. P. Tsamerian, "Vklad XXVI s'ezda KPSS v marksistsko-leninskuiu teoriiu natsional'nykh otnoshenii" [The contribution of the 26th Congress of the CPSU to the Marxist-Leninist theory of national relations], *Nauchnyi kommunism* 4 (July-August 1981), 63-64.

[31] *Pravda*, February 24, 1981, p. 7.

[32] *Pravda*, December 22, 1982, p. 2.

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officers conflicts with the need for Russian-fluent and technically skilled cadres. Recognizing that the prevalence of units in which non-Slavic troops are commanded by Slavic officers is a built-in source of tension, military leaders have called for increased efforts to recruit and train non-Russian officers in greater numbers. As a recent article in a Soviet military journal put it, "the party constantly points to the necessity to be concerned that all nationalities of the country are adequately represented in military training institutions and in the Soviet officer corps."[33] The differing requirements of different institutions and republics thus precludes the formulation of a uniform cadres policy and makes it likely that the issue will be a continuing subject of controversy in the years ahead.

Demographic policy has become yet another catalyst of interethnic tensions in recent years. With demographic trends no longer being treated as a natural process and increasingly as a subject of attempted official regulation in the U.S.S.R., the direction of state policy has become the object of intense public interest and controversy. The vitality and potential political "weight" of different national groups are deeply engaged by this issue. Nationalities experiencing declining birthrates—the Russians, the Balts, and the Ukrainians—express growing fear and anxiety over the perceived threat to their national identity and focus their criticism on central policies that have constituted, in their view, a contributing element in this decline. On the other hand, those nationalities with high birthrates—particularly those of Central Asia—find in this demographic vitality a source of pride and self-confident assertiveness, as well as a rationale for the allocation of increased resources and greater political representation to their region.

Moreover, in a situation where sharply contrasting regional demographic trends are linked to differences in the cultures, values, and socioeconomic opportunities of distinct national groups, and where the policies involve not only the allocation of material resources but also intervention, however indirect, in the most sensitive domains of group and personal behavior, the effort to develop a nationwide population policy is an inherently delicate undertaking. Unavoidably, the discussions focus on the most sensitive and potentially divisive issue of all: the question of whether this policy should be regionally—and, by implication—ethnically differentiated. In the past few years, a number of leading economists and demographers largely centered in Moscow have advocated the pursuit of a differentiated policy which would seek to

[33] Lt. Gen. Ye. Nikitin, *Agitator armii i flota*, No. 23, 1982, 10-14.

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increase birthrates in regions suffering from decline while attempting to control and limit them in regions of high population growth.[34] Opponents of such a policy have argued, in the words of a distinguished Kazakh demographer, that a "differentiated population policy is by its nature and intent a discriminatory policy,"[35] which runs counter to key features of Soviet nationality policy and constitutes a direct violation of Leninist norms.

The decisions taken at the 26th Congress of the CPSU in 1981 represented a compromise between the two positions. The inherent sensitivity of the issue, however, as well as the tendency to structure interests and issues along dichotomous lines that correspond to fundamental ethnic cleavages, make it highly likely that demographic policy will continue to serve as a precipitant of ethnic tensions in the years ahead.

The status and recognition accorded various nationalities—whether in the treatment of their languages, history, cultural monuments, or customs and traditions—has been a fifth source of tension and conflict. Language policy has become especially sensitive in recent years as demographic trends combine with military requirements to make the expansion of Russian language training an increasingly urgent central priority. While basic instruction in the local languages is guaranteed in the non-Russian republics, Russian remains the official language and its study as a second language is compulsory in non-Russian schools. Moreover, upward mobility—especially in the scientific, political, and military arenas—requires that local elites master the Russian language and cultural norms; Russians, on the other hand, are not required to learn the languages of the republics in which they live and work—a source of widespread local resentment. Under these conditions, recent shifts in language policy that are intended to give further impetus to the study of Russian, but which threaten the status of the local language, have generated not only widespread resistance but even mass demonstrations in several instances, and have prompted the leadership to shroud new initiatives in utmost secrecy.[36]

While the language issue has proven to be the single most sensitive

[34] For a fuller account of these discussions, see Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, *Women in Soviet Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), chap. 8, and Cynthia Weber and Ann Goodman, "The Demographic Policy Debate in the USSR," *Population and Development Review* 7 (June 1981), 279-95.

[35] M. V. Tatimov, *Razvitie narodonaseleniia i demograficheskaia politika* [Population Development and Demographic Policy] (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1978), 4.

[36] For a discussion of the controversy provoked by Khrushchev's initiatives in 1958-1959, see Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Soviet Education Laws of 1958-59 and Soviet Nationality Policy," *Soviet Studies* 14 (October 1962), 138-57. More recent conflicts are reviewed in Roman Solchanyk, "Russian Language and Soviet Politics," *Soviet Studies* 34 (January 1982), 23-42.

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catalyst of national protest, cultural assertion takes far broader forms. Russian and non-Russian elites alike are engaged in exploration as well as in glorification of their "roots." The resurrection of folk heroes, both ancient and modern, including those previously under opprobrium; the purification of national languages and exclusion of foreign borrowings; the evocation of group achievements; the concern with preserving the group's environment, both cultural and natural; and the defense of local traditions, from religious practices to family behavior—all involve an assertion of developing cultural identities and an effort to convert cultural traditions into a political resource.

Although many aspects of this development have a conflictual aspect, it would be a mistake to exaggerate the degree of polarization involved or to assume a uniform situation from republic to republic. Georgia, the Baltic republics, and the Ukraine have offered more open resistance to measures that threaten national languages; in Central Asia, where the cultural divide between the indigenous and Russian communities is especially great and the prospects for large-scale assimilation are minimal, such measures do not present the same threat, nor do they evoke as strong or visible a reaction. Moreover, although local cultural elites—particularly from intellectual, professional, and student milieus—have been in the forefront of efforts at national self-assertion in the U.S.S.R. as elsewhere, there are many for whom career interests are bound less to the fate of national languages and cultures than to upward mobility in a largely Russian scientific, technical, and administrative environment. Finally, it should be borne in mind that cultural self-assertion by national elites is part of a process of political bargaining as well as of conflict: cultural traditions are converted into a political resource in a within-system competition over power, wealth, and status.

All these problems could well be exacerbated by several emerging trends and issues in Soviet political life. The succession process, which promises heightened competition and instability at the apex of the political system, could increase the temptation of rival claimants to exploit nationality policy in order to build political support. Declining rates of economic growth are also likely to make the management of ethnic relations more difficult; competition over the allocation of limited resources among the different republics as well as within them is likely to grow. In the past, an expanding economic pie mitigated both the costs of empire, on the one hand, and the resentment of exploitation, on the other. When economic circumstances are strained, rival groups will confront each other's claims more directly. This trend is highlighted in a striking article in the prominent journal *Soviet State and Law*. The

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essay conveys the widespread sense of grievance among Russians by cataloguing a whole succession of central policies—from family allowances to agricultural procurement prices—which transfer resources from the Russian heartland to unspecified "outlying regions." "As for budget policy," the authors complain, "not once in the entire existence of the Soviet state has the Russian republic benefited by a subsidy from the all-Union budget, as several other republics have."[37]

Major shifts in the relative "weight" of different regions, resulting from demographic trends or new technologies, compound the problems of low growth. A more flexible deployment of resources between the older industrial regions and the emerging "sun belt" is vitally needed, but as American experience suggests, such shifts are politically difficult to achieve. Moreover, the prospect of reduced social mobility in the decades ahead is especially conducive to increased ethnic tensions as the competition for educational and professional advancement sharpens. Differential birthrates are producing a rapidly growing cohort of young people in the Muslim regions of the U.S.S.R. who will confront a stable but well-entrenched cohort of their Slavic counterparts. Short of massive investments in industrialization and social infrastructure to generate new job opportunities and forestall a deterioration of living standards, increased competition is likely to intensify ethnic prejudice.[38]

The increasing salience of foreign policy in Soviet domestic affairs may also interact with ethnic assertiveness. The greater involvement of the Soviet Union in the outside world during the past two decades has exposed the Soviet population to a wider variety of influences, values, and experiences than was the case when official media held an unchallenged monopoly. The Baltic population could follow events in Poland on Scandinavian television transmission; in the case of Central Asia the orientation of Soviet policy toward the Middle East has been accompanied by the emergence of Tashkent as a showcase of Soviet achievement. The proliferation of officially sponsored technical, cultural, and even religious delegations, the increasing reliance on Central Asian cadres in technical and diplomatic roles, and most recently, the dispatch of

[37] G. I. Litvinova and B. Ts. Urlanis, "Demograficheskaia politika Sovetskogo Soiuza" [The demographic policy of the Soviet Union], *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* 3 (March 1982), 38-46.

[38] The inverse relationship between upward mobility and ethnic prejudice, and its special salience in the more educated, intelligentsia strata, is clearly demonstrated in the research of Iu. V. Arutiunian, "Konkretno-sotsiologicheskoe issledovanie natsional'nykh otnoshenii" [Concrete sociological research on national relations], *Voprosy filosofii* 12 (December 1969), 129-39. The potentially divisive impact of economic issues on nationality relations can be seen with greater clarity in studies conducted in Yugoslavia; see Steven L. Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) chap. 2.

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Soviet armed forces and administrative personnel into Afghanistan, have created both opportunities and problems for Soviet policy. The gains derived from using members of minorities to expand Soviet influence abroad are undeniable, but recent developments have also rekindled traditional anxieties about divided loyalties.

The effects of increased interaction on popular attitudes are difficult to assess, but they introduce a new frame of reference for evaluating Soviet accomplishments and failures. Whether or not comparisons of Tashkent with Kabul or Teheran are as unfavorable to the Soviet Union as comparisons of Moscow with New York, renewed campaigns against religious organizations that are now said to embrace "foreign Moslem reactionaries" testify to official sensitivities. Soviet publications issue repeated warnings against efforts to bring the "flame of Islamic revival" to the U.S.S.R. in order to destabilize Central Asia, foment nationalist prejudices in these regions, and "arouse discontent among believers with the policies of the Communist Party and the Soviet state."[39]

The greater visibility and impact of linkages between foreign policy and regional domestic needs also help to explain the growing attention that Soviet regional elites give to foreign policy issues. The repercussions of events in Poland on the Baltic republics is one case in point. Finally, Sino-Soviet tensions also intersect with the Soviet nationality problem, both in providing an impetus for better treatment of the indigenous nationalities of Soviet Central Asia and in the Soviet appeal to fellow-nationals across the Chinese frontier.

This brief discussion of some of the major issues around which ethnonational grievances have centered demonstrates the considerable difficulties that stand in the way of forming ethnonational movements able to bridge the diverse backgrounds, interests, and objectives of their constituencies. The conflicts outlined here create diverse and cross-cutting cleavages rather than cumulative and mutually reinforcing ones. They span a broad spectrum, including the competing claims and interests of center and periphery, of different regions against each other, of local elites of the titular nationality against those of the Russian settler community (often itself allied with other minority nationalities), as well as of conflicting views within local as well as national elites. With the possible exception of the Baltic republics and the Ukraine, where in deteriorating economic conditions it is at least conceivable that protest

[39] For two examples of a large number of articles dealing with efforts by the KGB to combat ideological subversion from abroad directed at Central Asia, see S. Tsvigun in *Kommunist* 4 (September 1981), 88-89, and Major General Z. Yusif-Zade, in *Bakinskii rabochii*, December 19, 1980, 3.

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movements could join working-class unrest to national grievances, considerable difficulties clearly stand in the way of defining issues "which strike responsive chords simultaneously among the elites and masses and serve to link the concerns of different strata in a coherent ethnic movement."[40]

Strategies and Goals of National Self-Assertion

The widespread tendency of Western observers to assume that political instability, if not outright secession, is the natural and logical outcome of rising national consciousness neglects the broad repertoire of potential strategies and goals available to ethnonational elites. Especially in light of the severe constraints on the political mobilization of ethnicity imposed by the Soviet system, it is important to be mindful of the full gamut of possibilities available to those who wish to identify themselves with some form of national self-assertion in the U.S.S.R.

At the individual level, national elites are presented with a variety of options. They include assimilation, whether in the form of identifying with the dominant group and its culture, or by actually altering one's ethnic identity; maximizing individual power through political mobility or by acting as a broker between the two cultures; or linking one's personal fate to that of one's nation and defending or asserting its distinctive traits. The ethnonational groups face a parallel range of possibilities, such as the promotion of cultural or political nationalism in its various manifestations; mobilization for increased autonomy, communalism, or resources; or outright secessionism at the far end of the political spectrum.

Of this entire gamut of possible strategies, by far the most widespread in the Soviet context are those devoted to working within the system. They encompass center-periphery bargaining designed, on the part of the participant group, to enhance its resources, power, and status as well as the reliance on bureaucratic politics and clientele relationships to modify centrally imposed policies in the course of implementation. The degree of direct pressure that any group can exert on the center is, in turn, the product of several factors. The most important have been the responsiveness of a given leadership as well as of the central elite to group pressures; the overall "weight" of the particular group in the system as a whole; its role in key positions of economic, political, and

[40] Donald L. Horowitz, "Multiracial Politics in the New States: Toward a Theory of Conflict," in Robert J. Jackson and Michael B. Stein, eds., *Issues in Comparative Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), 172.

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military power; its control over strategic resources; and the availability of exogenous political forces willing and able to offer effective support to its goals or to provide leverage on its behalf. In short, the scope, the strategies, and the outcomes of national self-assertion are highly diverse, variable, and problematic. They will, moreover, be shaped in important ways by the particular constraints imposed on its expression by Soviet institutions and practices.

The Political Mobilization of Ethnicity in the U.S.S.R.: constraints and prospects

The long-term prospects for ethnonational resurgence in the U.S.S.R. are constrained by both intrinsic and systemic factors. First, as I have already noted, there are significant intrinsic constraints on the political mobilization of ethnicity in the Soviet Union as elsewhere; the repertoire of potential ethnic identities and their salience varies among individuals and in different situations. Furthermore, individuals have multiple and overlapping identities and roles based on gender, socioeconomic status, age, and institutional affiliation of which ethnicity is only one, and not necessarily the most important. Under normal conditions, education and profession are likely to be more significant determinants of attitudes and behavior than ethnicity *per se*. Moreover, neither national elites nor masses share homogeneous and unified attitudes or aspirations; these divisions complicate still further the task of mobilizing large populations around a single issue.

An additional constraint on the political mobilization of ethnicity in the U.S.S.R. is the absence of a single overriding cleavage on which such mobilization might center. The issues that pit the interests of Russians against those of the non-Russian nationalities form only a small part of a much larger spectrum. Divergent historical and political experiences have shaped the attitudes of different non-Russian nationalities toward the Russians; for some, the Russians represent allies or protectors against traditional enemies. In other cases, regions and republics compete over the allocation of resources. And even within the same national republic, ethnic communities may be divided over key issues, such as the importance and value of religious traditions or the desirability of further modernization, with its attendant Russification, for example. The dissident groups themselves are internally divided; Jewish and Ukrainian activists have more than once accused the civil rights movement of being insufficiently concerned with the national question, while Russian nationalists hold widely divergent views about the costs and

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benefits of empire. Thus, the existence of multiple cross-cutting cleavages that are not cumulative and mutually reinforcing constitutes a major asset for the regime in the management of ethnic relations.

Another Soviet asset turns on matters of comparative size, consciousness, integration, and demands on the system among national groups. The most "advanced" Soviet nationalities—the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, absorbed into the Soviet Union during World War II—which are likely to make the greatest demands and are potentially the least "digestible," are numerically the smallest. The potential demographic weight of the Central Asian republics, on the other hand, is offset in the short run by their more parochial, underdeveloped, and self-sufficient way of life that makes comparatively fewer demands on the system.

Furthermore, the very nature of the Soviet regime imposes severe constraints on the political mobilization of ethnicity (as, indeed, on the mobilization of any other subculture or group identity), through a combination of coercion, repression, control, co-optation, competition, and concessions. Any potential national movement faces a political regime with an exceptionally highly developed mechanism of control. Repression and the threat of repression have remained central components of Soviet nationality policy. They are used to prevent the organization of dissident movements, outlaw their activities, ban their publications, and to arrest and try participants. In addition, the management of dissidence includes efforts to ridicule and discredit potential participants in such movements by defining their concerns as non-issues, by labeling their spokesmen as fanatics of anti-Soviet accomplices of Western imperialism, or by warning or the disastrous political and economic consequences that might follow from any effort to disengage a constituent unit from the federal Union. Official statements are not above depicting many national languages and cultures as relatively primitive and limited, unlikely to receive full international recognition on their own; they may even imply that nationalist movements would deprive these groups of the cultural status and economic benefits that derive from their association with the larger Union. An official monopoly over all forms of organization and association as well as the overall means of public communication is a further impediment to the expression of demands outside official channels; the effort to assign military conscripts outside their own regions ensures the loyalty of the armed forces and makes possible their use in local disturbances. To the extent that a solid organization is a *sine qua non* of any potential ethnonational movement, prospects for such an organization inside the U.S.S.R. are exceedingly slim.

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Quite apart from the coercive restraints on the politicization of ethnicity, the Soviet regime also appeals to normative and material interests. The leadership goes to considerable lengths to emphasize the way in which members of non-Russian nationalities derive substantial benefits from working within the system. Unlike classic colonial systems, the Soviet Union proffers full and equal citizenship, providing symbolic recognition and genuine opportunities for participation and advancement of the non-Russian nationalities in exchange for loyalty and partial assimilation. Having initially destroyed traditional local elites and eliminated the economic and political bases of alternative centers of power, the Soviet system proceeded to train, promote, and co-opt new indigenous sub-elites and to reward them for their collaboration and loyalty. In the absence of any major threats to the viability of the Soviet system, these new elites are more likely to direct their energies toward within-system demands than toward secession.

Displacement and depoliticization are especially useful instruments for the management of ethnic tensions. The enormous expansion of cultural and scientific elites in Central Asia is not only a way of rewarding and co-opting local elites, but of channeling ethnic aspirations away from more sensitive political and administrative domains. Similarly, the toleration of societies for the preservation of historical and cultural monuments reflects a recognition that they constitute a comparatively harmless alternative to other forms of ethnic self-assertion. The expansion of Soviet contacts with the Third World in recent years and, more recently still, the construction of a new administrative and cultural infrastructure in Afghanistan are likely to offer opportunities to enlist the energies and skills as well as the "imperial" aspirations of the Central Asian elites.

The regime has also employed a strategy of avoidance in a number of areas. By concentrating its efforts at control of the "commanding heights," and avoiding direct assaults on local customs and norms when they are marginal to central priorities, it has reduced the potential for counterproductive confrontations. The treatment of Islam within the U.S.S.R. is a telling illustration: thanks to its control of the recruitment, training, and activities of official religious elites, and to an active campaign of antireligious propaganda, the Soviet leadership can afford to tolerate a considerable degree of private religious observance.

Another major device in the management of national relations is the exploitation of alternative lines of cleavage and solidarity. By emphasizing class rather than ethnicity as a fundamental social division, by promoting contacts across ethnic boundaries among different profes-

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sional groups—from writers and artists to natural and social scientists—and by exploiting conflict among ethnic groups as well as divisions within them, the Soviet leadership has sought to create solidarities that transcend ethnic boundaries and to exploit cleavages that cut across them. It has also largely avoided creating situations which activate ethnic identities in politically destabilizing ways.

Finally, the Soviet leadership has motivated ethnic elites to participate in and benefit from the system, rather than to exacerbate ethnic conflict. By exploiting external threats (particularly threats from China directed at Soviet Central Asia), by pressing the view that any conflict would detract from the economic well-being of the whole, and by making clear that the acquisition or retention of political power depends upon collaboration with central elites, the Soviets have emphasized the benefits of the present system as well as the dangers of fragmentation. For all these reasons, although the political salience of national self-assertion is likely to increase significantly over the next decade, and to pose increasingly difficult problems of management for the Soviet elite, rising nationalism, in the absence of a major military conflict on Soviet territory, is unlikely to pose a serious threat to the stability of the Soviet system.

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Review Articles

MORAL MEMBERSHIP IN A POSTLIBERAL STATE

By NANCY L. ROSENBLUM

Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*. New York: Basic Books, 1983, 345 pp.

READERS have come to expect two things from Michael Walzer's writings: eloquence and radical principles. *Spheres of Justice* fulfills both expectations. While other contemporary treatises are arguments from formal principles, this study is a *portrait* of the just community. Actually, it is a portrait gallery of just communities—not one only—illustrating the many good and desirable things that can be parceled out among men and women, and the many ways in which communities distribute

> membership, power, honor, ritual eminence, divine grace, kinship and love, knowledge, wealth, physical security, work and leisure, rewards and punishments, and a host of goods more narrowly and materially conceived—food, shelter, clothing, transportation, medical care, commodities of every sort, and all the odd things (paintings, rare books, postage stamps) that human beings collect (p. 3).

Walzer has something provocative to say about all of these and more: opportunities for education, control of industry, rewarding of the Nobel Prize for Literature, even pairing off on dates.

In view of this variety of good things, no single universal principle of distribution could serve—not need or merit, desert or free choice. Every community must decide whether education, for example, should be distributed according to merit or bought on the open market, but in any case, education is likely to be distributed in a manner different from pleasure boats, or power, or personal affection. So, from this array of goods Walzer goes on to describe the existence of several spheres of justice, each with its own distributive procedures, agents, and criteria, and to oppose the domination of any one of them. The book is "a declaration of distributive independence" that differentiates him from socialists and egalitarians who would simply substitute the rule of officialdom for the rule of wealth. It also differentiates him from libertarians, who would leave everything to voluntarist free exchange. Wal-

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zer's ambition is to make readers aware of the plurality of spheres of justice, and of what follows when the autonomy of these spheres is respected: the fact that equality will be complex since there are many distributions making for many kinds of equality.

Spheres of Justice is about something more than distributive justice, however; this second subject, which is less obvious but certainly as important as the first, is community. For Walzer, justice is the shared moral understanding of particular men and women in a particular political community. He is not concerned with the way philosophers or others think about justice when they reflect alone, but how communities value goods and distribute them to their members. That is why he proceeds primarily through the persuasive force of example, mining the past—our own and that of other cultures—for examples of the various social meanings that have been assigned to various goods and for examples of communities of shared understanding. Where John Rawls uses psychology and economics to produce a *theory* of justice, Walzer uses history and anthropology in his effort to *describe* "communities of character," and to convince us that membership in such a community is good.

In the ordinary course of moral philosophy, these two distinct subjects—distributive justice and community—are treated separately. Philosophers abstract distributive questions from the discussions of actual communities, and they treat the question of the moral foundations of justice as a subject apart. For them, justice does not begin with "persons-in-the-social-world" (p. 261); it is the business of philosophy to discover a transcendent ideal or to conceptualize a hypothetical social contract.[1] Walzer's originality lies in combining distributive justice and community. Taken together, they amount to a radical *political* claim: not only is complex equality just, but membership in a *community* of shared moral meanings is "conceivably" the greatest good (p. 29). It is Walzer's vision of community, more than his egalitarianism, that represents a challenge to liberalism. I will argue that he presents a *postliberal* theory of the state, and I will offer a defense of liberalism against Walzer's highly original attack.

I. Community and Sovereignty

For Michael Walzer, justice is contextual, an ethics of social meanings. Distributions are just or unjust only in a particular setting, with regard

[1] Ronald Dworkin emphasizes the fundamental question in his review, "To Each His Own," *The New York Review of Books*, April 14, 1983, 4-6. See, too, the exchange with Walzer in *The New York Review of Books*, July 21, 1983, 43-46.

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to particular people who share an understanding of goods and purposes. But if justice is contextual, what is the relevant context? It is not any social group or club, church, party, race, or local municipality (the usual meaning of "community" in American politics) but a political community that is also an independent state.

This ethical position is avowedly relativist: different communities develop or choose different distributive systems. Readers familiar with Walzer's writings on international relations will recognize that one question arises right at the outset. If justice is the creation of particular communities and if membership is the only way to benefit from or to participate in justice, what about universal principles of justice? What is the connection between *Spheres of Justice* and Walzer's conception of human rights in *Just and Unjust Wars*, where he states that men and women are members of the human race as well as members of a particular political community?[2]

In *Just and Unjust Wars* Walzer pointed up the remarkable continuity in moral sentiments through history and the constancy of just-war conventions that embody them. There has always been a stable moral vocabulary in international relations, which explains why his discussion of justice among states ranged from Vietnam back to the Peloponnesian wars. But in my reading, even there Walzer took the same "radically particularist" position he assumes in *Spheres of Justice* (p. xv). Just-war conventions may be universal, but Walzer did not give them the status of ethical absolutes. These conventions give way under "utilitarian extremity" when a community's territorial integrity or political independence is at stake. Walzer defended self-determination. And he made nonintervention the rule unless it can be shown that an autonomous community no longer exists—for instance when a distinct community wages a war of liberation so as to become a nation within a nation, or when a government has already permitted a third party to intervene in a civil war, or when extraordinary violations of human rights make talk of community seem "cynical" or "irrelevant."

The two books combine to form a vision of two universes, each with its own moral vocabulary. We inhabit them simultaneously—the domestic world of distributive justice and the world of international relations where the claims of common humanity have standing (*Spheres*, p. xv). Walzer keeps these two moral universes distinct, as in the instance of refugees seeking asylum: "On the one hand, everyone must have a place to live, and a place where a reasonably secure life is possible. On

[2] Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Hedley Bull, "Recapturing the Just War for Political Theory," *World Politics* 31 (July 1979), 588-99.

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the other hand, this is not a right that can be enforced against particular host states" (p. 50). There is almost nothing about human rights in his discussion of domestic justice, and Walzer summarily rejects international distributive justice as impracticable. It is as if a world of sovereign states were so much the only imaginable one that debate with universal socialists, say, was irrelevant; as if the range of international distributive theories currently debated as well as the range of actual international practices—from commerce to charity and scientific exchanges—did not have a significant bearing on a community's own internal distributions. Walzer is able to disregard these matters because of his conviction that moral membership in a community is the greatest good, and that the overriding concern of the community is with its own members.

In *Spheres of Justice*, principles of national self-determination and nonintervention in the affairs of other states have their domestic counterpart in the community's control of its own membership. Walzer makes two assertions. First, the community alone decides on admission to citizenship, emigration, exiling, and stripping citizenship away. Second, the community ought to adopt a policy of inclusiveness: all of its present inhabitants—immigrants, refugees, guest workers, and residents—should be offered full membership because it is tyranny to rule over strangers. But there are no standards for admission initially other than the ones the community sets for itself. The community's right of closure is inviolable. Why should it be? Walzer's commitment to the concept of community shows itself for the first time in his justification for autonomous control of membership.

In some instances Walzer seems to argue that the community's right of closure is inviolable because without it there can be no justice. States alone determine distributions for their members. That is what sovereignty means. Beyond the human right to life and liberty, we have rights or claims only as members of a particular political society, and to goods only in terms of the part they play there. We can receive only what our society gives. Since all states give members something in the way of security and provision, Walzer says that every state is in principle a "welfare state" (p. 68). Presumably that is why he maintains that because of the community's investment in its members, the right to emigrate should be granted only after the state has been repaid in work or money (p. 101).

But this argument from sovereignty in practice is not a justification for the state's right of closure, and Walzer usually agrees. For him, control of membership is more than an accompaniment of sovereignty—it is also good, and the collective right to shape the resident population

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follows directly from this view of political society as a community with its own conception of itself. "Admission and exclusion are at the core of communal independence. They suggest the deepest meaning of self-determination. Without them, there could not be communities of character" (p. 62). Inclusion and exclusion must be managed in a fashion faithful to a common way of life, for without communities of character there would be no good of membership to be distributed. Thus, the moral claims of common humanity can require only the most limited redistributions of territory or resources, and considerations of common humanity cannot be allowed to transform policies of admission (pp. 47-48, 51). Without community control, there could be neither members nor strangers.

Walzer refers to the wars of this century that drove the Greeks from Turkey and the Turks from Greece. The refugees were taken in by their homelands, by communities that expressed the common life of their national families. "What else are such states for?" he asks (p. 42). Perhaps such states are homelands, but not all states fit this description, nor should they, in my view. And surely the elements of moral community are not exhausted by nationality, though it remains unclear what else is included. What, for example, should be the standards for admission to heterogeneous liberal states? What affinity "to us" merits inclusion? Walzer ponders whether the United States should be open to all victims of tyranny and bigotry, or only to some, or to anyone who espouses liberal principles. He is not sure. For our purposes, the question is whether *either* of these considerations amounts to a test of potential membership in a community of shared meanings. After all, neither the espousal of liberal ideology nor past victimization can create a population that is a national family like the Greeks, or even a community of character. In liberal states, people who are ideological and cultural aliens can still enjoy citizenship. And that is the troublesome point, since it is membership in a community that Walzer values and not simply citizenship in a state. What distinguishes a community of character from a sovereign state, thus justifying its inviolable right of closure?

Standard perspectives see sovereignty as having little to do with "belonging" in a deep psychological or moral sense. Since Bodin and Hobbes, sovereignty has meant the exercise of power by means of general laws that are commands. Especially in the international sphere, sovereignty is a legal concept, and the autonomy of the state follows from the fact that the authority whose commands are law is not subordinate to any other—neither to an external authority nor to a higher law. The relation between citizens and the state is a formal one. Although citizens may

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have patriotic sentiments for their state, they do not necessarily enjoy shared moral understandings, or agree about or practice just distributions among themselves.

Typically, community connotes the opposite. Where there is community, law is not command, and relations are not legalistic but direct. Membership is marked less by law-abidingness than by felt obligations and shared understandings. In a community, the notion of "belonging" has meaning and place, for there is no conflict between obligation and personal inclination. Here, patriotic sentiment has a moral basis (p. 37). In community it is crucial for the regime to appear "lovely" to its members (p. 64).

The dichotomy between citizen and alien stems from legal and analytic notions of sovereignty; most discussions of admission to the state employ this conceptual framework. But for Walzer, the significant division is between member and stranger. It derives from his judgment that belonging to a community of character is an independent good that requires protection, such as the right to control what kinds of people, and which particular ones, may belong. Before considering just why it appears as a good to Walzer, we must examine his account of moral community and membership in contemporary states. Then we can take a sharp look at what is most problematic about Walzer's position from a liberal point of view.

II. Community Standards and Comparative Politics

Walzer's central assumption is that the closest we can come to a world of shared meaning is political community. Surprisingly, he offers neither a historical nor a philosophical account of community—what it is, how and under what conditions it develops, how we can identify when a community of shared moral meanings exists. Is communitarianism a matter of degree? And if political societies are more or less communities, what makes them so? Walzer speaks of membership and belonging in a way that begs for a theory of community, but he does not provide one.[3] His sense of community must be teased out of his examples.

One standard of community—perhaps the closest to Walzer's purpose—is subjective. Since community consists neither of mere association nor formal citizenship but of shared social meanings, the measure of its existence is the strength of its members feeling that they belong to a just order. In that case, anger and resentment are evidence that citizens

[3] For social science views see "Community," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. III (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 157ff.

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perceive a falling-off from justice. Walzer proposes Thucydides' Melian dialogue as a dramatic instance of a community recalled to its collective moral self. But how useful is this (excellent) example of moral community in action for discerning in practice whether a community exists in other cases? Apart from the Greek dialogue, what is the institutional expression of members' anger at unfaithfulness to moral tradition? Civil war? Does acquiescence in injustice prove that there is no shared sense of what is deplorable? How many members must be morally offended before we can say that a community has deviated from its shared meanings? Walzer is in danger of crossing the threshold of Benthamite calculation—weighing the number, purity, intensity, and so on, of individual moral judgments in order to estimate whether "the community" thinks it has become corrupt.

Most important, how do we know when dissension is fundamental and reflects profound disagreement about practices (or about the moral foundations of practices) rather than resentment over unfaithfulness to shared meanings? Does fundamental moral dissension eliminate community? And if so, does the justification for inviolable control of membership disappear too, so that other standards for admission—charitable or utilitarian ones, perhaps—take over?

Walzer's most effective examples of community are historical ones in which membership is unambiguous and separation from strangers is sharply drawn: Periclean Athens or the Jewish community in Christian Europe during the High Middle Ages. He uses these examples to prove that a community of genuine moral membership is possible. But it is not clear how large, complex modern societies—especially liberal ones—conform to their model. Walzer refers to Athens and to the Jews because, like the United States, they were relatively democratic and respected private property (p. 68). But neither of them was a heterogeneous or differentiated society, and neither was a state. Still, it is Walzer's intention to use these examples to show what community can be, and to show that the United States is one.

The absence of a theory of community is felt most keenly when Walzer turns his attention to the contemporary United States. In *Just and Unjust Wars*, he set out a wide range of historical cases in order to demonstrate the existence of a shared moral vocabulary. Here, he musters the same range of illustrations to the opposite purpose; he uses examples of radical *differences* in the moral values that communities assign goods in order to jolt Americans into a sense of their uniqueness and agreement with one another. Perhaps they (Walzer employs the pronoun "we") will recognize themselves as a community with shared social meanings when

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confronted with divergent ones. In contrast to the Athenians, Americans agree that social welfare should extend beyond public baths and gymnasiums; in contrast to the Jews, they want education for women. But this method can only succeed in proving that Americans differ from others more than they differ among themselves; in fact, it proves only that they differ from a peculiar array of alien others more than they differ among themselves.

These contrasts do not make Walzer's case that the United States is a moral community, and certainly not that the shared moral meanings of its citizens point, as he insists, to complex equality: "A society of equals lies within our own reach. It is a practical possibility here and now, latent already, as I shall try to show, in our shared understandings of social goods" (p. xiv). My quarrel is not that Americans do not agree about the meaning and value of some goods or about the criteria by which they should be distributed, of course they do (though even so they do not necessarily agree about specific public policies to effect these distributions). I also think, with Walzer, that the structural differentiation necessary for complex equality is present in American political society, and I will return to this point later. But which social goods are interpreted similarly, on which goods and policies is there disagreement, and which of these shared understandings add up to community?

At times, Walzer seems simply to deny the existence of fundamental dissension—as when he states that despite a shoddy health care system, the "deeper understanding" is that justice requires that more than a minimum standard of care be distributed to everyone. In another example, Walzer points to the end of the sale of exemptions for military service in 1863 as evidence that Americans agree that the state should not impose dangerous jobs on some and let others off. He maintains that universal military service reflects a "deep sense" of what it means to be a citizen—despite persistent support for selective service and policies like college deferrals or bonuses for conscripts (p. 98).

At other times, Walzer recognizes the existence of fundamental disagreements, but denies that they prevent the United States from constituting a community. Racial prejudice and inequality may not make America a divided society like South Africa, or vulnerable to justified international intervention for having disregarded the claims of common humanity; but if conflict and misunderstanding over matters like schoolbusing or affirmative action or bilingual education do not disqualify the United States from unified membership, what does? If community means nothing more than the opposite of a society radically divided by incompatible cultural traditions, Walzer's talk about belonging is virtually

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superfluous; he has identified only the barest minimum conditions for political unity, and not community. Throughout, the absence of comparisons with other contemporary states that he would characterize as communities of character is a serious omission. With its conflicts as well as its areas of moral consensus, is the United States more or less a community than Sweden, or Canada, or Brazil—and in what respects?

But from the liberal standpoint I have taken here, the most confusing aspect of Walzer's discussion of the United States is that he ignores entirely the obvious bases of accord—the classical stuff of liberalism, such as confidence in constitutionalism and appeals to civil rights. He insists not only that America is a (latent) community, but that the content of its shared understandings is his own theory of complex equality rather than political ideology.

Walzer admits that "few of us have any direct experience of what a country is or of what it means to be a member" (p. 35). Still, he claims that a "deeper understanding" of shared meanings would indicate that complex equality is just. But who reveals "latent" community? The public opinion pollster? The philosopher? "Deeper understanding" and "latent" community appear to conflict with Walzer's definition of justice as faithfulness to shared meanings. Can there be moral principles that are simultaneously a matter of shared understanding and subversive of common practice—at least where tyranny or terror do not repress them? Or, to put it another way, can a latent community be loved?

It is possible to describe the United States in terms that take account of some of these difficulties. Samuel Huntington does so when he shows how latent consensus about values can manifest itself in political instability. He argues that democratic, egalitarian, and liberal ideals—especially in combination—are incapable of being fulfilled by any institutional arrangement.[4] The constitutional state is by definition self-limiting, and both equality and democracy oppose the exercise of authority by some over others. Hence, the American "creed" is incompatible with the strong government necessary for collaborative purposes. As a result, America experiences recurrent periods of idealism that are marked by political instability. Under these conditions, suspicion of authority and intense politicization are proof of latent moral aspiration.

But it is the perspective of political sociology that reveals what I take to be the crucial ambiguity in Walzer's discussion: the problematic way in which he relates his three central ideas to one another—spheres of justice, complex equality, and community.

[4] Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).

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Walzer's best examples of community are relatively undifferentiated societies where religion and art, family and education, politics and economics do not occupy separate contexts. By contrast, modern societies are structurally differentiated. They contain many spheres of justice, and complex equality is impossible without structural complexity. Walzer argues that societies are not necessarily more just simply because they are more differentiated. But he does insist that justice has greater scope in such societies, "*and the more scope justice has, the more certain it is that complex equality will be the form that justice takes*" (p. 315; italics added). That is, complex equality is in some sense the accompaniment of the emergence of plural spheres. Social scientists since Weber would agree.[5] But Walzer is not content with this statement. He wants something more than structural differentiation, plural spheres of justice, and a tendency for equality to be complex. In addition, he wants community—a *regime* of complex equality.

Such a regime implies a new form of political order, one that makes the old distinctions of political sociology obsolete. As I read him, Walzer replaces the standard conceptual distinction—traditional community versus modern differentiated society—with another: differentiated societies with community versus differentiated societies without community. I also perceive an implied chronology of political development here: homogeneous communities with a strong sense of moral membership, followed by a falling-off from original unity to differentiation and fragmentation, and then by a new stage of community—postmodern and postliberal, based on complex equality.

My concern is the challenge that Walzer's communitarian standard poses for liberalism in particular. What is most important from this perspective is the difference between *liberal* notions of why plural spheres of justice are good and Walzer's very different belief that, without community, spheres of justice are inadequate.

III. Pluralism, Spheres of Justice, and Liberalism

Modernization produced plural spheres, but liberalism—with its insistence on public/private, society/state dichotomies—gave plural spheres formal recognition and a central place in political thought. Walzer recalls that liberal opposition to political tyranny produced the original modern defense of autonomous spheres—separation of church and state. He cites Locke, who argued for "two jurisdictions, two distributive spheres; in

[5] For example, Robert A. Dahl, a political scientist of pluralism, writes about "dispersed inequalities." *Polyarchy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 87.

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the one, the magistrate presides . . . in the other, God Himself presides" (p. 245). Sometimes Walzer uses this liberal argument himself, limited government being a reason for rejecting simple egalitarianism. To sustain a regime of simple equality would require periodic returns to the original condition, which only a centralized, activist state would be strong enough to enforce (p. 14).

There is another beneficial consequence of plural spheres, one that has more resonance today—namely, individuality. The contemporary longing for uniqueness and self-expression creates its own distinctive defense of liberal society because of its pluralism, its tolerance, and the opportunities it provides for self-development. Liberalism does not require men and women to be fully realized in one or even a few limited contexts; pluralism makes good on its assumption that there are many kinds and ways to happiness. Thus, the simplistic classical liberal division into public and private spheres (where public meant government and private meant civil society) is replaced by a diversity of spheres. In liberal society, our public selves engage in commerce, contribute to the marketplace of ideas, and participate in politics, while our private selves are exercised and restored by immersion in other contexts such as art, or domestic affairs, or friendship. Individuality is conceived in terms of a unique, personally cultivated, always-changing balance among contexts and within a complex self. Plural spheres also insure "limited liability": since the whole person is not at stake in any one sphere there is protection against total loss, disappointment, and satiation, as Albert O. Hirschman points out in his recent study of cycles of privatization and politicization.[6] When liberalism combines plural spheres with individualism and toleration, the result is liberty and individuality.

But Walzer's concern with plural spheres of justice is not a matter of liberalism; it is not liberty or individuality so much as equality. In fact, his concern is equality *for the sake of community*. Complex equality will decrease not only absolute inequality, but also feelings of relative deprivation. Where there are many autonomous contexts, inequalities are segregated and comparisons are harder to make. Thus, complex equality is a necessary condition if people are to feel that they belong to a community, that they are full members of it. For liberals, by contrast, the acknowledged accompaniments of differentiation and plural spheres are partial and "cross-cutting" memberships—or, in darker terms, anomie among strangers, not belonging. It may be argued that one of the advantages that anomie has over membership is precisely that it is an

[6] Hirschman, *Shifting Involvements* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

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alternative to the intrusions and demands of community, especially where community means shared understanding about the boundaries of perfectly autonomous spheres.

IV. Spheres of Justice versus Community

In *Spheres of Justice*, Walzer rejects what modernization and liberalism together provide: messy moral pluralism and imperfect complex equality. He favors perfectly autonomous distributive spheres, which are defined and defended by men and women who share a sense of how goods should be parceled out in order to sustain their feelings of membership in a community. When he takes this step, Walzer fails to carry me along. It is one thing to argue that the concept of plural spheres of justice is advantageous because it promises liberty or individuality. It is quite another to argue that shared moral understanding about the boundaries of the spheres is advantageous, and that this sense of community is the chief good.

When we consider all the goods Walzer would open to moral scrutiny, it is clear that, as vigilant distributors, we would be required to make judgments literally all of the time. Justice "draws the entire world of goods within the reach of philosophical reflection. Nothing can be omitted; no feature of our common life can escape scrutiny" (p. 3). In other radical scenarios, we would constantly be "flying to political meetings"; here, distributions involve us in more settings than just the democratic assembly, but the insistence on engagement is the same. The moral sensibility Walzer requires, which allows "nothing to escape its scrutiny," might be admirable in a philosopher, but not in a neighbor and not in ourselves. As a matter of practice, we make judgments about how goods ought to be distributed and to whom, but our moral intrusiveness is not a collaborative endeavor. Ordinarily we make these judgments on our own, or in association with some others, and not as self-conscious members of a distributive regime. Above all, we do not make them with the objective of arriving at shared moral understandings and enforcing them if the boundaries of the spheres are trespassed.

In a liberal society, institutions such as the market and courts of laws intervene to make our considerations of goods—and of one another as recipients of goods—indirect. Walzer wants to restrict the commodities money can buy because in our society money is dominant; it permits "desperate exchanges" and it improperly controls too many goods. But he also argues that the perception of goods and relations in terms of money inhibits the full range and force of moral judgments, which he

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would unleash. If money were not allowed to buy fine art, for example, we would have to consider the meaning painting and sculpture has for us in order to determine what criterion of distribution fits our shared understanding of this good and to specify which class of people or even which particular ones (who is an expert or has an aesthetic sensibility?) should be allowed to have this good.

The market does inhibit moral judgments, and liberalism generally encourages indirectness. It is not that liberals believe men and women are "really" or "essentially" consumers or legal persons, though. Liberalism simply asks us to ignore many of the other things we are and provides a framework for us to treat one another impartially, as if we were simply consumers or bearers of rights. The object is to inhibit incessant judgments of moral worth, on the assumption that these are likely to interfere with liberty or individuality and that, in any case, we are not likely to agree. Legal and commercial relations provide a special kind of personal security; they ward off the anxiety that comes from exposure to moral judgment.

My defense of abstract market relations is not based on the traditional argument that it guarantees liberty to individuals from the authority of the state or economic planners (or that it ensures prosperity). Instead, my defense is that it extends—where Walzer would restrict—the number and kinds of transactions that can occur without bringing considerations of worth and desert into play. "Formal rationality" reduces moral vulnerability by encouraging relations in which criteria of merit or love or politics are not incessantly brought to bear. Money and rights discourage just what Walzer encourages—preoccupation with persons and goods themselves, with one another's substantive values (p. 97). I do not disagree with all of his specific suggestions about the things money should not buy; I disagree with his reason for wanting to restrict the sphere of free exchange, with his moralistic and communitarian alternative.

I have a second objection to spheres of justice when their definition is a community affair—when "political power is used to defend the boundaries of all the distributive spheres, including its own, and to enforce the common understandings of what goods are and what they are for" (p. 15, note). It is impossible to maintain the boundaries (even if they could be agreed on) and to make sure they are not trespassed upon or scrambled. Walzer's fine discriminations make for a justice that is too demanding, that requires a sort of psychological asceticism. Our minds and moral sensibilities are not feudalistic and respectful of turf; we inevitably allow the spheres to overlap. We bring considerations of

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money or power, professional competence or beauty, to bear on love (and vice versa, in every combination). The reasons George Eliot gave for Rosamond's falling in love with Lydgate can stand for all the ways in which we cannot help but fail to preserve the autonomy of the spheres:

> If you think it incredible that to imagine Lydgate as a man of family could cause thrills of satisfaction which had anything to do with the sense that she was in love with him, I will ask you to use your power of comparison a little more effectively, and consider whether red cloth and epaulets have never had an influence of that sort. Our passions do not live apart in locked chambers, but, dressed in their small wardrobe of notions, bring their provisions to a common table and mess together, feeding out of the common store according to their appetite.[7]

V. Democracy versus Liberty: "The Community Decides"

For Walzer, money is the chief marauder, intruding where it should not go. What about political power? He professes to circumscribe democracy, keeping it within its proper sphere, by counterbalancing it with the just claims of other goods: "Once we have located ownership, expertise, religious knowledge, and so on in their proper places and established their autonomy, there is no alternative to democracy in the political sphere." Democracy is "*the political way* of allocating power, where every extrinsic reason is ruled out" (p. 303). Walzer thus composes a circumscribed *definition* of democracy, referring exclusively to a politics where nothing but arguments have weight (p. 304). But politically, the old contest between liberty and democracy is revived.

For the community determines the boundaries of the several distributive spheres. Democratic politics determines what goods should be distributed according to "need" (p. 67, note) and when taxes are too burdensome so that socially recognized needs must be allowed to go unsatisfied (p. 120). If the license Walzer gives to democratic politics does not stand out, perhaps it is because, as a communitarian, he does not present democracy as adversary democracy. His democratic leadership, for example, neither protects particular interests nor creates public opinion; it is supposed to enunciate shared meanings. That is what he means by authority—the ability to articulate deeper understandings that are already "there."

Another reason why Walzer's commitment to democracy does not strike readers as forcefully as it might is that in community as he describes it, shared understandings find diverse institutional expressions. "The community decides" in many ways, ranging from democratic opinion

[7] George Eliot, *Middlemarch* (New York: Penguin, 1982), 196.

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politically expressed, to workers' control of the workplace by choosing their own coworkers on the basis of ethnic or political compatibility (p. 162), to less deliberate processes of arriving at shared meanings (such as the one that turned the automobile into a symbol of individual freedom). For me, the break with liberalism is clearest in one notable omission from the list of ways in which the community decides: there is no reference to judicial decision by the courts.

It is remarkable that Walzer says nothing about constitutionalism or about legalism in general. Defining and protecting spheres is part of the business of courts. Courts use the constitution to preserve the autonomy of spheres as in church-state disputes. Courts mediate changes in social distributions, as when they extend the rights of certain groups—minorities for example—or give new groups legal recognition. Courts provide an alternative to the slow and mysterious "sea change" evolution of shared social meaning on the one hand, and to rhetoric and majoritarianism on the other. Courts also protect personal liberty, the premier liberal value. But Walzer says nothing about civil liberties, or about civil disobedience. In fact, he does not directly consider liberty as a good.

I have argued that it is not Walzer's commitment to complex equality that pushes liberty into the background, but his communitarianism. The thrust of the book is not only that community provides the context for complex equality, but also that complex equality can provide the basis for community today. So, once again the question remains why community itself is a good. Why should we *want* membership in a community of character?

One clue to the desirability of community may be found in Walzer's earlier collection of essays, *Obligations*.[8] In a liberal society, he observed, government protects private life, especially family life. But an "enormous strain" is placed on these affections if a man "has no other reference than his relatives in a time of despair." Community relieves the family of psychic burdens. Thus, community is good because, paradoxically, it is a better protection for private satisfaction than liberalism.

The most obvious reason for wanting a community of shared meanings is dislike of disagreement. Walzer's references to the Civil War and to the bitter divisions of federalism based on race or religion capture his sense that political society without community implies hostility among strangers, and that feeling oneself to be among strangers is intolerable. What is unusual here is that Walzer wants the community of fellows in which we feel at home to be inclusive—to extend to the state as a

[8] Michael Walzer, *Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 188.

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whole. In *Obligations* he recognized the difficulties this would create and took as his subject the tension we experience between our obligations as citizens and our obligations as members of other subordinate associations. Tension exists for us because these associations—churches, towns, political parties, and so on—give us our most intense experiences of belonging; their affective and moral claims on us are stronger than the state's. In this earlier work, pluralism, free association, conflicting obligations, and civil disobedience were comfortably allied. Walzer's radical response to an imperfect liberal society was to laud "partial membership." In the present volume, his answer to liberalism is a comprehensive community-state, and Walzer imagines a social contract that "connects the strong and the weak, the lucky and the unlucky, the rich and the poor, creating a union that transcends all differences of interest, drawing its strength from history, culture, religion, language, and so on" (pp. 82-83).

Spheres of Justice is a postliberal vision. This vision would have been impossible without liberalism fostering and protecting plural spheres of justice—spheres produced by modernization, but given political recognition in liberal thought. It is postliberal because of its concern that complex equality be a conscious collective purpose, the basis for community. Walzer is not alone among contemporary political theorists who would reinvent community,[9] but he has gone farthest in detailing how radical a departure from liberalism moral membership would be.

[9] See, for instance, Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), and Sandel's review of *Spheres of Justice*, in *The New York Times Book Review*, April 24, 1983, 1.

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WHY THE SOVIETS BUY THE WEAPONS THEY DO

By MATTHEW A. EVANGELISTA*

Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, *Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982, 171 pp.

Andrew Cockburn, *The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine*. New York: Random House, 1983, 323 pp.

David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983, 211 pp.

I. Introduction

THE increase in public concern about nuclear weapons over the past few years has coincided with a resurgence of scholarly interest in determining the causes of the U.S.–Soviet arms race. Three recent books attempt to account for Soviet military developments; they employ a spectrum of possible explanations ranging from an analysis emphasizing bureaucratic politics and a "Soviet military-industrial complex" to an approach stressing strategic "requirements." Antecedents of these types of analysis are found in the work of American social scientists and European peace researchers writing during the 1960s and early 1970s, mainly on U.S. weapons policy.

I will begin by placing the three books under review in the context of the earlier literature on arms control and military policy. Next, I will outline each author's approach through a discussion of how each relates Soviet weapons procurement to military doctrine. The authors' arguments will then be analyzed and assessed in relation to a particularly topical issue—Soviet regional nuclear force posture in Europe and the deployment of the SS-20 missile. Finally, I will put forward some tentative conclusions and recommendations for future research, again using Soviet regional forces as examples.

Scholarly attempts to explain the U.S.–Soviet arms race in the wake of the "missile gap" and the ABM debates of the 1960s resulted, by the end of that decade, in what James Kurth has called a "thicket of theories."[1] Rational-actor models, favored in particular by economists and

* The author is grateful to Judith Reppy, Peter Katzenstein, and Myron Rush for helpful comments and criticisms on earlier drafts of this article.

[1] Kurth, "A Widening Gyre: The Logic of American Weapons Procurement," *Public Policy* 19 (Summer 1971), 373-404.

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strategic analysts associated with the RAND Corporation,[2] came under fire from political scientists, mainly at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, who focused on the role played by bureaucratic politics in determining U.S. military developments.[3] Other observers thought U.S. policy could be explained better with reference to a military-industrial complex.[4] Related theories, set forth especially by European researchers, stressed the "autistic" nature of military decision making and, rejecting interpretations of rational actors responding to external threats, proposed instead models of an "internal dynamic" (*Eigendynamik*).[5] Kurth described the dilemma of choosing between such competing theories of weapons procurement as "the problem of alternative causes or the problem of *a posteriori* overdetermination," and related it to the issue of level of analysis:

> In brief, *a posteriori*, the military policy is overdetermined by several alternative and analytically coequal explanations. The logical dynamic of the process of discovering or inventing alternative causes is to equalize explanations, to destroy degrees of validity among them, while not destroying the explanations themselves. We are left entangled within a thicket of theories.[6]

As recent explanations of Soviet military policy resemble in many ways the analysis of U.S. policy that preceded them, so too do they suffer from many of the same problems—not the least of which is overdetermination. One goal of this essay is to propose a possible means of coping with the problem of overdetermination in explanations of Soviet weapons procurement by adopting an approach developed by Kurth. First, however, it is necessary to discuss the books under review and how they relate to the earlier traditions.

In *Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses*, Robert Berman and John Baker attempt what has become known in the literature as a "requirements" or "mission analysis" approach to explaining Soviet mil-

[2] An excellent study of the RAND strategists—including, among others, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, and Albert Wohlstetter—and the best work on the evolution of U.S. nuclear policy is Fred Kaplan's book, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983).

[3] See, most notably, Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), and Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974).

[4] For example, Richard J. Barnet, *Roots of War* (New York: Atheneum, 1972); Edgar M. Bottome, *The Balance of Terror: A Guide to the Arms Race* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971); Seymour Melman, *Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970).

[5] See, in particular, Dieter Senghaas, *Rüstung und Militarismus* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972).

[6] Kurth (fn. 1), 377-78.

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itary policy.[7] This approach is generally considered apart from a rational-actor analysis, which posits cost-effective responses to objective threats. In a requirements approach, perceptions of threats are shaped by a country's specific history, geography, military traditions, and organizational structures. These factors in turn influence the nature of the response to external threats. Berman and Baker claim to have adopted this method of analysis (pp. 1-5); but, as I will attempt to demonstrate, their explanations more often resemble those of a rational-actor approach. In this regard, their analysis harks back to the early RAND studies of the vulnerability of the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) that spawned the bomber and missile gaps. The authors describe Soviet responses to existing U.S. threats much as Albert Wohlstetter and others prescribed U.S. responses to projected Soviet threats in the 1950s—as sensible, cost-effective, "rational" responses based on objective "threat assessment."[8] Furthermore, in discussing Soviet nuclear weapons doctrine, Berman and Baker often employ concepts that are not found in Soviet military writing on nuclear weapons (for example, the notions of "strategic reserve" or "theater reserve" forces, on pp. 19-21, 62-65, 130-32), but that are quite commonplace in the terminology developed at RAND for thinking about the unthinkable.[9] Consideration of the factors that constitute a true requirements approach receive comparatively little attention.

Andrew Cockburn's *The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine* relies alternately on two competing types of explanation: a bureaucratic politics approach (emphasizing competition among military services and military-industrial interests), and a military-industrial complex approach (focusing on cooperation and collusion between military, political, and industrial interests). His work falls in the tradition of Graham Allison and Morton Halperin on the one hand, and of European peace researchers such as Dieter Senghaas and Johan Galtung on the other.

[7] The best work using the requirements approach has been done by Michael MccGwire, particularly on Soviet naval policy. See his articles in *The Soviet Union in Europe and the Near East: Her Capabilities and Intentions* (London: Royal United Services Institution, 1970); Michael MccGwire, ed., *Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context* (New York: Praeger, 1973); Michael MccGwire, Ken Booth, and John McDonnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints* (New York: Praeger, 1975); MccGwire "The Rationale for the Development of Soviet Sea Power," in *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 106/5/927 (May 1980); and MccGwire "Naval Power and Global Strategy," in Derek Leebaert, ed., *Soviet Military Thinking* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981). Another good example is Raymond L. Garthoff's article, "The Soviet SS-20 Decision," *Survival* 25 (May/June 1983), 110-19.

[8] The major study is Wohlstetter, Hoffman, Lutz, and Rowen, *Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1954), discussed in considerable detail in Kaplan (fn. 2).

[9] See Kaplan's discussion, *ibid.*

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In *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race*, David Holloway proposes a more complex explanation for Soviet military policy—one that incorporates aspects of the requirements and bureaucratic politics models but adds a historical dimension and an analysis based on study of the Soviet military "research-production cycle." The closest parallel among the earlier studies of U.S. weapons policy is probably the work of Herbert York,[10] although in certain respects, Holloway's case studies of Soviet weapons decisions resemble studies of U.S. weapons conducted by Allison, Frederic Morris, Michael Armacost, and others.[11]

It should be noted that of the three works under consideration, only the Berman/Baker volume sets out directly to explain the Soviet Union's strategic posture.[12] Both Cockburn's book[13] and Holloway's[14] take broader approaches and cover a number of diverse issues. In focusing on the question of what drives the Soviet side of the arms race, I attempt to extract from the Cockburn and Holloway volumes explanatory approaches that the authors do not always make explicit.

[10] York, *Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970); and York, *The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976).

[11] For some representative case studies, see Frederic A. Morris, ed., "Acquiring Weapons," Part II, pp. 111-215, in *Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., June 1975), Vol. IV, Appendix K, "Adequacy of Current Organization: Defense and Arms Control." For a similar, but more in-depth approach, see Michael H. Armacost, *The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

[12] Although Berman and Baker do not fulfill their promise of providing a true requirements analysis, they display a number of compensating strengths. The authors deserve a good deal of credit for their attempt to present a relatively parsimonious explanation for Soviet strategic posture, and also for the amount of detailed information they have compiled on characteristics of Soviet strategic weapons design and deployment. In addition, they provide useful material on U.S. and NATO nuclear weapons deployments, which they see as having greatly influenced Soviet developments. The book—particularly the many informative tables and charts found in the appendices—constitutes a valuable source of reference for researchers in the field of U.S. and Soviet military policy.

[13] Cockburn's book is a highly readable and carefully researched work, written with one primary intention: to counteract the practice of "threat inflation" by which some U.S. military and government officials greatly exaggerate Soviet military strength in order to rationalize procurement of the new weapons they favor. Cockburn focuses on four aspects of the Soviet military: the "hordes," or regular conscript army; the "professional warriors," or officer corps; the "weapons makers"; and the weapons themselves. For the purposes of this essay, the most relevant sections of Cockburn's book are those in which he discusses the politics of the Soviet High Command, the process by which new weapons are procured, and the characteristics of those weapons.

[14] Holloway's book covers a number of topics, including the role of military power in the formation of the Soviet state; the early Soviet nuclear weapons program; Soviet thinking on nuclear war; the role of military power in Soviet foreign policy; Soviet arms control policies; the structure of military research and development; and the role of military production in the Soviet economy. This volume is especially valuable in that it brings together the results of Holloway's many years of research into Soviet military policy in a form more accessible—particularly to nonspecialists—than his original articles and chapters in various books.

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II. Military Doctrine and Weapons Procurement

The distinction between military and political roles lies at the heart of the debate over the determinants of Soviet military policy. Strategic theories hold that the military is subordinate to the political leadership and does not exert autonomous influence on weapons procurement. Theories emphasizing bureaucratic politics or a military-industrial complex posit that weak political control over the military allows weapons to be produced that have no genuine strategic rationale. The requirements approach often neglects the broader political goals that influence military policies.

In principle, military doctrine defines the relationship between military and political leaders in the Soviet Union. Therefore, as a starting point for comparing the explanations for Soviet military policy offered by the three works under review, it is worth considering how each of them treats the relationship of Soviet military doctrine to weapons procurement.

According to Berman and Baker,

> In Soviet military writing the terms *military doctrine* and *military strategy* are used more precisely than in the West. Military doctrine, the highest level of military thinking, is dictated by the Communist party leadership as a set of official views about the types of warfare for which the Soviet military establishment must be prepared. Subordinate to Soviet doctrine are various levels of military thought, including military strategy, which develops the detailed organization, methods, and preparations for waging war (p. 24; emphasis in original).

The authors briefly mention "broader purposes" for which Soviet doctrine and strategy may be intended, including their use

> in shaping public beliefs to conform with official thinking, . . . to influence the adversary's perceptions, [and] to rationalize away intractable problems and to promote various institutional interests . . . Moreover, changes in Soviet statements on military doctrine and strategy may reveal the ideological, institutional, and technological influences that have shaped the Soviet Union's strategic posture (p. 24).

Unfortunately, none of these broader purposes is explored throughout the rest of the book. Instead, the authors relate Soviet strategic posture to doctrine according to the formal definition: the political leaders determine the requirements of Soviet military forces on the basis of their perception of the foreign threat, and the military leaders carry out the political directives to meet that threat. The best summary of the explanation Berman and Baker provide for Soviet military developments is found in the subtitle of their book: Soviet military doctrine sets *require-*

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ments for force posture, which are best explained as *responses* to foreign threats.

The requirements approach taken by Berman and Baker is in principle distinct from a rational-actor approach. Although not explicitly defined, it seems intended to take into consideration the role of military tradition and organization, geopolitical and historical factors, and perception of threat, whereas the rational-actor approach concerns itself only with threats and "rational" responses to them.

Thus, Berman and Baker state at the start of their work that "Soviet strategic forces are as much a product of military traditions as of changing circumstances" (p. 1). The argument here would seem to be that because the Soviet Union never had a tradition of strategic air power as did the United States, it never developed a strong strategic air command with a large fleet of intercontinental bombers. By contrast, the Soviet strategic posture derives from the fact that, as a land power, Russia had long emphasized artillery in its military policy; early Soviet interest in missiles, as opposed to bombers, should be understood in relation to the Russian artillery tradition. Indeed, the first Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Marshal Nedelin, was a former artillery commander, and artillery officers have played a major role in shaping the missile forces.[15] Berman and Baker mention, but do not fully develop, this notion (pp. 26, 47-48, 110). The concept seems particularly important for distinguishing a true-requirements approach (which explains an early emphasis on regional missiles) from a rational-actor approach (which does not explain why a regional posture should take preference over one that emphasizes intercontinental missiles, or even bombers, from the start).

Consistent with the military-requirements approach is a historical rationale for Soviet emphasis on regional systems. Berman and Baker argue that,

> historically, the most vital interests of and greatest threats to the USSR have been in neighboring areas. Hence the Soviet tendency—not fully appreciated in the United States—to attribute a strategic importance to its regional nuclear forces (p. 2).

The authors have in mind Russia's long history of invasions of its territory from both east and west; they mention in particular the impact

[15] See the biography by V. Tolubko, the present commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces: *Nedelin* (Moscow: Molodaia Gvardiia, 1979). Holloway points out that the officers of the Strategic Rocket Forces "have tended to see their missiles as extensions of artillery, not as pilotless bombers." He suggests that the artillery concept of "operation in depth" may account somewhat for early Soviet emphasis on regional missiles by encouraging "Soviet designers to concentrate on extending the range of their rockets step by step, thus increasing gradually the Soviet capability to launch deep strikes against the enemy" (p. 153).

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that the German invasion of June 1941 had on Soviet military thinking (p. 22).

One wonders to what extent historical and military-traditional factors would have produced a similar Soviet regional nuclear policy in the absence of concrete threats—the formation of NATO and the deployment of U.S. atomic bombers on bases surrounding the Soviet Union in the late 1940s, and the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into Europe in the early 1950s. According to the requirements approach, such threats must be taken into consideration. In fact, however, by devoting relatively little attention to the organizational, military-traditional, and historical aspects of a requirements approach, Berman and Baker are left mainly with foreign threats as the basis for explaining Soviet military policy:

> In the past, Western actions have created or affected many basic requirements that have determined how the Soviet strategic forces would develop.... Clearly, [however,] the Soviet strategic force posture has developed not only in response to strategic developments in the United States and the countries adjoining the USSR. As part of a complex and interactive process, the USSR has sought to take account of external developments and develop a capability to counter them while attempting to fulfill its long-standing security requirements (p. 72).

By providing only a superficial account of the "complex and interactive process" by which threats are translated into security requirements, Berman and Baker make it difficult to distinguish "long-standing security requirements" from rational-actor responses to external threats. It is not clear from their explanation, for example, that even if Russia throughout its history had never been invaded from the west, Soviet leaders would have responded any differently when faced in the 1950s with the threat of nuclear-armed aircraft on bases that encircled the U.S.S.R.

The authors try to explain the peculiarly Soviet nature of the response to external threat by attempting to understand Soviet targeting requirements. Once the targeting requirements are known (to the extent that is possible), the requirements approach differs little from the rational-actor approach. An external threat causes a change in targeting requirement; the best means of fulfilling that requirement constitutes a "rational" response.

The main problem in this exercise is arriving at an accurate understanding of Soviet targeting requirements. Berman and Baker infer Soviet targeting priorities from selected translations of Soviet military writings, from missile deployment locations, and from "the presumed

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Soviet TVD [*teatry voennykh deistvii*, or theaters of military operations] planning framework" (p. 19, fn. 28). They come up with a list that, by including virtually everything, seems to provide little guidance:

> The broad list of requirements compiled by Soviet planners is likely to be composed of strategic nuclear targets, including missiles, submarines, strategic aircraft bases, naval bases, nuclear storehouses, and command-and-control centers; operational and tactical nuclear targets, including aircraft carriers, aircraft, cruise missiles and tactical missile deployments, tactical airfields, nuclear storage sites, and formations and reserves, logistical and fuel centers, naval bases and air defense bases and facilities; and administrative and economic targets, including critical industrial facilities, national administrative and political centers, transportation centers and ports, and centers of state administration (p. 19).

In order to explain the appearance of a new Soviet weapon (or an apparent change in Soviet force structure), the authors speculate how their presumed list of Soviet targets may have changed as a result of foreign developments, and call the new Soviet weapon a response to those developments.

In contrast to Berman and Baker, Andrew Cockburn believes that foreign threats have rarely created requirements or generated responses that are helpful in explaining either Soviet or American military policies. With the exception of the development of Soviet interceptor aircraft as a counter to U.S. strategic bombers, Cockburn finds "very little evidence that either the Americans or the Russians have actually initiated research and development of a particular system in response to a move by the opposition." On the contrary, "the record indicates that the desire for the new weapon or a longer production line comes first; only afterward is the threat discovered that the weapon is supposed to meet" (pp. 13-14). Thus,

> It may be that the military on either side is engaged not so much in an arms race as in simply doing what it wants to do for its own institutional reasons. The other side is relevant only in that it serves as a convenient excuse for these unilateral activities (p. 12).

It should therefore come as no surprise that Cockburn's views of military doctrine are quite different from Berman's and Baker's: "Military doctrine tends to evolve in response to demands from generals for an excuse to justify whatever they happen to be interested in spending money on, and the Soviet marshals and generals are no exception" (p. 238).

Cockburn's approach here seems consistent with theories of the military-industrial complex,[16] and he specifically uses the American model as his point of comparison:

[16] See Steven Rosen, ed., *Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex* (Lexington,

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> Just as names like General Dynamics, Lockheed, and McDonnell Douglas are synonymous with American warplanes and missiles, so too the Russians have big-name defense contractors. They are called design bureaus and are named after the designers who originally set them up. . . . [T]he relationship of these "contractors" to their military customers and the manner in which the bureaus execute their contracts have many similarities with how American defense contractors conduct their business (p. 79).

At times, Cockburn focuses more on bureaucratic competition between military services and between design bureaus than on cooperation within a complex. In any case, he argues that Soviet military policy can be explained better on the basis of these internal factors than as responses to external stimuli.

David Holloway's discussion of Soviet military doctrine indicates that he, too, believes that internal factors must be taken into account in order to understand Soviet military developments. He presents definitions of military doctrine (both its political and military-technical aspects), military science, and military art, as found in the official *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*, arguing that the formal definitions themselves "are relevant to an understanding of Soviet policy making, for they express a definite conception of the proper relationship between political authority and professional military expertise" (p. 30). In the "proper relationship," the Party dominates the formulation of military doctrine. Holloway has found, however, that in the post-Khrushchev period the Soviet military has attempted to exert more influence on doctrine.[17] Thus, "these abstract definitions reflect a certain tension between Party and military prerogatives in Soviet military thought" (p. 31). Contrary to the emphasis in the Berman/Baker approach, Holloway maintains that

> Policy cannot be derived directly from military doctrine because doctrine is too general to do more than provide broad guidelines. Policy must be understood as the product of a political process, in which both low politics (bureaucratic infighting and struggles for power) and high politics (disagreement over the direction of policy or over its implementation) play their part (p. 163).

Although Holloway's explanations resemble those of Cockburn in their emphasis on politics, his more detailed case studies of specific weapons developments also stress factors that are integral to a genuine require-

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Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973), esp. chap. 5 by Vernon Aspaturian, "The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex: Does it Exist? " 103-34; also see John McDonnell, "The Soviet Defense Industry as a Pressure Group," in *Soviet Naval Policy* (fn. 7), 87-122.

[17] See Holloway, *Technology Management and the Soviet Military Establishment*, Adelphi Paper No. 76 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971); and his articles in *The Soviet Union in Europe and the Near East* (fn. 7).

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ments approach—organization of the research-production cycle, and the influence of military traditions and history.

III. Soviet Regional Forces and the Case of the SS-20

The emphasis that Berman and Baker place on Soviet regional requirements constitutes one of the most valuable contributions of their work, and holds considerable relevance for the current debate over nuclear weapons in Europe. In essence, the story they present is one of Soviet capabilities constantly lagging behind requirements and threats.

In response to the postwar atomic monopoly of the United States, the Soviets built up a system of air defenses[18] and accelerated programs for developing their own atomic weapons and delivery vehicles for carrying them. (See Holloway, chap. 2.) However, partly because of Stalin's unwillingness to allow even discussion of the role of nuclear weapons in modern warfare (perhaps because he thought it might discredit the "permanently operating factors" he claimed to be responsible for the Soviet victory in World War II), Soviet troops received no nuclear weapons until after his death in 1953. The Soviets initially countered U.S. air bases and military facilities in Europe with a fleet of Tu-4 bombers (copies of the American B-29) armed with conventional weapons. The first nuclear-capable bomber, the Tu-16, appeared in 1954. In 1959 the Soviets began deploying the SS-4 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), and two years later, an intermediate-range system (IRBM), the SS-5. They deployed no new MRBMs or IRBMs until the SS-20 appeared in 1977. Berman and Baker argue that, throughout the postwar period, Soviet regional nuclear forces never successfully met the threat posed by U.S. and NATO aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles, and nuclear artillery.

The SS-4 and SS-5 missiles were particularly unreliable, requiring unstable liquid-fuel propellants; they were deployed at vulnerable, "soft" sites rather than in hardened underground silos, and needed eight to twenty-four hours to prepare for firing. Their vulnerability was increased dramatically, according to Berman and Baker, when the United States began deploying "quick-reacting and highly survivable Polaris missiles [that] could effectively strike both Soviet regional nuclear missiles and strategic bomber bases" (p. 59).

In the mid-1960s, the Soviets attempted to remedy these problems by

[18] Berman has addressed this issue in *Soviet Air Power in Transition* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978); see also Matthew A. Evangelista, "The Evolution of Soviet Tactical Air Forces," in David R. Jones, ed., *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual* (hereafter *SAFRA*), Vol. VII (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 1983).

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developing the medium-range SS-14 and intermediate-range SS-15 missiles: both employed mobile launch systems (to decrease vulnerability), and solid-fuel propellants (to improve "reaction time"). However, the Nadiradize design bureau that was charged with developing the missiles had considerable difficulty producing a satisfactory solid-fuel system (pp. 90-91), and neither missile was ever put into series production. Berman and Baker argue that because of this major technical failure, coupled with an increasing threat, the Soviets were forced in the late 1960s to adopt a "quick-fix" solution to their regional security requirements. Their answer was to divert the variable-range SS-11 missile, apparently designed originally for maritime use (against U.S. carriers with nuclear-armed aircraft), for employment as part of the regional force. By the early 1970s, some 120 SS-11 missiles were deployed in SS-4 and SS-5 missile fields in the western U.S.S.R., and another 200 or so along the Sino-Soviet border (pp. 60, 111, 122).

Berman and Baker believe that the SS-11 solution might have gone far toward fulfilling Soviet regional requirements but for the fact that deployment of the missiles was constrained by the SALT treaties. Although the Soviet Union had pressed from the beginning for inclusion of regional nuclear forces in the strategic arms talks, the United States was unwilling to discuss its forward-based systems in Europe, or the British and French nuclear forces.[19] Thus, Berman and Baker maintain, the Soviets were forced to develop a system specifically intended to fulfill the regional role that the SS-11s had satisfied. That system—the SS-20 IRBM—is the Soviets' first successful solid-fuel missile. It has been deployed with three independently targetable warheads (MIRVs), and is considered mobile (although it must be launched from presurveyed sites). Berman and Baker term the SS-20 "a long overdue follow-on to the vulnerable SS-4 and SS-5 missiles," one that has gone a long way toward meeting Soviet regional requirements (p. 67). Nevertheless, the authors foresee increases in Soviet requirements generated by NATO's deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (p. 71).

By contrast, Cockburn does not interpret the emergence of the SS-20 as a rational response to U.S. and NATO nuclear threats, although he, too, presents the technical failures of the SS-14 and SS-15 as part of his explanation. He accounts for the SS-20 in a manner consistent with a military-industrial complex approach. In essence, he argues that the SS-20 should be understood primarily as a means of keeping the Nadiradize design bureau in business, pointing out that the bureau "has

[19] Jane M. O. Sharp, "Four Approaches to an INF Agreement," *Arms Control Today* 12 (March 1982).

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been trying and failing to build a solid-fueled ICBM for twenty years" (p. 87). Its first attempt was the SS-13, which was considered a counterpart to the U.S. Minuteman missile; only 60 were produced because of serious technical problems. Next came the mobile SS-14 and SS-15 missiles, derived from the SS-13, which were also unsuccessful. The SS-16 was the Nadiradize bureau's most recent try at developing a solid-fueled mobile ICBM. It has only been flight-tested once since 1975, and unsuccessfully at that (p. 200). This missile was such a failure that the Soviets were willing to bargain it away as part of the SALT II treaty.[20] Cockburn describes the sequence leading to the SS-20:

> Nadiradize and the strategic rocket forces did manage to salvage something of their reputation from the SS-16 debacle. By removing the third stage of the SS-16, they had a missile that could manage a flight of 3,000 miles—not enough for the serious business of intercontinental warfare but sufficient for use against targets in Western Europe and China. There was a market for such a missile because the medium-range SS-4s and SS-5s, which had first been installed in their silos in the late 1950s, were, in the words of one report, "crumbling in their silos" (p. 200).

Thus, Cockburn's explanation for the SS-20 is the Soviet version of the "bail-out imperative" that James Kurth has identified as a factor influencing the procurement of U.S. aerospace weapons.[21] According to Cockburn, the SS-20 was needed to satisfy the parochial interests of the Nadiradize design bureau and its military backers in the Strategic Rocket Forces—to find a "market" for their "product."

Holloway's explanation for the deployment of Soviet regional nuclear forces follows that of Berman and Baker fairly closely. Regarding the SS-20, for example, he discusses the problems inherent in the Soviet regional nuclear force, the exclusion of regional systems from SALT negotiations, and the advantages presented by the modern SS-20; he suggests that "the case for deployment must have seemed overwhelming" (p. 70). He also makes an important point about Western interpretations of Soviet policy and the extent to which they determined the reaction to the SS-20:

> Western governments appear to have regarded the Soviet SS-4s and SS-5s as no more than a stopgap, intended to hold Western Europe hostage until an effective intercontinental force was deployed. Because of this

[20] Cockburn has covered this issue in some detail in articles in the *Columbia Journalism Review* 21 (July-August 1982) and *The New York Times*, April 27, 1982; see also Strobe Talbott, *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II* (New York: Harper Colophon, 1980), 133-35.

[21] Kurth, "Why We Buy the Weapons We Do," *Foreign Policy* 11 (Summer 1973), 33-56; see also his article in Rosen (fn. 16).

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misunderstanding, they did not anticipate the deployment of new systems, now that the Soviet Union possessed powerful strategic forces capable of striking the United States. The new systems, therefore, have been interpreted not as a follow-on to the older ones, but as part of a Soviet attempt to tilt the balance of power in its favor by making NATO strategy unworkable (p. 71).

The notion of "competition in strategies" that Holloway introduces is a particularly important one. Whereas Berman and Baker stress only the new NATO weapons that threatened the force of SS-4s and SS-5s during the mid-1960s, Holloway emphasizes the impact of the new NATO strategy of "flexible response" as well. He recounts how

Soviet ideas about a war in Europe began to change in the late 1960s as a result of NATO's shift towards a strategy of flexible response, which envisages the possibility that war in Europe may begin with a conventional phase. The Soviet Union did not wish to be tied into an inflexible one-variant strategy of its own, and accordingly adjusted its policy to prepare for non-nuclear as well as nuclear operations in Europe. Since a European conflict might go nuclear at any time, flexible weapons, which could be fired quickly, were required. The SS-4s and SS-5s did not meet this requirement (p. 69).

Holloway suggests that Soviet leaders view the planned deployment of new Pershing II and cruise missiles in combination with strategies for "limited nuclear options" (the Schlesinger Doctrine and Presidential Directive 59) with the same (or greater) concern they evinced in response to changes in NATO weapons and strategies in the 1960s. He concludes that "what has been taking place between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is not only a competition in arms, but also—and perhaps more importantly—a competition in strategies" (p. 72).

In discussing Soviet regional nuclear policies, Holloway touches on an important point that he develops more thoroughly in his chapter on Soviet thinking about nuclear war: the distinction between military responsibility for preparing for wars and political responsibility for deterring them. The point is brought out in the author's discussion of Nikita Khrushchev's views on Soviet regional nuclear forces. Evidently the Soviet leader saw his medium-range missiles not only as military weapons, but as a deterrent broadly conceived. He maintained, for example, that the threat of nuclear destruction by Soviet missiles would keep France and Britain from joining the United States in a war over Berlin (p. 67). Moreover, Khrushchev's use of "missile diplomacy" to support broad foreign policy goals is well documented.[22]

[22] See, for instance, Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

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Holloway's analysis of Soviet regional nuclear forces suggests that it is important to consider the role of the top political leadership in certain types of decisions regarding Soviet force posture—particularly decisions related to broader foreign policy goals or requiring major changes in strategy. At the same time, he has identified other important factors—organizational, bureaucratic, historical—that are also emphasized by the other authors. It may therefore be argued that the level of analysis at which one studies Soviet military policy affects the nature of the explanations one derives. If all the relevant levels of analysis are considered, the result—as Kurth suggests—is overdetermination. It does seem possible, however, to study Soviet policy in such a way as to mitigate the level-of-analysis problem and to arrive at general conditions under which one type of explanation would be more appropriate than another. The issue of overdetermination would thereby be rendered less problematic.

IV. Levels of Analysis and Types of Explanation

Not all phenomena are best explained with reference to a single level of analysis. Even explanations for a particular category of phenomena, such as decisions regarding Soviet weapons procurement, would seem to benefit from a more eclectic approach. The problem lies in deciding at which point a given level of analysis provides more explanatory power than another. Students of international political economy have found it useful to consider the relationship between—and the relative strengths of—state and society as one way of helping to determine the appropriate level of analysis, and thus the most important explanatory factors for a given phenomenon.[23] In this section, I will first describe the level-of-analysis problem as it appears in the books under review. I will then consider the applicability of a state-society approach to the level-of-analysis problem in explanations of Soviet weapons decision making. Finally, I will address the related problem of overdetermination by employing the taxonomy developed by Kurth for analyzing U.S. weapons procurement.

Berman and Baker, after collapsing historical, military-traditional, and organizational factors into a Soviet target list, explain Soviet weapons decisions at the international level by assessing threats. This method has certain shortcomings when the authors are trying to explain weapons that seem redundant in terms of their missions. For example, even with their long Soviet target list, they can explain the fact that the SS-18 and

[23] Most notably, Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), see especially his introduction and conclusion.

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SS-19 missiles seem to offer redundant capabilities only by arguing that the latter missile constitutes "an additional hedge" (p. 125). In this case, it might make more sense to focus on the level of the Soviet leadership, and observe, as Holloway does, the extent to which Soviet leaders are commited to numerical parity with the United States in nuclear forces. (See his chap. 3.) Such a policy, in the context of an ongoing arms race, would by definition eventually lead to redundancies. In order to maintain "parity," the Soviets may feel obliged to match quantitative changes in U.S. force posture, such as increases in warheads, even if these do not necessarily represent developments of great strategic significance. For example, an increase in the number of warheads on existing U.S. missiles (through MIRVing) that does not add anything to the Soviet target list or render Soviet forces appreciably more vulnerable might engender a Soviet response for which a requirements explanation could not fully account.

Likewise, by relying only on the requirements approach, Berman and Baker would have trouble explaining the Soviet Union's current interest in developing modern ground-launched cruise missiles. Recent Soviet tests of such missiles indicate a "requirement" that the authors do not recognize in their book.[24] That requirement, as Cockburn suggests, could be a political one—the perceived need to match the latest products of American technology, regardless of their utility in the Soviet context or of whether the technology in itself is effective. (See esp. pp. 134-37, 148-49, 154-55.)

In his explanations, David Holloway discusses a number of levels of analysis: the international system for evidence of threats; the overall Soviet economic system for allocation of resources; the research-production cycle for processes of weapons innovation and procurement; factors at the organizational level; and the influence of technology and history. He maintains that "one reason why a historical perspective is important is that Soviet policy is not easily explained by the theoretical models of the arms race to be found in the social science literature" (p. 178). Since Holloway has considered such models as "action-reaction" and the "autistic" or *Eigendynamik* (internal dynamic) approach in the current work and in earlier articles,[25] his contention seems well supported. It still, however, begs the question which factors are more important under which conditions.

[24] See the Associated Press report on the SS-CX-4 in the *Washington Post*, April 7, 1983; also William M. Arkin, "Soviet Cruise Missile Programs," *Arms Control Today* 13 (May 1983).

[25] See esp. Holloway, "Technology and Political Decision in Soviet Armaments Policy," *Journal of Peace Research* (No. 4, 1974), 257-79; and Holloway, "War, Militarism, and the Soviet State," *Alternatives* 6 (March 1980), 59-92.

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Since Cockburn, in his "theoretical model," borrows from the bureaucratic politics and military-industrial-complex approaches, he looks mainly at the level of the military service and the design bureau for his explanations; he therefore finds the determinants of Soviet weapons decisions to lie in the competition between or cooperation among them. At times, he considers the higher level of the political leadership in order to explain the broad contours of Soviet military policy, but only by relating them to personal power struggles—for example, Brezhnev favored heavy industry and military production in order to gain military allies and win out over Kosygin, who supported consumer industries and cuts in the military budget.

For particular military procurement decisions and even major changes in force structure, Cockburn relies on an analysis at the level of bureaucratic politics. This type of explanation does not always work. In order to challenge the image of a monolithic Soviet military carrying out the dictates of the Party, Cockburn discusses the extent to which the Air Defense branch of the Soviet armed forces opposed the 1972 U.S.–Soviet treaty limiting antiballistic missile systems—which was the responsibility of the Air Defense Command (p. 223). The fact that the ABM treaty was signed anyway, and the Air Defense budget was reduced, suggests, however, that in this case Cockburn's bureaucratic explanation is insufficient. The Air Defense forces are considered a separate branch of the Soviet armed forces, ranked third in the hierarchy (ahead of the Navy and Air Force); according to a bureaucratic politics or military-industrial-complex argument, they should have won the ABM debate.[26] The fact that the Soviet ABM was unsuccessful should not have mattered—as Cockburn argues, Soviet military bureaucracies are particularly adept at obtaining their desired weapons, whether or not they work. By the same token, Cockburn's assertion that the expansion of the Soviet fleet during the past decade or so can be attributed to the bureaucratic machinations of its commander, Admiral Gorshkov, is unconvincing when one considers the weak bureaucratic position of the Navy within the military and the government. Explanations based on the expanding requirements of the Soviet Navy (put forth by Western analysts) or the utility of a blue-water navy in supporting broader foreign policy goals would seem more accurate.[27]

Although the comparative perspective Cockburn has adopted—study-

[26] David R. Jones, "National Air Defense Forces," in *SAFRA*, Vol. V (1981), 81.

[27] The expanding-requirements argument is McGwire's (fn. 7), while the foreign-policy rationale has been put forth by Gorshkov himself; see his *Morskaia Moshch' Gosudarstva* [Sea Power of the State] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979).

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ing the Soviet military-industrial-complex with reference to the United States—can engender useful insights, it can be taken too far. There is no reason to believe, for example, that the situation that obtains in the U.S.—a weak state penetrated by a strong society—is duplicated in the Soviet Union. In fact, the United States appears to occupy an extreme position in its relationship of weak state to strong society, and it seems likely that the Soviet Union represents the other extreme.[28] Such a generalization should not be used to solve all problems associated with explaining Soviet weapons procurement. Nevertheless, it seems helpful in dealing with the problem of overdetermination, especially when considered in tandem with an approach James Kurth developed for overcoming the analogous American problem.

In his "Widening Gyre," published in 1971,[29] Kurth attempted to cut through the "thicket of theories" used to explain U.S. military procurement, and to resolve the problem of overdetermination. His approach was to posit "modes of change" and relate them to "modes of causation" for application to types of weapons decisions and stages in the processes of research, development, and procurement. Specifically, Kurth found that four modes of change—quantitative, innovative, renovative, and redistributive—fit four modes of causation—bureaucratic politics, bureaucratic process, bureaucratic-corporate alliances, and the economic system. It is not surprising, in light of the state-society approach discussed above, that Kurth should find bureaucratic forces most important for determining decisions on weapons procurement in the United States—a country with a relatively weak state apparatus and strong interest groups.

Only detailed research will reveal how useful Kurth's taxonomy is for understanding Soviet developments (more research is necessary to assess its validity for U.S. developments as well). At this time, it is worth attempting a tentative application in the context of Soviet regional forces.[30] Although Kurth's categories of change seem relevant to the Soviet case, his modes of causation do not always apply; indeed, those for the Soviet weapons procurement process are often the opposite of those for the American. Again, this conclusion is what a state-society analysis would predict.

[28] See Katzenstein (fn. 23). The analysis offered by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington is also generally consistent with this observation; see their *Political Power: US/USSR* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), esp. chap. 4.

[29] Kurth (fn. 1).

[30] For the purposes of this essay, the order in which Kurth discussed his "modes of change" will not be followed, so as to permit a chronological presentation of the Soviet cases.

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For example, in Kurth's category "innovative change" he argues that

> because an innovative change is unfamiliar and sometimes inexpensive, it normally begins not in a decision at the higher levels of policymaking and budget-making but in technical and organizational procedures for research and development. At this initial point, some sort of technocratic explanation seems best.[31]

To go from research and development to production and deployment, Kurth argues, probably requires bureaucratic momentum and "strategic fears." He therefore divides innovative change into two stages: the first relies on a technocratic explanation, while the second emphasizes bureaucratic forces. This distinction is perhaps not necessary. If weapons designers want to promote technical innovations, they must act much as any other bureaucrat and contribute to the process of generating strategic fears.[32]

In the Soviet system, the situation is quite different; in fact, it is almost the reverse, as Holloway indicates:

> Soviet military R & D in the post-war period can be seen as the effort of a basically non-innovative system to cope with revolutionary technological change, which has been generated primarily by the Soviet Union's potential enemies. . . . Major innovation decisions cannot easily be handled within the standard operating procedure of the military R & D system, and require intervention from the top to authorize new funding and new institutional arrangements (pp. 148-49).

Thus, political intervention (based on strategic fears or technological opportunities) is necessary to generate bureaucratic momentum and to stimulate innovation. It is true that Soviet weapons designers have proposed innovative developments on their own initiative—particularly in some areas of aircraft and radar technology—but the successful implementation of their proposals usually required strong political (and not simply bureaucratic) backing.[33] In the context of the Soviet regional

[31] *Ibid.*, 396-97. Innovation is made even less expensive when weapons manufacturers are reimbursed by the government for unsolicited, "independent" research and development costs. See Judith Reppy, "Defense Department Payments for 'Company-Financed' R & D," *Research Policy* 6 (1977), 396-410; and her *The I R & D Program of the Department of Defense*, Cornell University Peace Studies Program Occasional Papers, No. 6 (Ithaca, N.Y.: March 1976).

[32] I am grateful to Judith Reppy for bringing this point to my attention. A good example of a weapon designer's engaging in bureaucratic politics in order to promote his product is provided by the inventor of the "neutron bomb," Samuel Cohen, in *The Truth about the Neutron Bomb* (New York: William Morrow, 1983).

[33] On radar developments, see the memoirs of a former Soviet radar designer, A. Fedoseev, *Zapadnia: Chelovek i Sotsializm* [The Trap: Man and Socialism] (Frankfurt/Main: Possev-Verlag, 1976), and John Erickson, "Radio-location and the Air Defense Problem: The Design and Development of Soviet Radar, 1934–1940, *Science Studies* 2 (1977), 241-68. On aircraft,

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forces, an important stimulus for research and development of rocket technology came from Germany during World War II, and top political support was crucial for developing ballistic missiles during the early postwar period.[34]

The next stage in the development of Soviet regional forces in the postwar period could fall into Kurth's rubric of "redistributive change."[35] Although in the American context Kurth has in mind primarily redistribution of economic rewards among industrial sectors, his examples find a close Soviet analogue in Krushchev's creation of the Strategic Rocket Forces in late 1959 and the large-scale change from production of aircraft at aviation industry plants to production of medium-range missiles.[36] Clearly, the impetus for this type of change in the Soviet military posture meets Kurth's requirements of being "both unusual in kind and general in scope." As Berman and Baker recount, the major deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons systems around the periphery of the Soviet Union during the early postwar years fits this description.

Kurth terms another type of change "renovative." In its "pure form," it is defined as "the production and deployment of a weapons system whose technical characteristics are generally familiar, whose strategic implications are generally minor, whose production renovates an established aerospace organization."[37] In the Soviet case, the deployment of the SS-20 seems to conform to this definition quite well. Its MIRV technology was certainly familiar, as was its solid-fuel propulsion system (albeit due to years of unsuccessful development). As Cockburn reminds us, the SS-20 served to renovate the flagging Nadiradize "corporation" as well as the regional component of the Strategic Rocket Forces. And, although the strategic implications of the SS-20 were deemed anything but minor by NATO officials, there is reason to believe that when the Soviets first made the decision to deploy the SS-20, they perceived the system mainly as a follow-on and did not expect that type of response.[38]

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see the memoirs of designer A. S. Iakovlev, *Tsel' Zhizn'* [The Goal of a Lifetime] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1966).

[34] See Holloway's studies of missile development—in particular his chapter on "Military Technology," in Ronald Amann, Julian Cooper, and R. W. Davies, eds., *The Technological Level of Soviet Industry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 407-89: and "Innovation in the Defence Sector," in Ronald Amann and Julian Cooper, eds., *Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 276-414.

[35] Kurth (fn. 1), 399-400.

[36] See Khrushchev's speech, *Pravda*, January 15, 1960, and his remarks in his memoirs, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, trans. by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 51.

[37] Kurth (fn. 1), 397.

[38] Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Soviet SS-20 Decision," *Survival* 25 (May-June 1983); see also Garthoff, "Brezhnev's Opening: The TNF Tangle," *Foreign Policy* 41 (Winter 1980-1981), 82-94.

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Kurth argues that for renovative change to occur in the absence of a major strategic threat, the proponent of the new weapons system must mobilize many allies in industry, government, and so forth. In the presence of a threat, "bureaucratic-corporate alliances can be rendered unnecessary by bureaucratic-strategic anxieties. Whether this happens seems to be a function of the relative bureaucratic power of the nuturing military organization."[39] The Strategic Rocket Forces represent one of the strongest bureaucratic powers in the Soviet military. Furthermore, as Berman and Baker point out, the threat or requirement that the SS-20s were expected to meet was a longstanding one. Finally, it was not necessary to rally great support among the design bureaus or military industries because the Strategic Rocket Forces already had the candidate weapon—the two-stage version of the SS-16, which became the SS-20.

The case of the SS-20 also serves to illustrate Kurth's remaining category, that of "quantitative change." In the United States, Kurth argues, such change depends mainly on bureaucratic-corporate alliances.[40] During an era of negotiated arms control agreements, this explanation does not adequately account for Soviet developments, however. One American participant in the SALT negotiations argues, for example, that at certain times the levels of Soviet missile deployments seemed quite sensitive to the political requirements of the arms control negotiators and were used as "signals" of Soviet intentions.[41]

Do Soviet arms control proposals regarding the SS-20 reflect a similar process at work? Holloway suggests that the various proposals put forward by Brezhnev between October 1979 and March 1982 to limit Soviet regional nuclear forces in return for cancellation of the NATO decision to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles were designed to maintain a large Soviet nuclear force targeted against Europe; they probably did not entail cutting back the amount of SS-20s deployed (pp. 76-78). At this stage one could argue, as Berman and Baker do, that military requirements demanded a large force regardless of NATO's decisions on further deployments, and that such deployments would call forth an even larger Soviet force as a response. Or one could imagine, as Cockburn does, that a bureaucratic-corporate alliance of the type described by Kurth was formed between the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Na-

[39] Kurth (fn. 1), 398.

[40] *Ibid.*, 400-401.

[41] Raymond L. Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet Military," *Problems of Communism* 24 (January-February 1975), esp. 30-32. For a further discussion of the influence of arms control negotiations on military posture, see Jane M. O. Sharp, "Is European Security Negotiable?" in Derek Leebaert, ed., *European Security Prospects for the 1980s* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979).

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diradize bureau in order to press the political leadership not to limit the numbers of SS-20s deployed. At a later stage, however, if the Soviet leadership were more interested in obtaining an arms control agreement with the United States than in satisfying the desires of its military services and design bureaus, the "bureaucratic-corporate alliance" explanation would no longer serve. Before breaking off negotiations in response to deployment of new U.S. missiles in Europe, the Soviets indicated a willingness to negotiate a substantial reduction in the number of SS-20s deployed (in return for cancellation of the NATO deployment), although presumably neither the military "requirement" nor the interest of the Nadiradize bureau in having its missile produced and deployed in great quantities had decreased.[42] Thus, when considering quantitative change, one must keep in mind the stage at which the quantitative decisions are being made, and whether the weapons under consideration are the subject of arms control negotiations.

In the above analysis, I have attempted to apply James Kurth's four "modes of change" to Soviet weapons procurement in the context of the development of Soviet regional forces. Some tentative conclusions emerge: First, the "modes of causation" for Soviet developments differ considerably from those Kurth identified in U.S. weapons procurement, with a greater emphasis on political intervention and strategic threats and opportunities as the stimuli for Soviet decisions, and a lesser role for bureaucratic factors. Second, it is important to distinguish stages within each type of change; the sequence and characteristics of the stages may differ in the U.S. and Soviet cases.

An analysis drawing on Kurth and informed by consideration of relative strengths of state and society would suggest that, for innovative change to occur in the United States, technocratic impulses must lead to bureaucratic momentum, which must be followed by the generation of strategic fears. In the Soviet case, strategic fears or technological opportunities lead to political intervention, which generates bureaucratic momentum and innovation. This interpretation seems consistent with the role that political leaders are supposed to play in the formation of Soviet military doctrine as formally defined. Although these conclusions are only tentative generalizations and can hardly serve to explain all U.S. and Soviet weapons procurement decisions, they do seem to hold some value for comparative purposes. Further research is required to test and refine these general observations.

[42] For details of Soviet and U.S. proposals, see Chalmers Hardenbergh, ed., *The Arms Control Reporter* (Brookline, Mass.: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, monthly).

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For conducting such research, the analysis presented here suggests the importance of applying a particular framework (such as that developed by Kurth) to the study of weapons procurement decisions in order to begin to specify conditions under which certain factors are more likely than others to influence the decision-making process. Identification of these factors, and the conditions under which they are most relevant, will serve as a guide to the proper level of analysis on which to focus, and will help to mitigate the problem of overdetermination.

V. Conclusion

The three books under review provide important insights into the factors that influence Soviet decisions concerning weapons procurement. They demonstrate that much can be learned of specific cases of weapons development, production, and deployment by applying analyses based on military requirements, bureaucratic politics, organizational structures and processes, and historical factors. Two tasks of future research in this area might be the following: first, it would be useful to propose a framework for analyzing weapons decisions that will suggest generalized conditions under which particular factors come into play. A second step would be to undertake parallel studies of particular Soviet weapons decisions in order to make generalizations about sequences in decision making and the relative weights of different types of determinants at different stages of the process. This kind of research can make an important contribution to understanding the main influences on Soviet military policy—influences that must be understood better if the dangers posed by the current arms race are to be addressed.

Errata

Supportive Participation with Economic Growth, by Ikuo Kabashima (April 1984)

Page 311—the last full paragraph should read:

> The indices of different modes of political participation are the same as those constructed by Verba, Nie, and Kim.[8] The income figure is based on the respondent's family income before taxes. Relatively speaking, the structure of participation in Japan is quite income-neutral. Income elasticity in voting, campaigning, and communal activities is 0.06, 0.13, and 0.36 respectively. Income elasticity in voting is lower in Japan than in five of the other countries; it is lower still for Austria and India. Not only is the coefficient small; it is also not statistically significant at an 0.05 level. Japan's income elasticity in campaign activity is the lowest of the seven countries; in communal activity, it is comparable to India, lower than the United States, the Netherlands, and Nigeria, and higher than Yugoslavia and Austria.

Page 314—the first letter on line 12 should be "1."

Page 331—in each of the diagrams, one of the arrows should be reversed: in the upper figure, it should point from "Less Political Stability" to "Less Political Participation"; in the lower, from "Less Political Stability" to "More Political Participation."

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

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